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ABSTRACT 
A single industry town and an important munitions centre, Barrow-in-Furness 
experienced the full force of industrial mobilisation, government intervention, and mass 
unemployment in the years between 1914 and 1926. In analysing the responses to these 
events, the thesis will give insights into their impact on a town dependent on industries 
stimulated by war and crippled in the post-war economic climate. 
The study comprises of two interrelated components. The first section establishes the 
socio-economic context at the outbreak of the war and examines the influence of war 
and depression on the occupational and social structure of the town, together with health 
trends and housing conditions. In doing so, the thesis will analyse the dual effects of 
higher wartime earnings and long term mass unemployment on popular health, and the 
role of housing reform in maintaining social stability. 
Having established the context in which ideology and social attitudes developed, the 
second section will interpret the impact of war and depression in terms of the pressures 
placed on industry, the local authority and the wider population. This section will 
address three key themes, beginning with an examination of the divisive impact of left-
wing ideology on the Labour Party, political allegiances and the composition of local 
authority bodies. Moving on, the study will assess the implications of these 
developments for local authority policy and the material well-being of the unemployed, 
giving particular attention to the distinctive response of Barrow's Board of Guardians 
and the application of the Poor Law. Thirdly the thesis examines the strategies adopted 
by the wider community to meet the demands of the depression, beginning with key 
local organisations, but focussing closely on methods of working class self-sufficiency. 
The thesis will conclude by addressing three important questions which emerge from 
this study. Firstly, drwing the various themes together, the thesis will analyse the 
impact of war and depression on social perceptions and levels of social antagonism. In 
demonstrating that to focus on workplace militancy and 'class conflict' is to miss the 
thrust of local developments, the thesis will argue that the tensions, hardships and 
uncertainties of the period stimulated social cohesion rather than class conflict. 
Secondly, the thesis will examine the nature of the communal identity that emerged 
during these years, and finally, will determine whether Barrow, as a result of the town's 
distinctive response to the post-war crisis, can be included among the 'Little Moscows' 
of the period. 
By examining these salient themes, the thesis provides fresh insights into the nature of 
social relationships and levels of class antagonism throughout the period, and makes a 
valuable contribution to the understanding of the impact of war and depression, and the 
social dynamics of distress. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The social impact of the First World War has been much debated and widely 
interpreted, and this study will examine the impact of the war and its aftermath on 
Barrow-in-Furness, a geographically compact and fertile area for study, dependent on 
traditional heavy industry and vulnerable to fluctuations in the trade cycle. The thesis 
argues that to focus on workplace militancy and 'class conflict' is to miss the thrust of 
local antagonisms, and that despite political upheaval, economic crisis and 
exceptionally high unemployment, Barrow society closed ranks and acted in unison 
against both the economic problems posed by war and depression, and the interventions 
of higher, centralised authority. Analysing the changing social and economic context of 
the period, the thesis will interpret the impact of war and depression in terms of the 
pressures placed on industry, the local authority and the wider population, giving 
particular attention to methods of working class self-sufficiency and the application of 
the Poor Law. This examination of the conditions of daily life will provide the context 
in which ideology and social attitudes evolved, and enable the analysis of their 
implications for political alignments, the composition of the local authorities and 
responses to the depression. Finally, these developments will be discussed in relation to 
the three key questions emerging from this study: the impact of war and depression on 
social relationships, the nature of the communal identity that emerged during these 
years, and whether Barrow, as a result of the town's distinctive response to the post-war 
crisis, can be included among the 'Little Moscows' of the period. 
A single industry town and an important munitions centre, Barrow experienced the full 
force of industrial mobilisation, government intervention, and mass unemployment in 
the years between 1914 and 1926, and an analysis of the responses to these processes 
will give insights into their impact on a town dependent on industries stimulated by war 
and crippled in the post-war economic climate. Barrow, rated eighty third among the 
one hundred and thirteen 'large' towns of the 'country' during the inter-war period', 
owed its origins to the exploitation of the Fumess peninsula's high quality haematite 
iron ore deposits in the second half of the nineteenth century. However, the transition of 
the local economy from the export of primary raw materials to large-scale steel 
manufacture transformed Barrow from a small town of 3,135 persons in 1849 to a large 
industrial town with a population of 47,000 by 1881, increasing to 63,770 by 1922. The 
town gained the Parliamentary franchise in 1885 and County Borough status in 1889, 
but whilst the predominantly working class population continued to expand, a broad 
ethnic mix from all over the United Kingdom, its level was unstable and fluctuating, 
and the rising figures concealed a steady rate of net out-migration 2. Furthermore, despite 
the construction of new docks in anticipation of continued growth, there was no 
immediate influx of shipping and few new industries were attracted to the town due to 
the inability to compete with Liverpool, the region's lack of natural resources and its 
geographic isolation. By the late nineteenth century the outlook seemed bleak, and 
although the expansion of the local shipbuilding and armaments industry halted this 
decline and superseded the iron and steel industry as the main employer, the town 
remained dependent on unstable industries. With regard to local government, although 
the town was initially ruled by an industrial elite with a greater interest in new industrial 
projects than welfare, representatives of middle class professional, trading and business 
interests had gradually filtered onto the town council 3 . Nevertheless, at the outbreak of 
the First World War, the prevailing attitudes remained those of the nineteenth century 4 , 
although the labour movement, strong and well-organised, was steadily increasing its 
municipal representation. 
As a result of the town's high level of working class organisation, its wartime role and 
subsequent high unemployment, Barrow provides a valuable location in which to 
examine a number of debatable issues, particularly the effects of higher wartime 
earnings on working class health, and the role of housing reform in maintaining social 
stability. Additionally, conditions in Barrow are valuable for the analysis of social 
tensions arising from deprivation of the right to work, whilst the limited impact of the 
General Strike in the town is a particularly unexpected and interesting aspect of local 
developments during the inter-war years. However, whilst many studies of the period 
tend to examine the impact of the First World War and the depression as separate 
entities, this study extends beyond a context of wartime industrial mobilisation into the 
post-war transition period in order to gain more measured insights into the effect of the 
changes and tensions of the period on longer term economic, demographic and social 
trends. Although helping to establish how closely Barrow conforms to national trends 
and existing historiographical interpretations, such national level debates take little 
account of local circumstances, and a deeper analysis through regional case-studies is 
required to put existing interpretations to the test and provide a deeper and more 
convincing understanding of the war's impact. To facilitate this, a comparative analysis 
with similar localities, based on secondary sources, will be applied to specific issues to 
emphasise the distinctive aspects of Barrow's development. 
Middlesbrough is a particularly valuable comparator due to its many similarities with 
Barrow, which include its mid to late nineteenth century origins and industrial base, the 
quality and type of housing, high inter-war unemployment and the similar municipal 
strength of the Labour Party. Nelson too, although a less obvious choice for comparison 
due to its cotton-based economy, will nevertheless provide a valuable extra dimension 
for the analysis of political change with its well organised labour movement, militant 
trade union tradition and a predominantly working class population. Other important 
comparators are three 'Little Moscows' of the period, Mardy, Lumphinnians and the 
Vale of Leven, all of which were working class communities linked directly to one 
staple industry, geographically isolated, and demonstrating a high degree of 
occupational unity and social cohesion. Despite the fundamental similarities of these 
localities, the responses to unemployment were very different, and comparison will 
place Barrow's political and social developments into a clearer perspective. 
The thesis is in two sections. The first, consisting of three chapters, will examine the 
socio-economic changes of the period and provide the context for the analysis of the 
responses to these changes across the community and their effects on the social 
dynamics of the period in the second half of this study. Chapter One establishes the 
social and economic context at the outbreak of the war and assesses the impact of war 
and depression on the demographic and occupational structure, together with an 
examination of income levels, to provide a workable definition of the town's socio-
economic structure and a foundation for the later discussion of changing social attitudes. 
This will be followed by an examination of housing conditions throughout the period, 
the changing municipal role and the impact of post-war legislation. In examining the 
impact of the first attempts at state intervention in housing in Barrow, the second 
chapter will discuss the argument that housing reform acted as a counter-balance against 
social unrest, whilst taldng account of local pressures which might either inhibit reform 
or re-shape attitudes. This, together with the previous analysis of income levels will 
provide the context for the examination of popular health issues in Chapter Three. In 
addition to a comparison of the health of Barrow with national trends from the 
immediate pre-war period to the late 1920s, the third chapter challenges established 
opinion on Barrow's high standards of working class health in the pre-war period, 
derived from Elizabeth Roberts' study of living standards in the town 5 . This is essential 
in order to illustrate the significance of the changing pattern of Barrow's health in the 
years following the First World War, and combines with a comparison of health trends 
in Middlesbrough to provide a comparative perspective. Particularly valuable for this 
comparison is Katherine Nicholas' study of the effects of unemployment 6 on working 
class diets, and her analysis of their calorific content provides keen insights into the 
effects of unemployment on health. These will be analysed in relation to existing 
historiographical debates relating to the conflicting effects of wartime gains and long-
term unemployment on popular health. Together with the preceding two chapters, this 
completes the reconstruction of the living conditions of the period and provides the 
context within which political forces, policy, and social attitudes developed. 
The fourth chapter serves as a link between the two main sections and examines the 
impact of left-wing ideology on the political fortunes of the Labour Party and municipal 
politics. In addition to comparing developments in Barrow with wider County Borough 
electoral trends, they will also be briefly compared to those in the other localities 
described above in order to illustrate the distinctive nature of Barrow's political 
developments. The comparison with Middlesbrough is particularly important at this 
point, and will combine with the comparison of health trends, to better inform the 
analysis of the administrative responses to unemployment in the following chapter. 
Building on material conditions established in the first section, Chapter Five analyses 
the impact of political change on the composition of local authority bodies, and the 
implications for social policy and the material well-being of the large proportion of the 
town's population affected either directly or indirectly by mass unemployment. 
Particular attention will be paid to the distinctive response of the Board of Guardians, 
caught between the demands of the Ministry of Health and those of the unemployed. In 
a similar vein, Chapter Six examines the strategies adopted by key local organisations to 
meet the demands of the depression: Vickers, a major shipbuilding and engineering 
company and the town's main employer, the Co-operative Society, and Barrow's two 
largest trade union branches, the Amalgamated Engineering Union and the 
Boilermakers. The responses of these organisations, central to the life of the 
community, together with an examination of changing working class self-sufficiency 
strategies in the final chapter, provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the 
depression on the wider community. Finally, this study resumes the analysis of Barrow 
society, combining the income-based 'class' structure established in Chapter One with 
an analysis of influence of the war and long-term mass unemployment on changing 
social relationships and perceptions, and their influence on levels of social antagonism. 
There are three significant omissions from this study however. Firstly, whilst drawing 
on Todd's comprehensive analysis of wartime industrial relations 7 , those of the inter-
war period are not examined in any detail, the thesis focusing instead on the social and 
economic impact of two major industrial disputes of the period, the Engineering Strike 
of 1922 and the General Strike of 1926. Also significant for their absence are issues 
relating to religion and ethnicity, neither of which featured strongly in the sources of the 
period. The evidence suggests that they played a minimal role in local political and 
economic developments at this time. 
An examination of the local press has shown key local issues of the period to include 
health, housing, poor relief and labour politics, and the abundant primary source 
material and published statistics are used in conjunction with other local studies to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of these developments. The Barrow Records Office 
holds diverse and extensive archive material on these issues, important local 
organisations and all aspects of local authority business, together with its extensive 
correspondence between the Ministry of Health and the Board of Guardians. In addition 
to the wealth of information contained in the published Corporation Accounts Books of 
the period, the statistics of the Chief Medical Officer provide comprehensive details of 
health and mortality levels. These, together with those of his Middlesbrough 
counterpart, enable the comparison of health trends in these localities, and are given an 
extra comparative dimension by Katherine Nicholas' study of the effects of 
unemployment in Middlesbrough. 
Other important statistics are derived from a variety of sources, including trade union 
records held at the Modem Records Centre, Warwick, and unemployment statistics 
published in the Ministry of Labour Gazette. Although the statistical data is generally 
good, some problems do arise. For example, the Ministry of Labour statistics do not 
begin until 1923, at a point when Barrow's unemployment levels had already peaked, 
necessitating the compilation of the missing data from the Corporation's 
correspondence files. Other difficulties include the lack of detailed police records, and 
the inaccessibility of local Co-operative Society records from 1924, held in an archive 
out-store and unavailable at the time this research was undertaken. Nevertheless, 
published Society statistics are available at the Co-operative Archive, Manchester, and 
enable a quantitative analysis of the depression's impact. A final difficulty is the 
conflicting accounts of the rate of out-migration from the area in the 1920s: whilst 
Grifflths asserts that Wigan had the highest rate of population loss of all Lancashire 
Boroughs in that decade, Bainbridge and the 1931 Census indicate that in fact, Barrow 
suffered the greatest loss. 
In addition to Elizabeth Roberts' study of working class living standards, the previously 
unpublished material contained in the transcripts of her interviews with local residents 
is particularly significant, and provides unique insights into social perceptions and self-
sufficiency strategies. Other important oral evidence is provided by the transcripts of 
J.D. Scott's interviews held in the 1950s with senior Vickers employees, and these will 
add a local dimension to his study of the responses of the Vickers Group to the 
depression 8 . 
Also of considerable importance is Todd's study of the rise of Barrow's labour 
movement to 1920, which provides a sound foundation for the analysis of its continued 
development into the post-war period. This, together with studies of other localities, 
particularly Hill's study of Nelson, a community in which the rise of Labour came to 
appear almost inevitable, and Turner's dissertation on poor relief and unemployment in 
Middlesbrough, will enable a comparative analysis of Barrow's political changes and 
the administrative response to unemployment. The latter is of central importance to the 
understanding of the significance of the impact of the depression in Barrow, and the 
analysis of political change, in conjunction with the Ministry of Health records held at 
the National Archives, Kew, will provide significant insights into the local 
administration of poor relief. 
With regard to the wider historiography of the period, the social impact of the Great 
War has received considerable attention from historians and is subject to much debate, 
the diversity of British society making generalisations difficult to sustain. Whilst some 
assert the Great War changed everything it touched' ° , its greatest impact being on the 
working classes and their relationship to the rest of society, others maintain the war 
'bolstered rather than undermined pre-war social forms". Marwick, a leading 
proponent of war as a stimulus for social change, asserts that war serves to activate 
certain processes and has the potential to transform some aspects of society, although 
not necessarily for the long-term and certainly not always in beneficial ways 12 . 
According to this view, the disruptive and destructive impact of war can both stimulate 
rebuilding and generate new patterns of behaviour and attitudes, whilst testing a 
nation's institutions, which must adapt to meet the strains imposed upon them. 
Additionally Marwick argues that the greater the proportion of the population 
participating in the war effort, the greater the impetus for social reform and gains for 
hitherto under-privileged groups. 
Reid supports this view, arguing that important legislative and political change resulted 
from the need for stable industrial relations, which strengthened the hand of organised 
labour and generated higher incomes, better living standards and improved health. 
Additionally, working class institutions were reinforced by the increased strength and 
bargaining power of the trade unions and also greater government intervention and 
consultation with the representative bodies of the working class. However, he maintains 
that the First World War generated less change than previously thought, much of its 
impact being only temporary. He argues that an assessment of the advances made 
through participation must take account of 'the relationship between what was offered 
by wartime governments and what was actually given by way of social reform in the 
changed context of the post-war period' 13, 
 and concludes that if emphasis is placed on 
working-class bargaining power, it becomes clear how wartime advance could be 
reversed in a changed economic climate. 
In a different vein, Hinton analyses the impact of the First World War in terms of class 
struggle, the government and employers combining to strengthen their hand against the 
working-class and the labour movement 14 . According to this interpretation, social 
reform (which began before the war) was a means of increased state control, wartime 
legislation being an extension of repressive state activity and part of a full-scale 
offensive on working-class culture and autonomy, which culminated in the General 
Strike of 1926. However, Reid has described the 'social democratic view' of Marwick 
and the 'revolutionary model' of Hinton as being on opposite sides of the same 
historical coin, despite offering different assessments of the impact on power relations. 
He argues that both views are based on a common assumption of increased working-
class homogeneity and an over-estimation of both the coherence and effectiveness of the 
response of the dominant political groups and the degree of co-operation between 
employers and organised labour' 5 . Offering a more cautious analysis of the war's 
economic and social impact, Reid concludes there was 'no simple overall impact of the 
First World War on the social and economic position of British workers for the forces in 
operation did not all act in the same direction' 16 
These diverse and apparently contradictory interpretations, draw on the inter-
relationships of key issues, particularly social class and attitudes, income levels, living 
conditions, social reform and industrial relations which inevitably create considerable 
regional variation. The complexity of these issues demonstrates the importance of 
analysing the inter-play of all these factors to provide an understanding of changing 
values, attitudes, and relationships within a given community. Whilst the term 
'community' is widely used throughout this study, its definition can be problematic and 
involve complex theoretical debate' 7 . However, as Calhoun argues, organisation is the 
crucial factor which turns a mere group of people into a community' 8 , and this study 
will focus on 'concrete social relationships, more abstract forms of relations, and the 
social structure which orders them" 9 within the Barrow-in-Furness County Borough 
boundary. 
The concept of class is another problematic and much debated issue. For example, the 
Marxist model describing society as polarised into two conflicting classes determined 
by their relationship to the means of production is increasingly regarded as too 
simplistic. In addition to identifying other forms of polarisation such as between tenants 
and landlords, or the wealthy and the poor20 , Cannacline argues that Edwardian society 
continued to be perceived as divided into three broad economic groups and that these 
and traditional hierarchies survived and co-existed with the bi-polar. As a result, society 
remained organised on the basis of assumed inequality and subordination 21 . Indeed, 
contemporary accounts such as those of Robert Roberts 22 reflect an awareness of 
complex and finely graded hierarchies, but with little reference to a perpetual class 
struggle between capital and labour. 
Whilst the composition of society changed over time, Joyce maintains that this process 
did not over-ride existing attitudes and perceptions 23 . Additionally, challenging the 
traditional economic interpretation of social hierarchies, he emphasises the importance 
of alternative factors which make a significant contribution to popular perceptions and 
the structuring of the social order, arguing that in addition to economic status, identities 
are shaped by many factors, including roles within the family and community, leisure 
activities and the growth of nation-wide mass institutions 24 . This more complex 
stratification is again illustrated in contemporary biographical sources, demonstrating an 
acute awareness of identity and status derived from a multiplicity of factors beyond the 
workplace, in addition to the distinct and clearly visible social divisions derived from 
income levels25 . 
Interpretations of the extent and nature of change to both the class structure and social 
perceptions are diverse. McKibbin for example, asserts that middle class perceptions of 
the working classes were shaped by powerful and often hostile stereotypes 26 , a view 
supported by Joyce and Mayne, who describe art, literature and the press as powerful 
formative influences 27 . However, whilst Winter argues that middle-class assumptions 
about the poor, particularly that their condition was the product of weakness of 
character, was undermined by the visible effects of higher wartime earnings McKibbin 
maintains that the severity of the middle class wartime experience simultaneously 
increased their hostility towards the more affluent working classes 28 . This, together with 
Cannadine's assertion that the war undermined both the hierarchic view of society and 
working class deference 29  suggests the war was likely to have stimulated considerable 
social antagonism. 
With regard to longer term social change, Kirk argues that whilst enduring divisions 
were created by wage differentials, there was a parallel tendency towards greater 
homogenisation as a result of the commercialisation of life and leisure patterns, strong 
attachments to family and neighbourhood networks, together with technological change 
within the workplace30 . However, whilst McKibbin argues that technical developments 
reduced the proportion of skilled workers to the semi-skilled 31 , Waites contends that 
change resulted in the emergence of new skills rather than a reduction in the number of 
skilled workers 32 . 
A substantial body of opinion argues against greater working class homogenisation. 
Reid for example, claims the narrowing of pay differentials between skilled and 
unskilled, and the tendency towards social homogenisation have been exaggerated 33 , a 
view supported by Cronin, who argues that distinctions were blurred 34 rather than 
reduced. Griffiths on the other hand goes further, and argues that internal working class 
hierarchies were becoming increasingly important and the strength of influences outside 
the workplace was undiminished 35 . 
As regards the middle classes, these were broad and fluid, and expanded rapidly in the 
first decade of the twentieth century. Consequently analyses of their composition vary, 
and whilst McKibbin describes the expansion of the professional and management 
classes as being shaped by technological development and largely confined to 
industry36 , Perkin identifies a simultaneous, broader expansion of specialist career 
hierarchies and meritocracies 37 . 
The vast and varied lower middle classes also expanded rapidly with the growth of the 
clerical and distributive trades, and aspired to middle-class status despite low incomes. 
Additionally, whilst Cannadine describes the middle classes as becoming generally 
more defensive 38 , Kirk argues that white collar workers were increasingly opposed to 
the labour movement 39. According to McKibbin the lower middle classes, despite 
viewing the working classes with great hostility, stood between the working classes and 
the middle class proper, and, in administering public policy, were caught in the front 
line of the class war40. Consequently, he describes the 1920s as witnessing Britain's 
most severe period of class conflic0 t . 
Long term mass unemployment also had a significant influence on popular perceptions. 
McKibbin describes the high public profile of the unemployed as fuelling the hostile 
middle class stereotype of the working classes as apathetic scroungers 42, but this was 
not universal. For example, Vincent describes the middle classes in some areas as 
becoming more sympathetic, the support from the wider community encouraging the 
destitute to see themselves as members of a benevolent community rather than retreat 
into despondency and isolation 43. Additionally, Croucher argues that shared hardships 
and the levelling effect of unemployment, together with the absence of a permanent 
unemployed /worker divide encouraged the development of a common identity among 
the working classes, a view also 44  reflected in contemporary accounts 45 . 
Given the diversity of the responses to unemployment, Macintyre's study of three 
'Little Moscows' of the period is particularly valuable in order to place the analysis of 
Barrow in perspective. Although there was never a typical 'Little Moscow', Macintyre 
asserts that such communities can be identified by their rejection of the stigma attached 
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to poor relief and their solidarity in support of their workless, with the result that morale 
remained remarkably high. A further important feature was the democratic thread that 
ran through these comnunities and the adoption of open and collective decision 
making, together with the willingness to override established institutional authority 
when the law was incompatible with basic human rights. However, one of the two key 
defining characteristics of 'Little Moscows' was not just the primacy given to human 
rights and the willingness to challenge authority, but that these ideals infused the lower 
echelons of that authority itself. Indeed, this attitude, combined with an unusually overt 
political standpoint and the attempt to enact a socialist lifestyle through fellowship, co-
operation and mutual support is described as the second key characteristic of such 
communities. 
Similarly, questions of political identity and allegiance, and the rise of the Left are also 
subject to diverse interpretations. Whilst some historians describe the rise of the Labour 
Party as the inevitable consequence of social and economic changes which began in the 
final quarter of the nineteenth century 47 , others hold the war to be a significant 
influential factor. For example, Kirk describes the labour movement and its institutions 
as consolidated by the war48 , whilst others attribute the rise of the Labour Party to 
greater government liaison with the trade unions and their closer relationship with the 
Labour Party49 . Nevertheless, despite these developments, McKibbin argues that the 
war failed to overturn established political traditions 50 , and with Marwick 51 , emphasises 
the continuity of Party leadership and policy into the post-war period. Davies and 
Morley describe the Labour Party as failing to build on wartime changes, and despite 
the widening of the franchise in 1918, Labour's municipal fortunes declined steadily 
after the initial successes of 1919. However, they identify a discernible trend of Labour 
gains from 1926 in County Boroughs with high unemployment, together with the 
increasingly confrontational and polarised nature of municipal politics, which they 
argue was expressed in the language of class and evident in the anti-socialist alliances of 
the period52. In contrast, Macintyre argues the working classes are better described as 
apolitical than polarised, and maintains that left-wing politics was not necessarily 
synonymous with class antagonism. Presenting an alternative to class identity, he argues 
that a shared financial interest and a common economic threat could stimulate the 
development of a cohesive communal identity 53  and the tendency of such communities 
to unite behind those best able to defend them. 
Returning to the relationship between participation and social reform, housing, seen as 
an accurate indicator of levels of social deprivation, came to symbolise the entire 
issue54 . Marwick contends that in addition to intensifying existing problems of 
overcrowding and deteriorating conditions, the war changed the nature of the housing 
problem. The Clydeside rent strikes of 1915 signalled the fusion of industrial and 
housing issues, but the introduction of the Rent Restrictions Act in 1915 did little to 
reduce frictions. By 1917, the Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest had 
identified the housing shortage, high rents and lack of repairs as a major source of 
industrial and social unrest. Consequently, the Ministry of Munitions housing 
programme introduced to defuse the crisis, is described by Pepper and Swenarton as a 
matter of compelling necessity rather than a welfare measure 55 . 
Abrams maintains that powerful forces worked against reform 56. Using post-war 
housingpolicy to challenge the participation concept, he argues that the unprecedented 
levels of popular participation should have stimulated radical change, particularly as 
government intervention in munitions workers' housing had generated an impetus for 
reform and created the machinery with which to implement it. One interpretation is 
provided by Swenarton, who asserts that a dynamic housing policy was judged to be the 
means to ensure a successful transition from war to peace, with housing becoming an 
instrument of public policy for the first time. Indeed, he describes the 'homes fit for 
heroes' campaign as a major political and ideological weapon of the state in the face of 
the threat posed by organised labour. However, with the onset of the depression in the 
autumn of 1920 which disarmed the labour movement, the balance of political forces 
was altered, and as a consequence, he argues that the 'insurance against revolution' was 
no longer needed, and the policy was abandoned as an unjustifiable expense. 
Rather than a response to an immediate political crisis, Daunton describes the post-war 
housing programme as a 'temporary ad hoc response to post-war price distortion', an 
emergency measure intended to deal with wartime shortages until the private sector 
could recover58 . Indeed, Bowley identifies a significant weakness of the 1919 Housing 
Act as providing insufficient financial restraints on local authorities, and was therefore 
unsustainable in the deteriorating post-war economic climate 59 , whilst Beattie attributes 
its collapse to a clash of interests between local and central government 60 . With regards 
the second Housing Act of 1923, Bowley contends that, in addition to representing a 
return to financial orthodoxy, it was another short term expedient intended allow the 
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private sector time to recover rather than enable local authorities to become permanent 
providers of working class housing 6t . 
As regards other facets of community welfare, Winter has demonstrated that an 
important effect of the First World War was the elimination of the worst aspects of 
urban poverty, as higher income levels and better diets resulted in improvements to 
civilian health, particularly at the lower end of the social scale 62 . Paradoxically 
however, despite a nation-wide improvement in health and life expectancy, Winter 
argues that deteriorating housing conditions created a parallel increase in respiratory 
disease63 . Howevef, Bryder challenges many of the assumptions upon which Winter 
bases his analysis". In addition to a general rise in living standards, she stresses the 
importance of improvements in the quality and purity of food in raising standards of 
nutrition, and argues that Winter's assertion that nutrition had little influence on the 
incidence of TB should be regarded with suspicion. 
Although valuable, studies such as Winter's do not extend into the post-war period 
when the erosion of war-time gains by mass unemployment had profound implications 
for living standards and popular health. Macintyre maintains that relief scales were 
insufficient to meet basic nutritional requirements, particularly during periods of 
prolonged unemployment, and 'while few starved to death, the effects of malnutrition 
were acute' 65 , a conclusion supported by Nicholas' study of the diets of the 
unemployed. Consequently, Webster treats official figures which indicate a marked 
improvement in health standards throughout the depression with caution, and attributes 
favourable statistics to government attempts to minimise the effects of long-term 
unemployment on health. 
Thus issues of poor relief are central to both the social history of the period and the 
material well-being of the unemployed. Although pauperism declined as a result of the 
war, by its end, the poor relief system with its overlapping of function and conflicting 
principles of administration, was in need of rationalisation. Although prospects for 
remodelling were favourable in the immediate post-war period 67 , Vincent describes the 
ensuing legislation as a paradox, 'preceded by the most coherent planning exercise ever 
attempted', but 'dominated by improvisation and curtailed by expediency' 68 . The 
inadequacies of the system are widely agreed among historians. In addition to a 
succession of weak governments which failed to pursue a consistent or firm line 69 , the 
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experiences of the 1920s demonstrated the government had no appreciation of the needs 
of local communities70 . Additionally, despite frequent legislative changes, 
unemployment insurance schemes remained inadequate and never more than a 
supplement to the Poor Law 71 , whilst Vincent describes the Labour Party as pre-
occupied with own electoral advance 'rather than the momentum of the attack on 
poverty' 72 . 	 - 
However, unemployment and poor relief issues were of great significance for the 
working classes, and Uddington describes the crucial political battles of the period as 
being fought at a local level 73 . Rose maintains that the Labour Party, boosted in many 
industrial towns by the extension of the franchise in 1918, pledged to support the 
unemployed at the expense of the ratepayer' 4 , although Thane argues that local 
conditions could be more influential than political persuasion in areas of high 
unemployment75 . Nevertheless, they concur that relatively generous relief scales were 
not confined to Labour controlled boroughs 76 . 
The impact of unemployment on attitudes was considerable. Thane maintains that the 
concept of the deserving and undeserving poor was extended to the unemployed, with 
the new 'deserving' poor being provided for by unemployment insurance. Indeed, 
Macintyre demonstrates that changes to the composition of a Board of Guardians could 
radically alter attitudes towards the unemployed, with a new hierarchy of the insured 
unemployed receiving better treatment and more respect than those on the parish 77 . 
Croucher describes the inadequacies of the poor relief system, together with the rituals 
associated with the Labour Exchange, as pushing people together, fostering solidarity 
and favouring the organisation of the unemployed 78 . Macintyre supports this view, and 
maintains that in lodalities where the unemployed fought to defend living standards, 
morale remained particularly high. Indeed, he describes a radical change of thinking 
during the inter-war period, the stigma attached to poor relief being superseded by a 
growing willingness to claim relief and the conviction that those thrown out of work 
still had a right to a basic standard of living 79 . 
Vincent identifies further consequences of the inadequacies of poor relief and state 
benefits. As a result of their failure to provide a sufficient level of maintenance, 
traditional self-sufficiency strategies remained central to working class life 80 and family 
and neighbourhood networks, pawnbrokers and credit remained important as ways of 
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coping with income shortfalls. He argues that the inadequacies of state benefits enabled 
private charity, stimulated in many areas by the scale of distress, to better focus its 
resources, enabling the more efficient distribution of aid in kind 81 . Indeed, he describes 
middle class charity as invading working class self-help networks, and in doing so, 
helping to discourage the unemployed from retreating into their neighbourhoods and 
isolation82 . 
Also of considerable local significance, the local Co-operative Society, an important 
working class institution, was an integral part of the local community. Strongest in areas 
of heavy industry 83 , Co-operative Societies, together with the trade unions were 
movements established for the protection and extension of working class interests, but 
their goodwill and co-operation were strained by the economic impact of the 
depression 84 . For example, Gurney describes the movement's difficulty in reconciling 
the interests of both worker and consumer 85 , and in the harsh economic climate of the 
1920s, the need to cut staff and wages created considerable conflict with the shop 
workers' union. The industrial disputes of the early 1920s also created tensions between 
the two movements, but interpretations vary. Whilst Southern maintains that despite 
increased friction, economic hardship and unfavourable government policies brought 
them closer together 86 , Gurney takes a different view. Arguing that, in addition to 
increased tensions, the societies' relationship with the trade unions degenerated as a 
result of these disputes, he maintains that by the end of the decade the movement was 
increasing]y sidelined by the Labour Party and trade unions 87 . 
Perhaps the most significant response to unemployment was the formation of the 
National Unemployed Workers Movement. Led by former shop stewards who saw the 
need to organise the unemployed in the militant defence of working class living 
standards 88 , the movement fought the stigma attached to poor relief and encouraged the 
unemployed to claim what was their due 89 . In addition to challenging Boards of 
Guardians and opposing evictions 90, the NUWM sought solidarity with the workers to 
prevent employers using the unemployed to undermine trade union standards 91 , 
although Vincent argues that the NUWM were often at odds with organised labour 92 . 
Although industrial relations as a theme lies beyond the scope of this thesis, it is 
necessary to outline the broad trends with specific relevance to this case-study, but 
whilst there is a general consensus that industrial and community militancy were 
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intensified during the war and in its immediate aftermath, again, interpretations 
inevitably vary. Reid maintains that, with industrial relations as in social reform, 
'participation' does not automatically generate social change. He argues that if change 
is a product of bargaining, then various outcomes are possible, and the improved 
working-class bargaining position must be balanced against the changing post-war 
context which weakened organised labour and helped ensure that any gains were only 
temporary93 . Hinton sees industrial relations in terms of class struggle, with industrial 
compulsion a clear indicator of the subordination of the workers' interests and an 
attempt to deflect the balance of power in the workshops away from the shop-floor and 
back to management. Thus the Munitions Act (1915), despite its presentation as a 
reciprocal agreement between employers and unions, was in reality a direct attack on 
organised labour which succeeded in reducing its protection and strength 94 . Wrigley 
however, describes government intervention in the deadlock between employers and 
unions over the suspension of craft union core practices as a necessity, a means of 
finding a compromise and providing the unions with some safeguards in the face of 
extreme employer demands. However, he does concur with Hinton that government 
proposals involved a greater sacrifice from labour, and describes the Munitions Act as 
'a one-sided piece of legislation... [that] was to prove explosive' 95 , fuelling the growing 
distrust of large sections of the working-class for both the government and trade union 
officialdom. 
Within the shipbuilding and engineering industries that dominated Banow, industrial 
relations had been largely delegated to employers' organisations 96 . Mclvor describes 
these organisations as strengthening the employers' market position and negotiating 
power, and whilst collective bargaining benefited the trade unions, it necessitated their 
recognition of the employers' right to manage 97 . The war increased these tensions, and 
whilst Scott describes wartime government intervention in the armaments industry as 
being confined to prices and profits, with no interference in management 98 , Mclvor 
contends that competition for labour, contracts and materials undermined the solidarity 
of employers' organisations and necessitated the adoption of a flexible, conciliatory and 
defensive policy 99 . 
Additionally, the dependency of the armaments industry on widely fluctuating market 
conditions, together with the government's non-interventionist policy which abandoned 
arms suppliers to their problems of over-capacity and trade slump is particularly 
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relevant to this study, as are the management strategies within the Vickers group. 
Trebilcock describes the company, run by a talented Board of Directors with mutually 
enforcing spheres of expertise, as not fitting any contemporary entrepreneurial model' °° . 
Scott supports this view and asserts that Vickers, aided by the versatile entrepreneurial 
skills of its experts, was able to meet the periodic crises of the industry with advanced 
technological solutions and perhaps more significantly, were able to anticipate the 
economic downturn and over-capacity which would follow the Armistice. 
Consequently, Vickers looked towards expansion into post-war markets unconnected 
with wartime products' °' and entered the post-war period with confidence. He maintains 
that despite the increasingly serious problems of the depression, Vickers was able to fall 
back to prepared positions. However, the Vickers style of management had significant 
implications for industrial relations in the Barrow shipyard where militancy was well 
established. Todd argues that management determination to take full advantage of the 
Munitions Act to force the re-adjustment of the workforce to new methods and 
technology generated long-lasting trade union and employer confrontation, and 
throughout the war animosity continued to characterise industrial relations' °2 . 
With regard to organised labour, the co-operation and identification of the trade union 
leadership with both employers and the state, together with their conservatism and 
penchant for acting within narrow constitutional limits severely restricted the scope of 
industrial conflict. As a result, Hinton argues that the official leadership appeared to 
have failed to defend the interests of its rank and file in the face of tightening controls, 
becoming increasingly unrepresentative' 03 . The rift was heightened by government 
policy which sought to strengthen the leadership by refusing to negotiate with 
unofficial, local bodies. This ignored traditions of local collective bargaining and 
existing workshop organisation which had developed in some industries from the late 
nineteenth century. Hinton also argues that national (and some local) leadership sought 
to use collective bargaining to increase their own power and authority, becoming 
"peace agents and negotiators" rather than organisers and leaders, seeing rank and file 
militancy as a threat to thatauthority rather than a basis for their power." 04 . 
Additionally, Cronin identifies a tendency for trade union leadership to become a caste 
in its own right, with vested interests, increasingly distrusted and unable to control the 
mounting unrest t05 , stimulating the growth of an independent rank and file movement as 
the true representatives of labour interests under the leadership of the shop stewards. 
Indeed Hyman describes the shop stewards as standing in the front line of resistance to 
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industrial compulsion as a result of the wartime extension of national collective 
bargaining and rank and file independence which drove the struggle for job control 
down to the workplace' °6 . 
However, rank and file militancy assumed different characteristics according to local 
conditions. As regards Barrow, Hinton argues that an independent workers' committee 
failed to emerge there during the war, and as a consequence the revolutionary left 
lacked real leadership and remained relatively isolated and powerless. However, this 
pattern does not emerge in Todd's study of the development of Barrow's labour 
movement, and in addition to the existence of a shop stewards' movement pre-dating the 
war, he asserts they became a power of some significance during the war years 107 . 
Nevertheless, peace provided the opportunity to dismiss the militants, signalling the end 
of the first shop stewards' movement and the transferring of their energies from the 
workplace to politics and the community. 
Additionally, the mass unemployment of 1921 enabled the employers to force massive 
wage cuts and re-assert their right to manage, placing organised labour, and particularly 
the engineering unions, on the defensive 108 . However, in addition to being a crisis of 
authority, Cronin describes the post-war explosion of unrest and class sentiments as too 
deep-rooted and potent to allow a return to normal political and industrial life' 09 . 
Consequently, the severity of the crisis demanded a more immediate political solution 
than a war of attrition between the unions and the employers, and the transitional 
condition of the post-war political system, together with the potentially revolutionary 
connotations of industrial disputes and state control of key industries ensured a 
turbulent transition period. Geary maintains that the crises of 1921 and 1926 took very 
different forms" ° . The intense and unusual class conflict of 1918-21, confirmed pre-war 
fears of organised labour, and represented a real threat of revolution justifying the 
creation of the governments' strike-breaking organisation. However, Cronin asserts that 
whilst a stable pattern had emerged by 1926, order and authority needed to be restored 
to the labour movement", and to this end, Geary maintains that in 1926 the idea of a 
labour threat and the concept of a constitutional struggle were deliberately fabricated to 
justify its use by a government seeking a final confrontation" 2 . 
Beyond a government attempt to curb the unions, the General Strike is frequently 
interpreted in terms of class struggle, and against the background of industrial and 
political uncertainty, Foster describes the General Strike as representing 'one of the 
crucial tests by which the balance of class forces in the inter-war years was 
established" 13 . However, whilst Farman describes those who responded to government 
appeals for volunteers and special constables to protect essential supplies and services 
as motivated by class instinct1 14,  Phillips argues that many Were drawn from the manual 
and clerical trades" 5 . 
Whilst Farman asserts that the regional variation of the effectiveness of the stoppage 
was a reflection of the strength or weakness of local labour movements" 6 , 
interpretations of the response to the sudden capitulation vary, The far left for example, 
saw the outcome as a triumph of rank and file solidarity betrayed by the 'character of 
those labour leaders who chose to work within the limits of the constjtutjon"'. In a 
similar vein, the failure of the General Strike is attributed to a lack of working-class 
unity and preparation in the face of a precise and ruthless government" 8 , in a situation 
where 'every organ of local and central government, the police and army, radio and 
press, scabs, employers and fascists united as one instrument against the labour 
movement" 19. However, an alternative interpretation describes the General Strike, as 
'the echo rather than the voice of class war', a pale reflection of the threat posed in 
1921 120 , 
 resulting in the taming of the trade union movement 121 . However, whilst there 
was evidence of great hostility among militants towards the TUC, the employers and the 
authorities, Phillips maintains that at a local level, rank and file displeasure was directed 
instead towards local trade union leadership, but was accompanied by an overwhelming 
pride in the levels of organisation, solidarity and sacrifice within the labour 
movement122 . 
Thus the years between 1914 and 1926 were a period of severe economic, industrial and 
political crisis, although interpretations of the effects of and responses to these changes 
vary considerably among historians. Difficulties are further compounded by 'the shape 
and pace of economic and social change, [which] differed markedly from one part of the 
country to another', the cross currents of these developments being best understood in 
terms of variations in local conditions' 23 . Thus with the aid of comparative analysis and 
by tracing the profound economic and political changes of the period, the impact of war 
and depression in Barrow will be interpreted in terms of the pressures placed on 
industry, the local authority and other key aspects of community life. 
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DEMOGRAPHY, EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME DIFFERENTIALS 
IITFRODUCTION 
This chapter will analyse the demography of Barrow-in-Furness in terms of the size and 
composition of the population, the occupational structure, income levels and rates of 
unemployment from the outbreak of the First World War to the General Strike. Despite 
the valuable body of research that exists on the origins and development of Barrow, the 
growth of its labour movement, and the study of working class living standards' there 
has, as yet, been no dedicated analysis of the town's social and economic structure. 
Thus the initial aim of this chapter is to use these secondary sources to provide an 
understanding of the town's industrial and demographic background, whilst utilising 
census data and previously unpublished oral evidence contained in the transcripts of 
Elizabeth Roberts' research on Barrow and the papers of J.D. Scott 2 , to provide a more 
comprehensive analysis of the town's socio-economic structure. The chapter will then 
investigate the impact of the war on incomes and population levels before moving on to 
the inter-war period and, with the aid of Ministry of Employment statistics, examining 
the extent and impact of unemployment locally. In bringing this evidence together for 
the first time this analysis will illustrate the main demographic and occupational 
changes during the period under study. 
McKibbin has described England as 'a country of social classes into which the English 
freely categorised themselves' 3 , yet despite this acceptance of hierarchy, definition of 
the social structure remains extremely problematic. For example, both the social 
structure and perceptions of it were subject to considerable geographic variation, factors 
which inhibit generalisation and emphasise the importance of regional studies. In 
addition, the composition of the various social 'classes' was far from static, changing 
over time and complicated further by considerable mobility between the various social 
groups. However, social 'class' in the sense of hierarchic gradations or an individual's 
relationship to the means of production, should not be confused with what McKibbin 
desOribes as 'culture', which, when used broadly, includes ideals and ideas, and a way 
of life derived from work, income, family relations, housing and community 4. In the 
context of this basic definition, this chapter is confined to the identification of Barrow's 
socio-economic 'class' structure, leaving the analysis of 'culture', and particularly 
social attitudes and relationships, to later in the thesis, when the composition of the 
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population, employment patterns and other factors influencing the community during 
the period have been established 
Class divisions and social relationships are the focus of extensive and on-going 
academic debate. The Marxist model, whereby society polarised into the two conflicting 
classes of capital and labour, to the point where it can be argued that, between 1911 and 
1920, 'the capitalist-labour dichotomy came to serve, ... as a first point of reference in 
class discourse' 5 , is challenged by Cannadine as being too simplistic and reductionist. In 
addition to emphasising the point that social polarisation could take other forms, such as 
between the rich and the poor, landlords and tenants or peers and the people 6 , he argues 
that the bulk of the population rejected this broad division, and that despite its high 
profile, the rhetoric of class conflict did not always reflect people's perceptions of the 
social situation. He maintains that other social models co-existed with the 
dichotomous7. For example, the triadic view of society, less appealing and resonant than 
the bi-polar model, divided society into three broad classes, whilst traditional 
hierarchies not only survived, but both society and its institutions 'remained organised 
around the sound social principles of assumed inequality, ... deference and 
subordination' 8 . 
The complexities involved are well illustrated in Robert Roberts' accounts of working 
class life in Salford at the turn of the twentieth century 9, which, in addition to using all 
three models, employs a wide ranging vocabulary to describe the social strata. 
Consequently, 'his over-riding impression was a complex, finely graded hierarchy, in 
which people were deeply sensitive to the smallest nuance of status. They did not think 
of collective identities, locked in bitter, permanent, inevitable, struggle.. . ,'. Joyce 
similarly emphasises alternatives to 'class' in popular perceptions, with factors such as 
neighbourhood, role within the family, housing and membership of churches, clubs or 
teams for example, all making positive contributions to the construction of identities. 
He maintains that 'class' is only one way of giving meaning to the social order, the 
concept evolving as the social structure changed over lime, existing ideas and attitudes 
being incorporated rather than superseded". 
Nevertheless, both income levels and their sources are an important factor determining 
life-styles and thus differentiating the various social strata, and whilst Waites agrees that 
'social classes are not income groups', he maintains that 'they arise in the first instance 
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from the different relationships individuals enjoy vis-à-vis the capitalist market" 2 . 
Waites uses D'Aeth's paper, 'Present Tendencies of Class Differentiation' of 1910, 
which was accepted by contemporaries as an accurate assessment of pre-war income - 
and consumption patterns, to support this view. D'Aeth contends that the class structure 
was determined by differing standards of living, and suggested a seven-fold method of 
social classification based on income levels: 
Table 1.1 	 Pre-war social classification according to D'Aeth 
Group Description Approx. 
income 
A, B, C The broad strata of manual labour: the skilled, semi-skilled and Up to £2 
casual P.W. 
D The lower middle class, with varied occupations including £3 p.w. 
clerks, shopkeepers and elementary school teachers.  
E Business, small manufacturers and lower professionals £300 p.a. 
F The professional and administrative classes: heads of business £500 p.a. 
and professional firms.  
G Simply designated 'the rich' £2,000+ 
p.a. 
B. Waites, A Class Society at War: England 1914-18, 76 
Although this categorisation is a blunt instrument for social analysis and fails to take 
account of other influential factors such as attitudes, values and more subjective social 
identities, it is nevertheless useful as a broad guide to income differentials and provides 
manageable definitions of socio-economic groupings. 
In general terms, the middle-classes were a large and heterogenous social group, and 
expanded rapidly in the Edwardian period. In addition to the pronounced growth of the 
professions and the emergence of a new plutocracy of very rich bankers, financiers and 
businessmen which could merge with the aristocracy, the lower middle-class expanded 
rapidly as a result of the growth of the clerical and distributive trades' 3 . Additionally, 
manual workers who composed eighty per cent of paid labour in 191114,  were a large 
but gradually declining majority of the English population and equally difficult to 
classify. The working class were also divided, the wide gap in the earnings of the skilled 
and unskilled resulting in different life-styles, dress and bearing. Additionally, although 
not evident in D'Aeth's analysis, there was a gUlf between the mainstream working 
class and what Waites describes as 'a pauper and slum proletariat', but although 
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commonly seen as the 'submerged tenth', the economic division between respectability 
and 'submersion' could be a narrow one' 5 . 
However, Edwardian middle and working class gradations became less distinct as 
changing employment patterns restructured the workforce. The vast and varied service 
sector was the most rapidly expanding sector of the Edwardian economy and recruited 
heavily, although not entirely, from amongst the semi-skilled. Although excluded from 
the middle class proper by income differentials, the lower middle class saw themselves, 
and were seen by others, as middle class by occupation, social aspirations and manners, 
and sought to distance themselves as far as possible from the working classes, although 
the financial gap between them was often narrow. Thus, distinct from both the middle 
and the working classes, the lower middle class acted as a buffer between the two 16 . In 
addition to the burgeoning service sector, the working class was further re-structured as 
a result of manufacturing and technological changes which resulted in a decline in the 
numbers of skilled men and stimulated the demand for the semi-skilled 17 . Whilst 
McKibbin asserts that these changes resulted in the redistribution of these categories, 
Waites contends that technological change created new skills, and that the skilled 
category did not decline as a proportion of the working class, 'but the location of the 
skilled category and the perquisites of skill were altered" 8 . Self-employment created 
further working class divisions, although the working class self-employed were 
distinguished from their middle class counterparts by the status derived from type of 
occupation and income levels. However, in general terms, the self-employed 
experienced a steady decline in numbers, whilst the complex system of subcontracting 
disrupted employer/employee divisions and make it difficult to distinguish an 
'employer' class. 
The composition of the middle classes was also subject to considerable change over the 
twentieth century. The increasing number of clerical and service sector workers was 
accompanied by the steady erosion of small businesses, together with the tendency for 
the middle classes to become salaried employees, and the expansion of the management 
class 19 . The 1911 census reveals that the majority of the 'higher' professions, such as 
the Church, medicine and law, were outside industry, but by 1931 change was clearly 
evident, and McKibbin describes the emphasis, for both the lower and higher 
professionals, as shifting towards the scientific and technical 20 . However, Perkin argues 
that in addition to the expanding business classes, society was 'increasingly composed 
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of career hierarchies of specialised occupations, selected on merit and based on trained 
expertise' 21 . According to this analysis, these new professions encompassed a broader 
range of occupational activity than the science-based professions alone, and created a 
vertical division within the middle class between the business and professional classes. 
However, comparison of the various census returns is unworkable, as the grouping of 
occupations under general headings was an arbitrary process and classification 
principles and job definitions changed over time 22 . Higgs describes clerks as a 
particularly problematic category 23 , whilst the fast growing professions such as 
laboratory technicians and draughtsmen, were not recognised as categories in thel9l 1 
census, making direct comparison impossible 24 . 
With regard to incomes, the Great War was a considerable temporary influence in the 
narrowing of working class divisions, virtually eliminating both unemployment and the 
worst aspects of urban poverty. In many sectors, money wages rose and out-paced 
inflation, with the unskilled making the greatest gains. As a result working class pay 
differentials narrowed, raising living standards and eradicating the residuum. In 
contrast, the war had a mixed impact on the middle classes. Small landlords' incomes, 
for example, were badly hit, and inflation transferred wealth from most lenders to 
borrowers, whilst stocks, such as in transport or public utilities, lost up to half their 
income potential. Although this affected a minority, McKibbin argues that this 
represents a redistribution of middle class wealth. Additionally, middle class salaried 
incomes tended to be fixed and thus wartime inflation created hardship, particularly for 
the lower middle class, whose incomes in real terms were significantly lower than 1914 
levels. To the contemporary view, pauperisation was a distinct possibility, but 
McKibbin argues this is dependent on which section of the middle class is examined. 
He asserts that for the clerical grades and professional classes, although their income 
levels fell in real terms, 'for some of them the decline was measured not against the 
working class but in terms of narrowed differentials within their own class'. However, 
although badly affected up to 1921, middle class losses were largely recovered by 1923, 
when the cost of living had fallen to two thirds of the 1920 level. Thus it can be argued 
that, from this point, middle class incomes recovered in real terms, restoring the pre-war 
relationship between salaries and wages25. 
However, social composition, occupational structure and related income levels were 
subject to considerable regional variation. In general terms, working class affluence was 
short-lived as 'pervasive unemployment eliminated many of the comparative income 
gains the working class as a whole had made during and immediately after the war' 26 . 
Kirk has argued, however, that in aggregate terms, real wages can be said to have 
improved during the period 1920-1926 as, despite continuing pay reductions, retail 
prices fell further, and continued to fall after 1927 when wage levels remained static 27 . 
McKibbin supports this view, maintaining that for those in work, from 1923 the 
stabilisation of earnings 'preserved the mild redistribution of working class income 
downwards which had occurred during the First World War' 28 . Nevertheless, it is 
income levels in the inter-war period that most highlight regional disparities. In regions 
of industrial growth, shorter working hours combined with improvements in health, 
education and employment provision, resulted in rising living standards for many, with 
increased scope for leisure and expenditure on non-essentials. In contrast, regions of 
traditional heavy industry were badly depressed, the varying economic activity of the 
different industries contributing to the geographic redistribution of the population, and 
being reflected in unemployment rates. For example, between 1923 and 1939 these 
averaged 19.6% in mining, 36.8% in shipbuilding, 20.7% in cotton, and 10% in 
vehicles 29, figures which indicate that shipbuilding, impeded by over-capacity, was 
among the main casualties of war 30. Thus regional specialisation created pockets of 
severe unemployment in which a large minority, which included the lower paid as well 
as the unemployed, experienced poverty and ill-health and for whom the inter-war years 
were 'marked by bitterness and fear, hunger, ill-health and desperation' 31 . 
Thus life chances were significantly affected by industry and geography, which 
underscores the importance of regional studies. Barrow, a single industry town totally 
dependent on 'traditional' heavy industry, provides a particularly valuable case-study. 
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BARROW TO THE EVE OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
(i) Occupational Structure 
By the twentieth century, Barrow's working classes still greatly outnumbered the small, 
'loosely defined middle class' estimated by Stark to be around 828 persons in 191132. 
Additionally, the region's natural resources had been exhausted, and the town, initially 
dependent on the fortunes of the iron and steel industry, economically unstable and 
facing increasingly severe competition, came to depend on the equally precarious 
shipbuilding and armaments industries. 
Between 1903 and 1911, despite the shipyard experiencing periodic minor revivals, 
Barrow's economy was in recession 33 . From 1911 however, the financial climate 
improved, the 1912 coal strike proving to be only a minor setback, and by the outbreak 
of war, the shipyard was busy, employment at the steelworks was expanding, and full 
time working was reinstated at the jute works, the pulp works and on the railway. The 
population continued to grow, reaching 63,770 by 191 1M•  The age structure of the 
population is shown in greater detail in Chart 1.3, whilst the size and composition of the 
workforce is examined below. However, the 99 juveniles under fourteen years of age 
shown as employed in the 1911 census tables have been omitted from the calculations 
in order to facilitate a closer comparison with the 1921 and 1931 figures, leaving a 
working age population of 23,225 males and 20,688 females 35 . 
Chart 1.1 demonstrates that women comprised a small minority of the workforce and as 
such were less directly affected by changing economic conditions. Thus women's 
employment patterns will be discussed first, before focussing on the predominantly 
male workforce and the associated issues which dominated the town throughout the 
period. The census figures indicate that 23.5% of Barrow's female population of 
working age were in waged employment and represented 18% of the total workforce. 
This percentage falls far below the national level, where women comprised 29.7% of 
the total workforce in 1911, a proportion which changed little in the first half of the 
twentieth century 36 . With regard to married women only a small minority (1.9%) were 
in paid employment, and comprised just 10.4% of the female workforce 37 . 
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Chart 1.1 	 Composition of the workforce by age and gender 1911 
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Additionally, women's employment options were extremely limited, and Table 1.2 lists 
the main sources of female employment in 1911, together with the number employed, 
also shown as a percentage of the female workforce. 
Table 1.2 	 Main employment categories for women 1911 
Code 	 Number 
IV Domestic Offices & Services 1667 34.3 
(including: domestic service 1233 25.4) 
XIX Dress 691 14.2 
xviii Textiles (jute) 457 9.4 
ifi Professional 458 9.4 
(including: teaching 318 6.5) 
XX Food 381 7.8 
V Commercial (including clerks) 90 1.8 
Source: Census of England and Wales, Table 13, 1911 
It can be seen that domestic service was by far the largest employer, followed by 
dressmaking and textiles, the jute works remaining the main source of women's 
industrial employment. Howeyer, although the Commercial category includes business 
clerks, it is unfortunate that the census does not give any indication as to the numbers 
employed in more general clerical or shop work. 
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Table 1.3 lists the main male employment categories and demonstrates that traditional 
heavy industries, in the form of iron, steel, shipbuilding and engineering, remained the 
town's main employers in the decade immediately preceding the First World War, 
whilst the building trade was still relatively buoyant. However, whilst the professional 
category is shown to be very small, this census does not classify the workforce by 
employment status, and does not differentiate between employers, employees or self-
employed. Thus it is impossible to gain even the most rudimentary impressions of the 
size of an employer class, and again there is no indication of the numbers in general 
clerical and retail employment. 
Table 1.3 	 Main employment categories for men 1911 
Code 	 Number 
X Metals 12,549 56.3 
(including: iron & steel production 1,485 6.7) 
general engineering 5,935 26.6) 
shipbuilding 4,297 19.3) 
VI Transport 2,305 10.3 
XII Building 1,248 5.6 
(including: house building 1,147 5.1) 
V Commercial (including clerks) 937 4.2 
ifi Professional 374 1.7  
Source: Census of England and Wales, Table 13, 191I 
(ii) Social and Economic Structure 
Moreover, cyclical unemployment, unpaid holidays and short-time working make pre-
war income levels difficult to pinpoint, particularly as wage increases negotiated when 
the order books were full, were followed by cuts as the local economy took one if its 
periodic downturns. Nevertheless, during the first decade of the twentieth century the 
pay of a skilled worker can be said to have averaged between 30/- to 36/- per 54 hour 
week, whilst labourers earned between 18/- to 20/- per week 38 , bringing them close to 
the subsistence levels identified in Rowntree's survey of working class living 
standards 39 . 
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What was judged to be an average labourer's weekly budget, excluding food and 
clothing, was published in the Barrow News in 1904 0 : 
Rent 516d 
Fuel and light 2/- 
Club 6d 
Newspaper 3d 
Tobacco 3d 
Total 	 8/6d 
Whilst the outgoings of individual families would vary, the figures for rent (typical of 
Barrow's comparatively high rent levels), and fuel and light, can be taken as a 
reasonably representative estimate and illustrates the problems faced by low-income 
families. According to these calculations, from a basic wage of 19/-, a labourer would 
be left with approximately 10/6d per week to feed and clothe his family at a time when 
the cost of living was between 5% and 10% higher than other towns with similar wage 
levels, and rose by 11.6% between 1900-1914'. Additionally, due to the scarcity of 
waged employment for married women, most labourers needed overtime in order to 
survive42, a factor which undermines poverty line calculations that make the assumption 
that basic-rate earnings were normal or adequate. However, Elizabeth Roberts contends 
that married women could work on a casual, part-time basis, and although it is 
impossible to quantify these earnings, 'their financial contributions to their families 
could be of considerable significance' 43 . 
Oral evidence suggests that the working class saw themselves divided by income levels, 
and one respondent, the son of a coachman and a baker by trade, clearly identifies three 
broad groups. For example, he discusses 'the people of the ordinary working class', and 
is at pains to differentiate these from what he terms 'the rich' and 'the poor among the 
working class. According to this respondent, the important people of Barrow were 
thought to be those with a good job and some money, a 'good job' being defined as a 
businessman, the head of a large company, or the owner of two or three houses. This 
raises an interesting point. Many craftsmen were able to save substantially, particularly 
between 1909 and 1914 when overtime was plentiful, and 'the object was to buy a 
house, and then gradually a row of houses' 45 , letting them out, and as landlords, forming 
part of 'the rich' working class of the town. It is unlikely however, that house ownership 
alone would have classified them among the town's 'important' people as, according to 
contemporary accounts, artisans in their Sunday best could never be mistaken for 
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middle class46 . The evidence suggests significant income differentials within the 
working-class, the rents received by working class landlords elevating them to an 
income bracket above the levels of the 'ordinary' craftsmen. 
Although Barrow's upper middle and professional class was small, income differentials 
created 'an immense distance between the work people and the lower paid office 
workers on the one hand, and the higher management on the other' 47 . 
Table 1.4 	 Municipal Chief Officer Salary Levels 
Officer 	 Date 	 Annual Salary £ 
Town Clerk 	 1907 	 600 
Borough Treasurer 	 1887 	 500 
Treasurer's Chief Assistant 1904 	 250 
Borouth Surveyor 	 1899 	 600  
Compiled from figures published in the Barrow News, 7 January 1922 
Table 1.4 gives examples of the salaries of some of the Corporation's Chief Officers at 
around the turn of the century, and although these salaries were high, there were equally 
significant income differentials between those of the professional and upper middle 
class and those at the top of the Vickers hierarchy. For example, by December 1913, 
forty of those described as 'higher staff' at Vickers were paid an average of £1,054 per 
annum, a figure inclusive of bonuses 48 . 
Unfortunately very little evidence survives of the income levels of Barrow's lower and 
'middling' middle classes, but the available information on local incomes does comply 
with D'Aeth's categorisation (Table 1.1). Skilled workers for example were unlikely to 
have earned over £2 per week, whilst the Corporation's chief Officers salaries brought 
them into Group F. However, although extremely high, the salaries of Vickers' higher 
administrators would not categorise them among 'the rich' (Group 0), but formed 
instead, an elite of Group F. Thus it seems reasonable to assume that D'Aeth's 
categories and income levels for the lower middle class, small businessmen and the 
lower professionals are a reasonable guide to those of their counterparts in Barrow. 
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THE WAR AND INCOME LEVELS 
As an important munitions centre, the town's population was expanded considerably by 
the influx of munitions workers during the war years (see Table 1.5), and whilst the 
accuracy of these statistics and the consequences of the rapidly expanding population 
are examined in the next chapter, income levels are discussed below. 
Table 1.5 
	
Estimated population size 1913-1919 
1913 	 1914 	 1915 
	 1917 	 1918 	 1919 
68,523 	 75,368 
	 179 	 83,179 	 83,179 	 73,627 
Source: Borough of Barrow-in-Furness Account Books 
The wages of many of Barrow's workers rose during the war, particularly for those in 
the shipyard, and some examples of 1915 rates quoted by Todd include: coppersmiths 
45 I-; turners 43/-; fitters and blacksmiths 42/-; machinists 39/-; capstan hands 36/- and 
drillers 35/-. However, whilst female machinists earned 23/9d per week in 1916, some 
female fitters only earned 121-, contrasting sharply with a male fitter's wage of 38/- per 
week, boosted by payments under the Premium Bonus Scheme and generally increasing 
a man's wage by 25%. Wage levels continued to rise, and by the end of the war the 
Engineering Joint Trades Committee asserted that the basic wage in the shell shop had 
increased from the 1914level of 28/- to 56/6d, together with an extra 2 to 3 shillings for 
skilled men49 
Again, little is known of changes to the salaries of Vickers technical and clerical staff, 
but all staff were paid a cost of living bonus which exceeded that paid to workmen 50 . 
Additionally, although information is sparse, the incomes of the management grades 
rose substantially, and an average annual salary of £940 in 1913, for example, had risen 
to £1,426 by the end of the war, an increase of 52%. However, forthe 'higher staff', 
rising bonus rates and salaries combined to give an average annual salary of £1,822, an 
increase of around 73%. Turning to the Chief Officers of the Borough Council, in 
addition to salary increases from turn of the century levels shown in Table 1.4, they 
were also paid substantial war bonuses. Examples are given in Table 1.6. 
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Table 1.6 	 Municipal Chief Officers' Salaries, 1922 
Position 	 Bonus £ 	 Total annual salary £ 
Town Clerk 255 993 
Borough Treasurer 247.5 907.5 
Chief Medical Officer 240 840 
Borough Engineer 240 840 
Electrical Engineer 240 840 
Director of Education 240 840 
Chief Constable ---- 800 
Source: published in the Barrow News, 7 January 1922 
It should be hoted that these figures and those of Table 1.4 are compiled from a 
document leaked to the local press and published at a time when Chief Officer salary 
levels were a contentious issue. By virtue of not being intended for publication, these 
figures are likely to be reasonably accurate, and whilst other salary levels revealed as 
the issue was fought out in the local press over the following months provide useful 
insights, they should be treated with greater caution. They do.suggest however, that 
other salaries came close to these levels. The Headmaster of the Municipal Secondary 
School, for example, is said to have received £800 per annum, whilst the Headmistress 
of the Girls' Secondary School earned £600 rising to £700 per annum 51 . Other figures 
illustrate the large differences between the incomes of Chief Officers and lesser local 
government officials. For example, whilst the Treasurer's Chief Assistant's annual 
salary had more than doubled from the 1904 level to £51052,  the Chief Librarian's 
salary, including bonus, was a mere £385 by comparison, relegating him to the ranks of 
the lower professionals 53 , demonstrating that although professional hierarchies were 
extending further down the social scale, they were far from equal in status or rewards 54 . 
Although evidence of lower and middle middle class incomes is sparse, the same source 
reveals that, whilst Corporation workmen's wages had risen to 150% of their pre-war 
level, they were outstripped by the salariesof technical and clerical staff, which rose by 
170%. 
It is unlikely that war-time inflation had a detrimental impact on the living standards of 
this upper middle class of businessmen and senior administrators, whilst income 
differentials between them and the middle class proper, far from being eroded, were 
probably 5xtended. For many of the working classes, rising wage levels, boosted further 
by payments under the Premium Bonus Scheme, generated unprecedented prosperity, 
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whilst the expansion of employment opportunities for women served to further raise the 
living standards of working class families. However, the payment of cost of living 
bonuses at a higher rate to clerical staff than to workmen by both Vickers and the 
Corporation, suggests that income differentials may not have been eroded to the extent 
that is generally accepted, although the lack of statistical data makes this impossible to 
explore further. However, the issues of the salaries of higher professionals in Vickers 
and the Corporation, and the financial strategies adopted by local employers to cope 
with the effects of the depression, will be dealt with at length in a later chapter. 
THE INTER-WAR YEARS 
The impact of the Armistice was immediate and profound. Thousands of munitions 
workers were discharged, but at such a rate that the rapidity with which the gun 
mounting shops emptied remained an enduring memory for one contemporary 55 . 
Nevertheless there was considerable post-war optimism, with enough merchant 
shipbuilding work alone to provide jobs for the next ten years 56 . However, depression 
set in rapidly and by late 1920 the steelworks were on an 'involuntary holiday'" and a 
total of 1,977 insured workers were registered as unemployed 58 . Early in 1921 ship 
orders began to be cancelled, and by the end of the year very few men were left in the 
Engine Department, and all single men were on short-time. By 1922, apart from an oil 
tanker awaiting repair, a barge for the Furness Railway and the suspended work on the 
Cunard Line's Servia, there was no work in the shipyard 59 and lay-offs continued, to the 
point, 'probably in 1922 or 1923', where only one man was left in the Engine Shop 60 . 
(i) The Clerical and Retail Sectors 
However, although industry, and manual workers in particular, are generally the main 
focus for studies of unemployment, sufficient evidence survives in Barrow to give some 
additional insights into the effects of depression on clerical and retail workers. Within 
Vickers for example, the technical and clerical staff were possibly as badly affected by 
unemployment as the workers themselves. By 1922 all the staff, even the married men 
in the Marine Engine Office were on short-time, and witnesses describe a time when 
there was no-one left in the Engine Drawing Office, recalling images of deserted offices 
where a man could stand and hear the town hall clock strike 61 . At this time the total 
workforce, including staff, was estimated to have fallen to 3,18962. 
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The effects of depression were also felt rapidly by Barrow's Co-Operative Society's 
retail staff, as indicated by Table 1.7. 
Table 1.7 	 Barrow Co-operative Society Staffing Levels 1913-1926 
1913 	 1919 	 1922 	 1924 	 1926 
Distribution 279 	 348 	 287 	 203 	 208 
Production 	 89 	 154 	 132 	 79 	 55 
Source: 'Co-operative Society Statistics', with thanks to Gillian Lonergan 
Short-time working was first introduced as early as September 1920 in the dressmaking 
department, but by April 1921 various departments began laying staff off for one week 
at a time. However, women bore the brunt of staff cuts at this point, all the female staff 
in the hosiery department for example, being laid off in order to avoid the suspension of 
the whole department. Throughout 1921 short-time working, staff and wage cuts 
continued, but suspensions were intensified in April 1922 and continued into 1923. By 
September 1923 all 'superfluous' employees were to be 'dispensed with' 63 , and by 1924 
staffing levels were reduced to 73% of the pre-war level. 
Although such evidence of unemployment amOng retail and clerical staff is sparse, it 
does nevertheless indicate that two of the largest and most prosperous employers of the 
town, Vickers and the Co-op, had to shed a large proportion of their staff in order to 
survive the depression. It can thus be surmised that smaller businesses with fewer assets 
were compelled to adopt a similar policy, and although impossible to quantify, this 
evidence suggests that there was considerable unemployment among Barrow's lower 
and middle middle classes. This creates a situation somewhat at odds with McKibbin's 
assertion that throughout the inter-war years in general, but 'even at the very worst of 
the depression, unemployment [among this group] was very lowM. 
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(ii) The Industrial Sector 
Chart 1.2 shows unemployment levels among Barrow's insured male workers between 
1920 and 1926. 
Chart 1.2 	 Quarterly unemployment totals of insured men 1920-1926 
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The sources for these statistics are threefold. Although comprehensive statistics were 
published in the Ministry of Labour Gazette from 1923, at this point the crisis in Barrow 
had already peaked. Vital figures forthe earlier period can be found in documents 
compiled by the Corporation, the Board of Guardians and the Local Employment 
Committee as they prepared their case to appeal for Ministry of Health assistance. These 
statistics however have two major shortfalls. Firstly, they are for the insured 
unemployed only and omit the vast numbers of uninsured men out of work, in addition 
to which they do not provide details of unemployment levels for the second half of 
1922. However, an impression of the full scale of unemployment between June and 
December 1922 can be gleaned from two sources. A press report of May 1922 estimates 
approximately 20,000 men were unemployed at that time, the total swollen by the five 
to six thousand men locked out of Vickers during the May engineering crisis 65 . 
Significantly, this figure cannot be dismissed as sensationalism on the part of the press, 
as the same figure was quoted in a report from the Mayor and Town Clerk to the 
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Ministry of Health in December 1922. The report, which stated that unemployment was 
still rising, and of the 20,000 out of work, around 12,000 were skilled men 66 , can be 
judged to be a reasonably accurate reflection of the situation at that time. The 
Corporation, whilst seeking to convey the urgency of the town's economic crisis, could 
ill-afford to over-state their case and thus lose credibility with the Ministries of Health 
and Labour, who were sceptical, well-informed and intent on minimising the crisis, and 
would seize on exaggerated figures as the opportunity to do so. 
The Chart illustrates that unemployment rose rapidly from late 1920 and reached a peak 
in the second half of 1922. The figure of 20,000 quoted in the Corporation 
correspondence represented a staggering 73% of the town's total male working age 
population, and is comparable to the very worst experiences of the early 1930's. 
Although falling again nearly as rapidly during 1923, the rate fluctuated at a relatively 
high level throughout the rest of the period, averaging 4,654 men per month, or 17% of 
insured male workers at 1921 levels 7 . Unemployment rates among women and 
juveniles do not show the same dramatic rise. The average monthly unemployment total 
peaked in 1922 at 677 for women and 605 forjuveniles, but fell to an average of 199 
per month for women and 241 for juveniles by 1926. However, these figures apply to 
the insured unemployed only, and reflect the result of discriminatory benefit 
entitlements rather than falling uneniployment rates. 
(iii) Occupational Structure 
These statistics support Marshall's view that Barrow was in a desperate situation as a 
result of its dependence on a few insecure industries and its distance from materials and 
markets 68 . Table 1.8 lists the occupational groups which employed over 5% of the male 
workforce between 1911 and 1931, and also the smaller professional groups. Direct 
comparison of the census tables, however, is impossible, as the general headings are not 
uniform and the grouping of occupations within them was an arbitrary process 69 . The 
calculations are based on aggregating the occupation groups used in the 1921 census, 
with the exception of the sub-divisions of the metalworking industry, which were 
undifferentiated in that year. 
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Table 1.8 
	 Main employment categories of men 1911-1931 
Category 1911 
No. 
1921 
 No. 
1931 
 No.  
Metals 12,549 56.3 11,043 42.8 12,003 60.0 
iron & steel 1,485 6.7 - - 1,568 7.8 
engineering 5,935 26.6 - - )9,821 49.1 
shipbuilding 4,297 19.3 - - 
Transport 2,305 10.3 2,029 7.9 1,828 9.1 
Coinmérciajlfinancial 937 4.2 1,422 5.5 2,167 10.8 
Clerks/draughtsmen - - 1,287 5.0 - - 
Building 1,248 5.6 724 2.8 629 3.1 
house building 1,147 5.1 - - - - 
Public admin/defence - - 368 1.4 875 4.4 
Professional 374 1.7 318 1.2 217 1.1 
Employers - - 589 1 	 2.2 1 	 - - 
Source: Census of England and Wales, Occupation Tables 1911, 1921, 1931 
In addition to the absence of change in the principal employers and the very limited 
variation in the proportion of the population employed by them, the table demonstrates 
an absolute lack of diversification during the period. Despite efforts to attract new 
industry, the town's geographical situation and lack of natural resources militated 
against this. One major change is the apparent expansion of the commercial and 
financial sector, but this is attributable to changing job definitions and rules of 
classification within the census rather than economic growth. The only significant 
change was the collapse of the building industry, suggesting the war and depression 
were influential in this, although by 1931 the industry was showing signs of a minor 
upturn. Women's occupational groups pose similar analytical problems (Table 1.9). 
Table 1.9 	 Main employment categories of women 1911-1931 
Category 1911 
No. 	 % 
1921 
No. 
1931 
 No. 	 % 
Domestic service 1,233 25.4 1,330 21.8 1,039 208 
Shops - - 816 13.3 - - 
Professional 458 9.4 538 9.1 241 4.8 
teaching 318 6.5 404 6.6 - - 
Clerks/twists - - 520 8.5 - - 
Textile goods 691 14.2 487 8.0 193 3.9 
Textile manuf. 457 9.4 266 4.4 - - 
Food manufacture 381 7.8 219 3.6 218 4.4 
Commercial/financial 90 1.8 - 1,245 24.5 
Public admin/defence - - 76 1 	 1.2 539 10.8 
Source: Census of England and Wales, Occupation Tables 1911, 1921, 1931 
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Again, there is very little change in the nature of women's employment patterns within 
this twenty year period. Domestic service, remarkably resilient, remained the main 
employer, but the most significant change was the loss of the local textile industry, such 
as it was. The problems inherent in categorisation are particularly evident, changes to 
major categories concealing trends in employment patterns, and prohibiting any 
assessment of changes in employment levels within the teaching profession, the clerical 
and retail or commercial and financial trades. It is possible however, to examine the 
proportion of women in paid employment (Table 1.10). 
Table 1.10 Women as a percentage of the occupied workforce 1911-1931 
	
1911 	 1921 	 1931 
Number employed 	 4,854 	 6,109 	 4,991 
% of the total workforce 	 17.9 	 19.0 	 20.0 
Married women as % 
of total workforce 	 1.9 	 2.1 	 n/a 
Source: Census of England and Wales, Occupation Tables 1911, 1921, 1931 
It would appear that during the immediate post-war period, employment prospects for 
women had improved slightly from their earlier level, but this was short-lived and thus 
overall the situation saw little change, and the percentage of working women in the 
town remained approximately 10% below the national average. Additionally, although 
the 1931 census does not differentiate between married and single women in waged 
employment,.the percentage of married women is unlikely to have risen, given the 
prevailing economic climate and absence of new industries. 
(iv) Demographic Change 
The demographic impact of high unemployment was profound, and Barrow's 
population fell from 74,244 to 66,202 between 1921 and 1931, a decrease of 10.8% 0  
The implications for the age structure of the population are indicated in Chart 1.3. 
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Chart 1.3 	 Age structure of Barrow's population 1911-1931 
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In addition to an increasingly ageing population as a result of falling birth and death 
rates, the chart indicates both a collapse of in-migration and a degree of out-migration, 
particularly among young adults. Table 1.11 examines the statistics of these age groups 
in greater detail. 	 - 
Table 1.11 The size of the population aged 15 to 44 years 1911-1931 
Age Group 
15-24 25-34 35-44 
1911 	 11,346 11,122 8,847 
1921 	 11,376 11,576 10,956 
1931 	 10,744 10,135 9,193 
Source: Census of England and Wales, Occupation Tables 1911, 1921, 1931 
The table indicates that the 25-34 cohort of 1921 had fallen by 2,383 in 1931, a massive 
20.6% decrease. Similarly, but less dramatically, the 15-24 cohort of 1921 had fallen by 
1,241, or 11%, in 1931. These statistics demonstrate that Barrow lost a considerable 
proportion of young adults and their families during the 1920's, and although it is 
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impossible to calculate how many later returned as economic conditions improved, oral 
evidence suggests the demographic impact was long lasting. For example, the policy of 
not taking on apprentices during the depression created an age gap in Vickers, 
noticeable until the late 1950s7I,  whilst Elizabeth Roberts' research identifies families 
that were permanently separated. Whilst Griffiths asserts that Wigan experienced the 
highest rate of population loss of all the Lancastrian County Boroughs in the 1920s 72 , 
this distinction does in fact belong to Barrow. Indeed, as a consequence of the town's 
enduring dependency on the notoriously unstable iron and steel, shipbuilding and 
engineering industries, the town experienced the third largest decrease of population in 
England and Wales between 1921 and 1931. Whilst the Rhondda encountered the 
highest rate of population loss at 13.1%, and Merthyr Tydfil occupied second place at 
11.3%, Barrow came a close third 73 with a population loss of 10.8%. 
CONCLUSION 
To sumniarise these trends, from the late nineteenth century to the outbreak of the First 
World War the population of Barrow had increased steadily despite alternating periods 
of boom and slump and a steady rate of out-migration. As a result of the town's 
dependency on traditional heavy industries the population was predominantly working 
class, which appears to have been divided into three broad groups perceived as the 
'poor', 'ordinary' and 'rich', the latter category including a group of relatively wealthy 
working class landlords. Thus income differentials within the working class could be 
considerable, particularly as the basic wages of most unskilled men were below 
subsistence levels during the pre-war period, necessitating overtime working to provide 
a barely adequate standard of living. Another important aspect of working class Barrow 
was the limited amount of waged employment open to women, and as a result, the 
proportion of women in the town's workforce remained small and approximately 10% 
below the national average. The dearth of work for married women further reduced the 
earning capacity of many working class families. 
The middle and professional classes were dwarfed in comparison, and whilst little is 
known of income differentials between the lower middle classes and the middle class 
proper, there was a wide gulf between them and the small number of wealthy 
professionals and administrators who formed a distinct upper middle class. Thus 
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Barrow's pre-war socio-economic divisions appear to comply with D'Aeth's 
categorization, and reflect extremes of wealth and poverty. 
The war boosted working class income levels, and created unprecedented employment 
opportunities for women, whilst virtually eliminating unemployment and raising the 
living standards of the majority of the population. Again there is little information on 
changes to middle class incomes. However, the payment of cost of living allowances to 
the technical and clerical staff of both Vickers and the Corporation at a higher rate than 
that paid to workmen, suggests that working and lower middle class differentials may 
not have been eroded to the extent generally accepted. However, the war boosted the 
incomes of the town's higher professionals, the salaries of those in Vickers rising by 
between 50% and 70% ; whilst the Corporation's Chief Officers were paid substantial 
war bonuses. As a result, the income differentials between the higher professionals and 
the middle class proper were likely to have been extended rather than eroded. 
The initial post-war optimism of 1920 was short-lived and depression struck and 
deepened with a rapidity unprecedented even in Barrow, where cyclic downturns were 
the norm. Accelerating unemployment had eroded the economic gains of the war years 
by the end of 1921, but the May engineering crisis of 1922 threw thousands more out of 
work and created the worst economic crisis in the town's history. Studies of 
unemployment tend to focus on manual workers, but it has been possible to challenge to 
some extent, the established opinion that the middle classes experienced less 
unemployment than their working class counterparts. Although impossible to quantify, 
the evidence from Vickers and the Co-operative Society suggests that those in the 
clerical and retail trades were perhaps proportionately, if not numerically, as badly 
affected as manual workers. 
As a result of the depression, local industry was unable to diversify, and rather than 
attracting new industries, Barrow witnessed the demise of its textile industry and 
decline of the building trade. Consequently there was little change to the occupational 
structure of the town, heavy industries remained the main employers and women 
continued to represent a small minority of the workforce. Additionally, whilst in areas 
of some economic growth or solvency, technological improvements had influenced 
changes in the composition and structure of.the working classes by reducing the demand 
for skilled workers and expanding the numbers of semi-skilled, the depression inhibited 
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these developments in Banow. However, the nature of the census tables conceals 
changes in the composition of the middle social groups and the lower middle class in 
particular, giving no information on the teaching profession, or the clerical and retail 
trades, although it can be ascertained that the professional class remained small. 
Thus Barrow is an example of a town in which specialisation in a few unstable 
industries generated unemployment figures of epic proportions. It should be stressed 
that an unemployment rate of 73% equals the very worse experiences of the 1930's and 
stimulated migration from the area at a level which gives Barrow the highest rate of 
population loss in England between 1921-1931. Moreover, the speed of the transition 
from the new-found prosperity of the war years to mass unemployment and distress was 
very rapid and possibly without parallel. Population pressure, the scale of 
unemployment and the speed with which it escalated exerted a massive influence on the 
economic, social and political life of the town, and the strategies and debates concerning 
how to deal with the crisis form an important part of this study, beginning with the 
examination of housing issues. 
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HOUSING AND THE IMPETUS FOR REFORM 
INTRODUCTION 
Housing was a key issue during the period under study, and this chapter will examine 
the impact of war and depression on the type and condition of Barrow's housing, 
together with patterns of ownership, rent levels, and degrees of homelessness. In 
addition to providing a background for the analysis of public health issues in the 
following chapter; this chapter will investigate the changing municipal role and the 
impact of legislation beyond the immediate post-war period through to 1926. By not 
confining the study to a context of wartime social unrest, this analysis will provide more 
measured insights into the first attempts at state intervention in housing, together with 
other local pressures which might inhibit reform and re-shape attitudes. This will begin 
with a discussion of general housing trends and debates to provide a context for the 
Barrow case-study. 
•Housing development was closely related to economic and social conditions. In addition 
to national trade and investment cycles, demand was shaped by local levels of 
unemployment, incomes and rents, together with family and migration patterns. Factors 
such as changing levels of need, regional housing traditions, costs, rents, patterns of 
ownership and employer building (and, increasingly, differing levels of local authority 
participation) generated considerable diversity of experience, and this emphasises the 
value of a local case-study. In areas heavily dependent on traditional heavy industry, the 
cyclic economy and fluctuating employment prospects created an ebb and flow of 
migration, which in turn was reflected in the housing market. The transformation of 
such areas into important wartime munitions centres exacerbated existing housing 
problems, with an intensification of overcrowding, rising rents and mounting levels of 
industrial and social unrest. The crisis continued into the post-war period, and was met 
by a series of housing experiments representing a radical departure from previous 
policy. This chapter will analyse the response to economic and social pressures, and the 
impact of legislation on housing policy in Barrow between 1914 and 1926. 
Early industrialists had provided workers' housing to attract and retain a stable 
workforce, but by the mid-nineteenth century most company schemes represented an 
outlet for capital during times of expansion rather than a social obligation, with few 
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employers concerned with raising standards. In the absence of effective intervention in 
the market, the squalor, disease and overcrowding associated with urbanisation had 
raised concerns for social stability and also, by the early twentieth century, Ooncerns for 
physical deterioration and national efficiency. Model housing represented one response 
to existing conditions, combining a practical solution to environmental problems with 
social awareness and the desire for instruction and improvement; but even in the new 
century, substantial and well-publicised initiatives like Port Sunlight or Bourneville 
remained exceptional. But less ambitious ideas about the improvement of basic norms 
through legislation, increasingly evident in mid-Victorian local bye-laws, were 
embodied at national level in the 1875 Public Health Act, and later incorporated in the 
model bye-laws produced as guidelines by the Local Government Board'. By the first 
decade of the twentieth century minimum Government standards were enforced by 
legislation and upheld by financial penalties 2 . 
In general terms, by the beginning of the twentieth century the majority of house buyers 
were small-scale investors buying to let, and most accommodation was provided by 
private landlords. Typically, working-class housing was differentiated according to 
income levels, and the greater job security and higher earnings of skilled craftsmen gave 
access to better housing. In contrast, as a result of cyclical employment and casual 
work, many of the unskilled gravitated towards the worst housing and the 'doubling up' 
of families was a comnon necessity, conforming 'to a national picture of endemic 
poverty and insufficient income for good housing' 3 . On the other hand, the inability to 
increase rents to sustain a competitive rate of return, together with steadily rising 
interest rates undermined owners' profits, and investment in housing fell in favour of 
more attractive alternatives 4 . By the outbreak of the First World War the housing market 
was in decline as a result of diminishing returns, lack of investment and the high cost of 
materials. However, the outlook for areas of shipbuilding and heavy engineering such as 
Barrow or Clydeside, subject to earnings and job fluctuations and uncertain demand, 
was particularly bleak. 
The war intensified existing housing problems, many areas experiencing severe 
overcrowding, whilst living conditions, particularly for tenants and lodgers, deteriorated 
further as scarce resources and inflated prices inhibited repairs. Additionally, the war 
radically changed the nature of the housing problem, supporting Marwick's assertion 
that participation in the war had enabled the working classes, and the more under- 
52 
privileged sections in particular, to press their demands and improve their living 
standards. The Clydeside rent strikes of 1915 for example, succeeded in fusing 
industrial and housing issues, and turned local dissatisfaction and unrest into a national 
campaign against both the state and the employers. The Rent Restrictions Act, 1915, 
illustrates the twin aspects of housing: as both a commodity in its own right and an 
essential investment to maintain a stable labour force. However, although freezing rents 
to 1914 levels, the Act did little on behalf of the poor and worst housed, and failed to 
quell housing unrest. Additionally, rent controls had little impact on major industrial 
and financial interests, but once housing was seen as contributing to a stable and 
efficient society, the small private landlord became vulnerable. Unable to develop a 
distinct political voice or apply national political pressure to protect their interests, this 
group was sacrificed by government policies which gave priority to tenants' rights and 
industrial stability5 . Thus wartime rent controls redistributed income from landlord to 
tenant, but discouraged investment in housing. 
Continuing industrial unrest and increasing discontent prompted the Government to set 
up a Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest, and its report of June 1917 
identified poor housing as an important factor contributing to mounting unrest. As a 
result, the Ministry of Munitions embarked on a housing programme to relieve pressure 
on housing stock and defuse the industrial and social crisis, but it 'was regarded less as 
a welfare measure than a compelling necessity' 6 . Initially, the solution was thought to 
lie in the provision of temporary housing, but this was quickly abandoned as 
uneconomical and a waste of resources. However, the building of permanent housing 
raised important policy questions. Building plans were inhibited by an anticipated post-
war population fall in these centres, which would create a housing surplus and thus 
reduce rent and property values. As a result, the private sector was reluctant to invest in 
such areas and local authorities, wary of high costs and future falling values, sought 
financial protection. To meet this need, a number of subsidies were devised for local 
authorities, but the government was to pay the full cost of Ministry built schemes 7 . 
Abrams argues that government intervention in munitions workers' housing both 
generated an impetus for reform and created the machinery with which to implement it 
and, coupled with the unprecedented level of popular participation, should have 
stimulated radical post-war change. However, whilst wartime building was restricted by 
lack of investment and high labour and materials costs, the economic consequences of 
53 
peace were almost as drastic, inhibiting reform and thus undermining the participation 
concept 8 . 
Acute housing shortages and high inflation had necessitated the continuation of rent 
restrictions into the post-war period, when The Housing and Town Planning Act of 
1919 (The Addison Act), represented a major turning point. Seen as the first experiment 
in the State provision of working-class housing, the Act encouraged local authorities to 
supply housing for the first time, and any losses above that which could be met by a id 
rate were to be borne by the Treasury. Although a radical departure from previous 
policies, the Act was never intended as a general rent subsidy, and was essentially a 
temporary measure intended to cope with the wartime housing shortage and inflated 
costs until the market recovered. Post-war housing policy, and the failure and legacy of 
the 1919 Act, are much debated and variously interpreted. 
Swenarton contends for example, that housing became an instrument of public policy 
for the first time, and describes the 'homes fit for heroes' campaign as a major political 
and ideological weapon of the state. He asserts that a dynamic housing policy became 
the means to defuse the considerable unrest of 1919, of ensuring a successful transition 
from war to peace, and the restoration of both working class confidence in the 
government and social stability. Consequently the 1919 Housing Act proposed a large 
scale working class building programme at a standard previously reserved for the 
middle classes, to be financed by the state, with local authorities becoming major 
suppliers of working-class housing for the first time. However, as the depression 
disarmed the labour movement and altered the balance of political forces, 'the 
"insurance against revolution" was no longer needed', and the policy was abandoned as 
being an unjustifiable expense9 . 
In contrast, Bowley identified the separation of financial and administrative 
responsibility as a principal factor in the undermining of the 1919 Act. Although the 
government retained a powerful influence on planning which restricted local authority 
initiative, the Act provided no check on inefficient or extravagant local authorities' 0 . 
Seen as too expensive in the economic climate of 1921, this first housing experiment 
ended with a panic-stricken rejection of financial innovation. 
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Beanie's interpretation" on the other hand, challenges the view that it was the loss of 
enthusiasm for building by many local authorities that led to the collapse of the Act, 
arguing that local authorities became converted to the need for municipal housing. He 
also asserts that the major legacy of the 1919 Act was the realisation that the private 
sector could not be relied upon to provide working class housing and that the shortage 
could not be met without state subsidies, necessitating the continued partnership of local 
authorities and central government. He maintains that the local authority willingness to 
build was an important factor in the shaping of subsequent legislation and the uneven 
natufe of its consequences. 
The 1923 Chamberlain Act represented another attempt to stimulate the private sector 
by offering subsidies to private builders and conformed to 'sound principles of 
conservative finance" 2. However, this second housing experiment was still essentially 
an emergency measure, based on the anticipation of a short-lived crisis and the 
assumption that house building would resume its pre-war pattern of private enterprise 
aided by a limited government subsidy. Bewley argues it represented a deliberate 
attempt to prevent local authorities from becoming permanent suppliers of working-
class housing, whilst limited subsidies had the effect of putting new house rents beyond 
the means of the poorer families. It was not until the Labour Government and the 
Wheatley Act of 1924 that long-term planning become a reality, and local authorities 
gained, and retained, responsibility for supplying working-class housing' 3 . 
Nevertheless, white collar and skilled workers were the main beneficiaries. The lowest 
paid remained unable to pay an economic rent and were thus reluctant to leave 
controlled properties, however bad the conditions, which in turn prevented filtering up 
and resulted in large numbers of families continuing to live in overcrowded and 
substandard housing. 
However, in some areas the rate of house building continued to decline as many local 
authorities, claiming a heavy rate burden, remained reluctant to build. Additionally, 
despite government subsidies, 'no self-interested body would readily wish to invest in 
economically crippled areas ... where there were few prospects and where the high 
level of both local rates and rent arrears gave poor promise of security for a loan'. Thus 
local authorities were unable to raise housing loans in either the public or the private 
sectors 14 . Thus areas with high rates and low rateable values were forced to stop 
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building, with the result that subsidies became focussed on areas least in need of 
assistance 15 . 
BARROW TO THE EVE OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
In the case of Barrow-in-Furness, the urban core of the town in 1914 consisted mainly 
of Victorian working-class terraced housing laid out in a grid pattern and although the 
streets were broad and paved, the houses opened directly on to the street with small 
back yards and narrow back alleys. However, they conformed to the minimum 
standards of model bye-laws, and were comparatively healthy and adequately built. 
Additionally, the tenement blocks of Barrow Island and Hindpool, four or five storeys 
high and built in the .1 860s by the Furness Railway and the Barrow Hematite Steel 
Company, provided high-density working-class accommodation and suggest that the 
economical use of land outweighed environmental considerations in anticipation of? 
good return for investment. During this period, working class housing was hastily 
erected with varying standards of workmanship, and by the 1880s, employer 
philanthropy in the form of the provision of even the most basic civic amenities was 
virtually extinct' 6 . Nevertheless, building was unable to keep pace with demand, with 
the result that overcrowding and sub-letting were endemic from the town's earliest 
days. The main industries of the town were established on the west and south west edge 
of the peninsula, and consequently the prevailing westerly winds blew funes and 
smoke from the gas works, shipyard and iron and steel works indiscriminately over the 
main town which lay to their east. The 'better' residential areas, which lay to the north-
east of the town, consisted of a few streets of semi-detached houses with gardens, 
which were owned or tenanted by clerks, draughtsmen and officials' 7 . To the west, th 
town was protected from the sea by Walney Island, sparsely populated in Victorian 
times and accessible only by ferry or rowing boat. 
Vickers' take-over of the Naval Construction Company in Barrow in 1897, signalled a 
new period of growth for shipbuilding in the town, and the need to attract and retain a 
stable labour force stimulated the second major phase of employer house building in 
Barrow. From the turn of the twentieth century, Vickers began to colonise Walney 
Island, building around 1,000 dwellings during 1900-01 to meet the needs of its own 
labour force, grading its provision to reinforce workplace hierarchies typical of 
shipbuilding regions' 8 . As a result, Vickers, in addition to being the town's main 
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employer, became the largest local provider of working-class housing. Within a ten-year 
period, Vickers had created what was in effect a new town with every conceivable 
amenity, creating one of the most desirable residential areas, populated by Vickers 
worknen living in company-built houses. Unlike Lever or Cadbury however, Vickers 
had no enlightened schemes of profit sharing. Rents were deducted directly from wages, 
the company keeping financial control of all the buildings and amenities, and reaping 
substantial profits at every turn. Equally significant was the building of Walney Bridge, 
an expensive investment which provided the island with a permanent link to the 
mainland. However, in order to recoup the massive outlay, Vickers levied a toll on all 
persons crossing from either side, including the Company's own workmen who were 
compelled to pay on a daily basis when crossing to and from work. The company made 
no concessions, even following the toll riots of 1922 which are discussed later' 9 . 
Vickers houses, soundly built, well-maintained and free from industrial fumes, with 
flush toilets, running water and also the first area of town to have electricity, carried a 
high status despite the fact that amid the trappings of modernity, their ashpits were as 
infrequently scraped out as in the rest of the borough. In contrast Hindpool, on the 
opposite side of the channel, was consistently identified as the poorest area. Built 
originally to house the workers of the iron and steel works, its dwellings were 
frequently described as sub-standard, badly designed and poorly maintained, whilst the 
tenements were unpopular and generated many prejudices as a result of their forbidding 
appearance. Yet even in areas such as Hindpool and Barrow Island, some groups of 
streets were seen to be better than others, and other evidence, whilst testifying to the bad 
conditions in certain areas, saw poverty as being spread right across the borough with a 
mix of income groups in all housing areas 20, an unusual situation where, unlike 
Vickerstown, skilled and unskilled could live side by side and pay the same rents 21 . 
Whilst many contemporaries blamed the tenant for the condition of the property, poorly 
maintained houses were common, and oral evidence reveals that many landlords 
avoided repairs and had no contact with their tenants 22 . The most commonly requested 
repairs were minor, such as window catches, toilet flushes, taps and so forth, but even 
these were avoided by a majority of landlords. Thus a common complaint was that the 
tenants found themselves 'paying money, money all the time, what dci we get for it 
we've paid money all this time and nothing for it'. This respondent describes house 
ownership networks, which included some local Councillors who owned and let a string 
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of houses. Among these, only Councillor Dockeray (an Independent) is accredited with 
frequent repairs, whilst doctors were listed among the worst offenders, owning 'some 
horrible houses' 23 . 
Despite poor conditions, rents were extremely high, aggravated by high land prices, 
rising building costs and the local authority's refusal to build working class housing. 
'Beyond the provision of bare essentials, the municipal concerns of the [Council] were 
very limited and reflected the councillors' intentions to keep the rates low and leave as 
many spheres as possible - most notably housing - in the hands of private firms 24 .' 
Average house rents during the pre-war period ranged from 4/6d to 7/6d per week, or 
expressed another way, were between 2/- and 2/6d a week higher than for similar 
houses in Liverpool or Manchester, whilst Vickerstown rents ranged between 5/- and 
9/- per week. The combination of high rents and the housing shortage contributed to the 
two key features of housing in the borough: overcrowding, and a high incidence of 
working-class house ownership. For example, whilst a rent of 5/- per week was not 
uncommon before the war, if a deposit could be raised the cost of a mortgage compared 
favourably at around 12/- per month 26 , making house ownership increasingly attractive 
to those who could raise the capital. In her study of pre-war Barrow, Elizabeth Roberts 
concluded that 'one of the most surprising pieces of evidence from respondents in 
Barrow is that of poor families placing such importance on housing that they managed 
to buy their own houses about the turn of the century' 27 . However, given the economic 
uncertainties and lack of job security in the town, it is unlikely that a considerable 
proportion of the poorer working classes were either able to save or would have 
qualified for a loan, unlike craftsmen, many of whom were able to purchase one or more 
houses. A closer examination of Elizabeth Roberts' respondents tends to support this 
view, typical occupations of house buyers including a journeyman baker, a Vickers 
foreman and a boilermaker 28 . Nevertheless, although there was a relatively high rate of 
working class owner-occupation owing.to  the high proportion of skilled workers in the 
town, the unskilled, the casually employed or the poor were unlikely to be included 
among the ranks of Barrow's home owners 29 . 
Sub-letting offered a profitable source of additional income and was also an economic 
necessity for some low-income families, and overcrowding remained a constant 
problem for the authorities. In 1913 for example, 62 cases were dealt with in the 
courts30. Nevertheless, despite a steady rate of population growth (Table 2.1), Table 2.2 
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demonstrates that the number of people per dwelling was in fact steadily fatling in the 
years prior to the war. However it should be noted that thecontinuation of this trend in 
the post-war period is not due to an increase in the housing stock (see Table 2.3), but to 
fatling population levels, notably due to migration from the area. 
Chart 2.1: Population of Barrow-in-Furness 1904-1926 
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Chart 2.2: Persons per dwelling 1904-1926 
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THE WAR: AN IMPETUS FOR CHANGE 
The outbreak of hostilities reversed the earlier downward trend as munitions production 
brought a massive influx of workers into the town, placing the still overcrowded 
housing stock under intense pressure. Precise information on the size of the expanded 
worklorce is not available, and whilst the sources average the number of female 
munitions workers at around 6,000, the total for the wartime workforce varies 
considerably. For example, whilst the number of pre-war Vickers workers is given as 
anything between 12,000 and 17,000 1 , the wartime maximum has been variously 
recorded as 31,319, 33,209 or 36,00032,  giving a total increase ranging between 14,319 
and 24,000 workers. A further disparity arises from the official population figures 
published by Barrow Corporation, which show an increase of only 14,600 by 1916, 
followed by a subsequent steep decline (Table 2.1). These figures however, are 
extremely suspect, and can possibly be interpreted more as a response to the findings of 
the Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest, 1917, rather than an actual decline in 
the numbers of munitions workers, particularly as there is no other documentary 
evidence to support this reduction. Additionally, Ministry of Munitions figures, based 
on evidence from the town's Medical Officer, put the wartime population at 
approximately 100,000 33. This is very likely to be the more accurate figure, and 
represents an increase of3l,477, or 46 1/o, over the 1913-1914 population level, and 
continued until the end of the war. 
Whilst an unspecified number of workers were billeted in nearby towns, in the first two 
years of the war it was largely left to private enterprise to meet the increased demand for 
accommodation. Within two months of the outbreak of hostilities Vickers secured a 
War Office loan on favourable terms for the purchase of house-building land on 
Walney. By the summer of 1916 they had built a total of 610 three-bedroomed parlour 
houses, and subsidised the building of another 111 by private syndicates 34. In addition, 
the Salvation Army had opened a hostel for 250 munitions workers, and Trades Hostels 
Ltd had built a hostel for 230 men on Barrow Island. However, whilst these and other 
hostels provided temporary accommodation for some munitions workers", the vast 
majority had to find lodgings in an already overcrowded town, and it is the impact of 
the latter group on the borough's housing that will be the focus of this study. 
An immediate response to the intensification of the housing shortage was the charging 
of famine rents. For example, the wartime cost of lodgings in Barrow ranged between 
eight and twelve shillings per week, exceeding the Billeting Board's allowance of 6 
shillings36, whilst the average rent of an artisan's house had increased to between eight 
and ten shillings per week by November 1918. The vast profits to be made from the 
letting of rooms stimulated the housing market, creating a rush to buy, and a spate of 
evictions. Although the Rent Restrictions Act froze rents and banned evictions, this was 
not extended to lodgings and an owner was able to take possession of the property, 
occupy a couple of rooms and let the rest. There was a growing body of opinion in the 
town that the law was operating unfairly in Barrow, 'people were buying houses to 
obtain possession, and it was practically defeating the objects for which the law was 
brought into effect.' 38 . A typical example was that of a house previously rented for 916d 
per week, but after it was sold over the occupant's head, the same tenant rented a single 
room in the same dwelling for 6/6d per week 39 . 'It was so bad in Barrow that everybody 
was buying houses and there was a long queue waiting to get possession' 40, resulting in 
rising numbers of evictions and overcrowding which reached chronic proportions. 
Corporation records on wartime overcrowding are sparse, but disclose they could only 
'get an idea' from figures obtained from Sanitary Inspectors' random checks, with the 
admission that only a census would provide comprehensive figures 41 . Information about 
wartime overcrowding levels is therefore patchy, and combined with suspect population 
statistics, must be viewed with caution. 
One surviving but undated report from the war years recorded no overcrowding in the 
town's tenement blocks, and contained only a cursory examination of the numbers of 
persons per house in just four streets, (Fable 2.3). Arithmetically inaccurate, it reveals 
little of housing conditions in the borough, but demonstrates the Corporation's poor 
recording procedures and further emphasises the problems arising from local statistics 42 
Another file dated June and July 1917, no doubt stimulated by the Commission of 
Enquiry into Industrial Unrest, again examined overcrowding in four streets and 
contained the table shown in Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.1 	 Corporation Estimate of Wartime Overcrowding 
Street No. persons 
per house 
No. persons 
per room 
Duke St. 4.2 1.9 
Blake St. 4.2 2.1 
WalneyRd. 4.7 2.0 
TaySt. 4.1 2.0 
Table 2.2 	 Corporation Estimate of Wartime Overcrowding, 1917 
Street No. of Rouses No. with 2 or 
more families 
No. with 
lodgers 
No. of 
bedrooms 
Melbourne St. 72 8 34 3 
Adelaide St. 35 8 15 3 
ExmouthSt. 48 1 10 2&3 
Howe St. 54 3 26 3 
Housing Statistics 1914.1921, BA/H BOXI I 
Although providing greater statistical detail than its predecessor, giving details of the 
number of families, lodgers and bedrooms, the report still fails to provide any 
meaningfUl correlation of the figures with regard to the level of overcrowding in these 
properties. However, the report does list some individual examples, the worst being the 
conditions at 49 Melbourne Street, where 12 adults and seven children occupied a three-
bedroomed house. Moreover, the report reveals a heavy reliance on 'alternative' forms 
of accommodation, and identified 79 caravans occupied as dwellings 43 . 
The reports contain no sense of urgency or concern for the deteriorating housing 
situation, and that the Council could find so little evidence of overcrowding is 
staggering in the light of the findings of the Commission of Enquiry Into Industrial 
Unrest 1917, which reported, 'The housing question is acute. The number of beds 
occupied by night and day on the Box and Cox principle is very high and runs into 
thousands.' TM. The Commission described living conditions in the borough as 'a terrible 
Housing Statistics 19 14-1921. BA/H BOXJJ 
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indictment' against those in authority, an opinion underscored by the evidence put 
before the Commission, which revealed the Corporation's blindness to the situation, 
wilful or otherwise. Indeed, the Chief Medical Officer's report for 1917, published in 
the wake of the Commission's Report, attempts to mitigate on behalf of the 
Corporation, stating that: 
'Considerable difficulty was experienced during the year [1917] in dealing 
with the housing of the extra immigration of males and females in the 
production of munitions of war. It was felt that action could only be taken in 
gross cases, and these were dealt with by serving notices to abate the 
nuisance of overcrowding. Many cases were overlooked on account of war 
conditions, which, under normal conditions, would have been dealt with.' 45 
Nevertheless the report fails to conceal the Corporation's failure to grapple with the 
housing crisis. 
The Commission's Report illustrated the profits being made through sub-letting. A 
family of six for example, paid 7/- per week for one bedroom in a house that was leased 
for 4/6d. It described other cases where nine were found to live in one room, or sixteen 
in one small house. The Council was not required to give evidence, but Councillor 
Ellison J.P., in his capacity as a representative of the Labour Party and Trades Council, 
gave evidence of cases from his own personal knowledge, describing cases of women 
close to confinement being evicted onto the streets, and of women giving birth in one 
room which was home, not only for the entire family, but often for lodgers as well. 
The report criticised central government for being remote, ignorant of local conditions 
and obstructive, but praised Vickers for its foresight and efforts to ease the housing 
shortage, describing the company's scheme as of great value to the town, although 
expressing some doubts as to the flsm's motives. The report also placed the number of 
evictions in perspective, stating these were not excessive. Ejectment orders had only 
been granted in 42 cases out of7l, and in many of these the incoming occupant had 
been compelled to take in the outgoing tenant as a lodger, a policy which aided the 
homeless situation, but aggravated the problem of overcrowding. However, despite the 
Magistrates' humane interpretation of the law, which kept evictions to a minimum, and 
deferred ejectment orders in the County Court, unscrupulous property owners were 
turning to the High Court, where tenants were unable to fight due to the high costs. 
This action prompted local magistrates to send a deputation to the Ministry of 
Munitions to press for a change in the law and the building of 1,000 new houses as soon 
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as possible47 . Although further evidence is unavailable, this provides an early indication 
that severe social problems could stimulate new forms of response and solidarity of 
action, and is particularly interesting as the first working class representative did not 
appear on the magistrates' bench until 1919. 
The Commission of Enquiry pointed the finger of blame squarely at the Corporation, 
and expressed the view that the housing problem in the borough was well recognised 
and 'ought to have been understood by the authorities'. The damning indictment, 'We 
cannot believe that the facts we propose to set down could so long have remained actual 
conditions of domestic life in England during the twentieth century', was to have 
significant and far-reaching repercussions. The impact on local politics and social 
attitudes will be dealt with in later chapters, whilst the administrative response to the 
rising crisis is examined below. 
The Commission stressed the need for greater government awareness of the true 
conditions in Barrow which would 'naturally be the cause of serious unrest in the 
future' 49, recommending the formulation of an emergency housing scheme with full 
government backing, to be instigated immediately. Thus, as Swenarton contends, 
housing was clearly seen as a key factor in the rising levels of unrest and for the first 
time became an instrument of public policy in a bid to defuse the serious threat of social 
instability. 
The Ministry of Munitions' plan, prior to the Commission's Report, to build 250 
houses50, was immediately considered to be insufficient, and on the strength of the 
Commission's Report, the Corporation demanded an extra 1,000. Vickers had refused 
any further financial assistance, but the Ministry doubted their ability to take up a 
scheme on that scale, and proceeded to undermine the Conunission's findings and dilute 
the scale of the crisis. The Ministry claimed that although building had failed to keep 
pace with demand and extra accommodation was necessary, it anticipated a drastic post-
war fall in population and a housing surplus, arguing that the need was not as great as 
the figures might suggest and that Barrow and district had been 'over-housed' in the pre-
war period. Additionally the civil servants argued that the examples used by the 
Commission should not be taken as typical, and concluded that rented houses were in 
the minority, 'for the most part the working man here owns his own house'. The 
Ministry also claimed that the 'people prefer crowded conditions to unsuitable housing', 
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and even quoted an anonymous witness as saying 'where there is most overcrowding in 
Barrow, is where the working man prefers to go.' Such an attitude clearly supports the 
Commission's opinion on the gulf between central government and the regions, and 
enabled to Ministry to minimise the crisis, stating that overcrowding in Barrow was not 
as severe as in other industrial towns, and was not a priority owing to its temporal)' 
nature5t . However, the ease with which the Ministry succeeded in limiting housing 
expenditure in Barrow undermines Swenarton's interpretation whereby housing 
provided an 'insurance against revolution'. 
Nevertheless, the Ministry of Munitions did recognise the need for more houses and 
sought to alleviate what it saw as the temporary problem of wartime overcrowding. The 
official Ministry scheme proposed 500 semi-permanent and 500 permanent houses to be 
built simultaneously and completed by March 1918. Additionally, Barrow was declared 
a special area under the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA), which prevented the 
eviction of munitions workers without Ministry of Munitions permission, as long as 
they had upheld the conditions of their tenancy agreements. Those already evicted were 
to be re-housed in unoccupied dwellings requisitioned under DORA, although there is 
no indication of where these 'unoccupied' dwellings were to be found 52 . 
THE FAILURE OF RECONSTRUCTION 
Seeking to avoid State ownership, the Ministry expected Vickers, private individuals or 
the Corporation (which had first reffisal), to purchase the permanent houses after the 
war. The semi-permanent dwellings on the other hand, made from cast concrete, poorly 
constructed and badly situated, remained under Ministry control. It was never 
anticipated that permanent workers would want to live there, but they were seen as an 
adequate short-term expedient. However, class attitudes at the Ministry of Munitions 
are reflected in the selection of suitable sites. For example, the Salthouse Road area was 
described as having 'natural leanings ... towards a rough and unthrifty class of tenant' 
and bordered on the Raglan Street area where, apart from 'the tell-tale smell of dirt', 
'the windows are broken and patched, and bear the usual marks of rough and low-class 
tenants' 53 . Nevertheless, the site was considered suitable for the semi-permanent 
dwellings of the Roosecote Estate, whilst a green-field site was selected for the 
permanent housing of the Abbotsmead estate (See Appendix 1). However, by January 
1918 the construction of the semi-permanent dwellings had been halted by a petition 
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from residents and property owners protesting against their erection in the vicinity of 
good property, and was to be abandoned following Corporation protests to the Ministry 
regarding the standard of the buildings, although the 202 that had been started were to 
be completed'4. The building of permanent housing at Abbotsmead was to continue, but 
again, 50% of these were delayed by a shortage of materials. 
The Roosecote and Abbotsmead estates were problematic from the outset. The first area 
of contention was the Ministry of Munitions' unilateral attempts to fix rents at the 
extremely high figure of 17/- per week, which roused Corporation protests at both the 
figure and the lack of consultation. By virtue of being a Ministry funded scheme 
however, the question of rents was a matter of public policy 55, and whilst the Ministry 
insisted on the need to charge an economic rent to recoup the high building costs, the 
Corporation was adamant that it was unreasonable to expect a working man to pay such 
an amount. However, following the Corporation's retinal to accept even reduced rents 
of between 10/- and 12/- per week, and with over half of the proposed houses not built, 
the Ministry of Munitions announced an end to its building programme 56 . 
A further problem on the Abbotsmead Estate was the large numbers of properties 
standing empty despite the chronic housing shortage. Following the Corporation 
decision not to purchase the properties from the Ministry of Munitions, the houses were 
placed on the market. However, when the best offer of 	 failed to meet the average 
building cost of £1,200, the properties were withdrawn from sale in July 1919, and they 
were still unoccupied in the autumn of 1920. In response to pressure from the Labour 
Party and Trades Council urging the Corporation to take over some of the empty 
houses, the Corporation appealed to H.M. Office of Works in a letter which clearly 
illustrates, not only that the housing shortages were still chronic, but also the rising 
threat of direct popular action: 
'in view of the acute shortage of housing accommodation in the borough, 
and the constant pressure of the Government on the Corporation to meet this 
shortage, [we] protest in the strongest possible manner against the action of 
the Department in keeping these houses empty; that the Corporation have on 
their books several hundred of applications for the houses which are being 
erected by them under their Housing Schemes, and that a large number of 
people are at present living in caravans and under most deplorable 
conditions, both as regards health and morality . further, that it has been 
brought to the notice of the Committee that threats have been made that 
unless such empty houses are at once let, forcible possession of them will be 
taken'". 
In 
Despite some delay, consent was eventually given to let the houses, although the fixing 
of rent levels within the borough continued to be disputed with both the Ministry of 
Health and the Regional Housing Commission. 
With a view to reconstruction, during the latter half of the war the government had 
requested local authorities to submit plans or at least state their intentions regarding the 
post-war provision of working-class housing. However, out of a possible 1806 local 
authorities, only 311 responded, Barrow being among the abstaining majority which 
required a more definite financial commitment from the government 58 . Similarly in 
1918, Barrow was among the 130 districts which again failed to respond to a further 
request from the government 59, the Corporation protesting against the vagueness of the 
financial proposals which gave no indication of the extent of local authority financial 
responsibility60 . 
Nevertheless, the war had brought a major change to the Council's attitudes towards the 
provision of working-class housing, the Corporation acknowledging that 'it is the duty 
of local authorities to carry through a programme of housing for the working classes' 61 . 
However, following the demise of the Ministry of Munitions, the Corporation's decision 
to proceed with the building of the remaining 500 houses quickly ran into difficulties. 
With only 113 near completion, the Housing Commission rejected tenders for the 
remainder for being too high, and despite Council attempts to stimulate the building of 
working-class houses and limit non-essential work, construction was hindered by 
shortages of labour and materials, and the need to balance housing needs against the 
effects of the depression. However, the Council was fairly evenly divided on the 
housing issue. Some councillors were against the entire concept, while others believed 
building could not be justified, as local industry would never again be able to employ 
such a large populatiOn. Another view suggested building should be deferred until costs 
fell and rents could be reasonable. The pro-housing lobby supported building on the 
grounds of the borough's poor and insanitary conditions, whilst others argued for giving 
people 'decent places to live and not herding them like pigs'. On the other hand, there 
was a considerable body of opinion, both within the Corporation and from the general 
public, that it was the habits of the people themselves that were responsible for the bad 
conditions, and such arguments and their consequences will be examined fully in 
Chapter Seven. 
["A 
Table 2.3 illustrates the rate of house building in Barrow throughout the period. 
Table 23: 	 Houses constructed in Barrow 1912-1926 
Year 	 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 
No. Houses 180 230 416 284 612 183 	 6 	 1 	 123 
Year 	 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 
No.Houses 191 	 149 	 6 	 5 	 1 	 0 
Source: Borough Surveyors Reports 1912-27 
Clearly, despite some change of attitude, house building in the Borough fell away 
rapidly in the post-war period. Apart from those built by the Ministry of Munitions, the 
few subsidised, built and completed under the 1919 Act barely equalled the pre-war 
rate, and the table also indicates that the Acts of 1923 and 1924 had a negligible impact 
on local house building. 
However, whilst the Corporation successfiully influenced rent levels of new housing, it 
had no control over caravans, and the post-war period saw continued evictions, 
increasing numbers of houses standing empty and the expansion of 'alternative' forms 
of accommodation. The leasing of caravans was a profitable business and a landowner 
would pay rates for the land and lease vans, railway wagons and furniture vehicles, 
creating small colonies in which families lived under primitive conditions. In April 
1919 for example, 28 adults and eleven childmn were living in railway wagons 
measuring 6'6" high, 6' wide and 10'6" long, at weekly rents of seven shillings per 
wagon, with just one toilet between them. Rates were not payable on mobile homes 
and they were not affected by bye-laws, and this generated an assortment of structures, 
some with artificial wheels and others with wheels blatantly painted on as landowners 
sought to profit from the homeless. By 1925 such dwellings were leased for up to 15/-
per week, but although housing pressure had forced a degree of official toleration, by 
this time the Corporation began to clamp down on what it saw as 'an objectionable state 
of affairs' 63 . 
Although the Corporation had taken steps to deal with the worst abuses, efforts proved 
futile in the face of increasing homelessness, but the post-war experience, unlike 
wartime evictions which took place in a climate of rising prosperity, was one of 
unemployment and increasing hardship. Pressure was mounting from the Labour Party 
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and Trades Council in June 1919, urging the Council to make every effort to ease the 
hardships caused by the housing shortage, and threatening grave industrial disorder 
unless the granting of ejectment orders stopped immediately". The magistrates refused 
to meet a Corporation deputation, stating that evictions involved the judicial function of 
the Justices, whose powers and duties were subject to legislation rather than negotiation. 
Nevertheless, the magistrates continued to interpret the law with humanity, some 
defendants winning their cases and others being deferred. As an illustration of the scale 
of the problem of rent arrears, of the 68 houses purchased by the corporation on Walney 
in November 1921, by August 192260 tenants were in anears, yet the eviction of just 
one tenant who refused to respond to negotiation attempts was sought (successfully). 
Whilst the Corporation began taking an active role in all aspects of working-class 
housing, the housing policy of Vickers also underwent change. The firm had sold off 30 
of its Walney houses in order to raise capital for its wartime building scheme 65 , and 
inunediately after the war took the decision to sell off its Walney housing stock to 
employees in a bid to capitalise on the boom in property prices, on condition that if the 
purchasers decided to sell or left Vickers' employ, the Company were to re-purchase the 
property at no greater than the original selling price 66 . However, post-war economic 
confidence was short-lived, and by March 1920 both the Corporation and local building 
societies had stopped giving loans. Undeterred, Vickers created its own building society 
in order to continue to reap the benefit of the still buoyant housing market. In 1920 a 
total of 48 houses were sold, and initially continued to sell at a rate of approximately 
one per week. Rents on the other hand, were a more delicate issue which the Company 
had to approach with great caution, particularly in view of agitation both nationally and 
locally and with no wish to provoke a local version of the Clydeside rent strikes. Whilst 
it was impossible to raise rents at this juncture, an alternative course of action was to 
give tenants responsibility for the payment of their own rates and water rates directly to 
the Council, ensuring any increases would fall directly on the tenant. This was a shrewd 
move as Vickers and the Walney Estate Company were to be badly hit by the effects of 
the depression. 
Problems were encountered by the end of 1920 as increasing numbers of tenants and 
mortgagees were laid off. These trends continued, and a paradoxical situation developed 
during 1921, with company houses still selling steadily whilst rent arrears increased 
with rising unemployment; By December 1921, rent arrears of £2,300 were 
compounded by the withdrawal of a £7 per house subsidy by the parent company, 
resulting in a revenue loss of over £8,000 by March 192267. 
 Anticipating the situation 
would worsen, Vickers' Chairman had ruled as early as December 1920 that employees 
living in company housing 'should, in the interests of the Housing Companies68 , receive 
special consideration' 69 . Consequently the Estates Company compiled lists 'of the men 
who have bought houses so that they may receive consideration when discharges are 
made' 70, and took the precaution of protecting all its properties with riot insurance 71 . 
Vickers and the Estates Company liased to assist 'good workmen' who were discharged 
and unable to meet their liabilities, giving priority of employment to men with 
mortgages from the Company's building society, and temporarily employing tradesmen 
as labourers until a more suitable vacancy arose 72 . Nevertheless, by September 1922, 
the number of tenants with rent arrears peaked at over 800, and the financial report in 
December was grim. Whilst increasing numbers of houses were repurchased 73 , the 
recovery of rent arrears had proved virtually impossible as the courts persistently 
adjourned the cases, compelling the Company to write off losses totalling over £9,000 
in an effort to reduce their own income tax liabilities. 
Whilst unemployed tenants and buyers continued to be given priority of work 
throughout the period, from 1923 the strategies on arrears became more severe. Vickers 
began providing lists of men likely to be laid off in the near future, enabling the Estates 
Company to take steps to evict any of the men thus identified who had rent arrears 74 . 
Although unemployment gradually fell, the building society began to foreclose on those 
'hopelessly in arrears' in November 1924. However, this was done surreptitiously, the 
society repossessing the properties in its own name and taking 'such steps as will 
altogether disassociate the houses from the Companies at Walney' 75 . Action was also 
taken against rent arrears cases, but only in the instances where success was most likely. 
Despite taking these cases to the Police Court, which more readily granted vacant 
possession than the County Court, few ejectment orders were made and the court 
generally only ordered nominal repayments 76 . Inevitably, such houses as did become 
vacant stood empty for the prescribed period to enable rent increases. Thus the Walney 
Estates Company went to great lengths to protect its position during the early 1920s, 
liasing closely with Vickers and creating a caste of workers with greater job security. 
However, no evidence has come to light, in either the minutes of the trade unions or the 
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Trades Council, or in the local press, to suggest that the public were aware of this 
collusion between the two companies and their manipulation of the labour crisis. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the housing situation in Barrow can be summarised as one of insufficient 
housing stock and deteriorating living conditions, resulting in increasing overcrowding, 
rent arrears and homelessness. The housing shortage kept rent levels high, and 
stimulated working-class house ownership, largely among skilled craftsmen, some of 
whom became landlords in their own right, letting a string of houses. There is evidence 
of firmly established spatial and social hierarchies, in addition to an element of 
sympathy and tolerance at an administrative level, such as the actions of the magistrates 
and the manner in which various 'abuses' were tolerated, particularly regarding the 
makeshift colonies of the homeless. These are important facets of local social attitudes. 
In the pre-war period, the Corporation maintained a minimal role in the provision of 
civic.amenities, relying on the private sector in order to keep the rates low, a lack of 
involvement demonstrated by the early attempts at overcrowding assessment. This 
attitude however, underwent considerable revision, the Commission of Enquiry into 
Industrial Unrest providing the catalyst for a break with the past, condemning the 
Corporation's passive acceptance of appalling living conditions. The Conm,ission's 
report demonstrates that the housing issue was closely linked to rising industrial and 
social unrest, and Barrow can be said to have directly benefited by the response to the 
unrest on Clydeside. However, despite appearing to support Swenarton's contention that 
government intervention represented a defence against the threat of revolution, the 
practical response to this threat, particularly in Barrow, qualifies this interpretation. The 
ease with which the Ministry of Munitions succeeded in undermining perceptions of the 
scale of the crisis in Barrow suggests that social disorder was not seen as an imminent 
threat, whilst the scale of building was limited, even before industrial militancy was 
neutralised by high unemployment. With regard to the concept that popular 
participation stimulated social reform, the case-study fails to find evidence to suggest 
that ideology such as the 'Homes Fit For Heroes' campaign, or the reconstruction 
debate more generally, was influential at municipal level, but supports Abrams 
contention that powerful, competing forces worked against reform. 
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One such factor operating in the Barrow context was the wartime building by the 
Ministry of Munitions which, by virtue of meeting, in theory at least, the anticipated 
need for working-class housing, reduced the impact of the Addison Act. Additionally, 
the setting of rent levels demonstrates a clash of interests between central government 
and the local authority, and reflects the need to attract the private sector through the 
charging of economic rents, whilst keeping rents to an affordable level in order to 
relieve the housing crisis. A second important factor operating against reform was the 
deteriorating economic climate in the immediate post-war period which greatly 
increased pressure on the rates and prohibited all house building, not just that 
designated for the working classes. As a result, the influence of subsequent housing 
legislation was negligible. Thus, Barrow in many ways reflects the problems typically 
associated with working-class housing but with some important idiosyncrasies, and fails 
to fit neatly into broad theories and debates, illustrating the diversity of local experience 
during these years. 
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HEALTH TRENDS THROUGH WAR AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
us, IRSJP1I1SiiIXl 
This chapter examines the health of Barrow in relation to national trends from the 
immediate pre-war period to the late 1920s. Owing to immense regional variations of 
occupational structure, social composition and economic experience, local studies are 
central to the understanding of the dual impact of war and depression on the health of 
the community. Barrow's wartime role as an important munitions centre provides ideal 
conditions with which to test the assertion that the war produced significant health gains 
for the working classes as a result of higher earnings. Additionally, the analysis will be 
extended into the inter-war period, and using existing studies of working-class living 
standards, will make a longer-term appraisal and assess the extent to which any wartime 
gains may have been eroded by long-term unemployment. To facilitate this, the study 
includes a comparative analysis of Barrow and Middlesbrough. This comparison will 
provide additional context for the Barrow data and help to explain any exceptional 
features, and in conjunction with the preceding two chapters, will contribute to the 
reconstruction of the everyday living conditions which formed the bckthop against 
which social attitudes and political forces developed and operated. 
To provide a context for the Barrow case-study, it is necessary to outline the general 
trends and debates relating to public health issues. An awareness of class was central to 
British society, and fixed, widely held assumptions permeated debates on population 
and health issues. Many social ills, including poverty itself, were thought by many to 
originate in weaknesses of character, whilst ignorance, particularly among working-
class mothers, was seen as making a substantial contribution to poor standards of 
nutrition, health and childcare. However, by the late nineteenth century national health 
statistics were reflecting the benefits of improved sanitation and legislation directed 
towards the improvement of public health, housing and factory conditions, resulting in 
falling death rates for all age groups in England and Wales (with the exception of 
infants in the first year of life), and rising life expectancy'. 
However, lower death rates did not necessarily equate with better health. Social 
Darwinists argued that public health reforms, by contravening the laws of nature, 
created a 'new, sickly urban "type" which, thanks to sanitary science, survived to 
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perpetuate and so thus weaken the national stock' 2 . Similarly, it was widely believed 
that the physical qualities of this new urban 'type', characteristically stunted, with little 
stamina and poor social and mental abilities, were passed on genetically from one 
generation to the next. Supporters of such hereditarian arguments refused to accept that 
better wages would provide higher standards of living and ultimately better health. 
Consequently, the falling birth rates among the 'better' classes and continuing 
expansion at the lower end of the social scale generated unease for the future prospects 
of 'a nation dominated numerically (if not politically) by the urban working-class', so 
often characterised as lazy, stupid and irresponsible 3 . Nevertheless, although many 
believed the claim that preventative medicine had weakened the nation, the case for 
public health reforms to counter the problem of physical weakness and urban debility 
proved more influential 4 . Such arguments were given additional impetus when the 
rejection of forty to sixty per cent of army recruits as unfit for military service during 
the Boer War5 roused fresh concerns for the health of the nation and the strength of the 
Empire. 	 - 
Amid concerns for national health and efficiency, the environmentalists advocated the 
need for a living wage, better diets, and improved living and working conditions 6 , 
whilst the Commissions and Committees of inquiry preferred to alleviate the problems 
of the residuum by mitigating the effects of poverty. Thus the Inter-Departmental 
Committee on Physical Deterioration of 1903, although not ignoring the influence of the 
urban environment, focused its attentions on the alleviation of the consequences of 
poverty. 'What this amounted to was the acknowledgement that the standard of national 
health now depended on raising the nutritional standard and physical fitness of the next 
generation' 7 . The feeding of school children and their routine medical examination were 
among the demands made by the Committee, and were implemented in 1906 and 1907 
respectively. 
However, the most concerted efforts were directed towards the prevention and cure of 
tuberculosis. In addition to being a major killer, its infectious nature had evoked 
government intervention and a unique, state-financed system for its treatment and cure, 
superseding that previously provided by voluntary organisations and private charities. 
The National Insurance Act, 1911, contained clauses for sanatorium provision which 
were exceptional in that they provided treatment both for insured workers and their 
dependants. Local Authorities were to establish dispensaries for the diagnosis of TB and 
'I' 
to direct patients to the most appropriate form of treatment. These were to be managed 
by TB Officers appointed by the local authority. Additionally, voluntary 'care 
committees' were to be organised to support the work of the dispensaries, although their 
efforts were often insufficient to meet the demand as a result of lack of funds 8 . The 
system was extended in 1912 when local authorities became responsible for the 
provision of treatment for non-insured workers and their dependants, aided by a 50% 
government subsidy, and in 1913 compulsory notification was introduced. However, 
positive steps to fight TB, such as by the isolation of patients and control of the milk 
supply, received a half-hearted response, and vaccination was not seriously considered. 
The emphasis instead, was placed on 'raising the resistance of the individual naturally' 9 . 
Some saw the improvement of economic conditions as the key to this, whilst others 
placed the emphasis on individual responsibility, giving the working classes more 
information in preference to tackling poverty directly. 
According to Rowntree's survey, at the turn of the century ten per cent of the population 
were unable to 'afford to buy enough food to ensure a minimum level of 
Additionally, routine medical inspections in schools identified malnutrition as a serious 
problem, with between 15% and 20% of schoolchildren suffering from dietary 
deficiencies at this time 11 . Simultaneously however, long-term demographic trends 
over the period indicate a distinct decline in both birth and mortality rates from the start 
of the twentieth century, whilst infant mortality, traditionally high as a result of 
environmental conditions and the prevalence of infectious diseases, also fell sharply, 
particularly during the war years. However, poverty crippled as well as killed' 2, and 
mortality statistics reveal little of underlying levels of ill-health and the incidence of 
minor ailments. In monitoring health levels, special importance has been attached to 
infant mortality rates, and it is widely agreed that these statistics, in relating to the most 
vulnerable section of the population, provide a useful indicator of general health and 
living standards. Additionally, many health problems, particularly maternal and infant 
health and the incidence of infectious diseases, are directly linked to levels of nutrition, 
and thus levels of malnutrition provide a reasonably good indication of the condition of 
national and regional health. 
School medical examinations sought to identify levels of malnutrition, but Webster 
argues that they tended to under-estimate levels of ill health by failing to recognise 
conditions not identifiable by a cursory examination. Their anthropometric techniques 
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which compared a child's build, height and weight to a given standard could, at best, 
only provide unsatisfactory estimates of nutrition levels, whilst subjective clinical 
assessments based on the condition of the hair, eyes, mucous membrane, attitude and 
level of alertness are a further illustration of this problem. Thus, in the absence of 
objective criteria, a particular difficulty was a lack of uniformity of response and 
assessment, as a result of which the level of malnutrition among school children was 
likely to be under-reportec 13 . 
The war focussed attention on the problem of popular health as never before, as once 
again, a high proportion of working-class men were unfit for military service. Addison 
argued that the reports of the National Service Board 'demonstrated beyond the shadow 
of a doubt that widespread ill health was "a source of national weakness" 14, 
 and 
contributed to the contemporary belief that civilian health deteriorated during the war. 
Winter challenges this view, and asserts that the youth of the 1914-18 war were the last 
generation to bear the effects of the scale of deprivation widespread in pre-war Britain, 
and that the war considerably improved civilian health and mortality rates 15 . 
Whilst Winter stresses the primacy of improved nutrition in the wartime decline of 
mortality rates, particularly among young children, older adults, and (with some 
qualifications) women in childbirth, arguing that the incidence of diarrhoea related 
deaths provides 'a very sensitive indicator of nutrition levels' 16 
 other interpretations 
provide a different emphasis. Linda Bryder for example, stresses the importance of the 
improved quality and purity of food rather than its nutritional value as a major 
contributory factor to the decline in infantile deaths' 7 , whilst Nigel Morgan argues that 
high concentrations of urban horses and the related housefly population were major 
contributors to the spread of disease. Consequently death rates fell as motorised 
transport gradually superseded the urban horse, particularly with regard to diarrhoea and 
enteritis among infants 1 8 .Nevertheless, life expectancy among most sections of the 
civilian population increased, but the greatest gains were evident in the under five age 
group, and although infant mortality rates were declining steadily throughout the first 
thirty years of the century, they fell most rapidly during the war years, and decreased by 
28% between 1918 and 1923'. Additionally, complications in pregnancy decreased by 
30%, and diarrhoeal diseases, identified as the greatest single cause of nineteenth 
century infant deaths fell by 35%20• 
 However, although it is generally accepted that 
deaths from infectious diseases declined as higher wages improved nutrition and raised 
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resistance to infection 21 , tuberculosis and other respiratory diseases paradoxically 
moved against this trend. TB death rates for example, increasing nationally by 25% 
between 1913 and 191822. 
However, whilst Winter attributes the rise of TB and respiratory disease to the effects of 
overcrowding and deteriorating housing conditions and dismisses nutrition as a 
contributory factor, Bryder 23 stresses the complexity of epidemiology and the 
interaction of housing, nutrition, sanitation and working conditions. She argues that 
Winter over-states the value of infant mortality statistics as a reliable indicator of 
general health standards and grossly under-estimates the role of nutrition in the 
prevention of TB. Neither contemporaries nor modem epidemiologists dismiss 
malnutrition as a contributory factor, and the link between them continued to be debated 
throughout the inter-war period, although the relationship between health, nutrition and 
unemployment was increasingly played down, particularly in the 1930s24.  Bryder also 
stresses the danger of basing generalisations on higher wartime wage levels, 
emphasising the need to differentiate. The wages of those engaged in war work, such as 
engineering, coal, rail and agriculture for example, outpaced the level of inflation, but 
other sectors did not, the building trade being a case in point. For many such workers, 
income levels fell in real terms. 
With regard to the inter-war period, Webster questions the impartiality of statistics 
relating to working class health, and official figures for the percentage incidence of 
malnutrition among school children showing a steep decline are a case in point. The 
15%-20%, which was seen as a serious problem before the war, had fallen to less than 
5% by 1925, which was attributed to improved Maternity and Child Care provision 25 . 
However, although the routine inspection of school children had been much valued, the 
advent of more scientific methods in the 1930's emphasised the inadequacies of the 
earlier examination techniques, and it became increasingly 'difficult to stave off fears 
that ... the steady improvement in the nutritional state of school children rested on 
totally unsound foundations' 26 . Amid increasing criticism of official figures and concern 
for the effects of long-term unemployment in distressed areas, the Ministry of Health 
mounted a survey of local evidence in 1932. The report concluded that 'health was 
poorer in depressed areas but not greatly worse than average' and black spots were 
attributed to 'chance' factors or ignorance rather than poverty. Throughout the 
depression, many Medical Officers' Reports have been described as falsely optimistic, 
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and the Ministry of Health used these to assure the nation that unemployment was not 
having a detrimental effect on health 27 . Thus Webster argues that from the 1920's, 
unreliable examination techniques and the under-reporting of ill-health make it difficult 
to thaw conclusions on health trends. 
Beyond these problems, local statistics are additionally problematic. Whilst health 
issues in Barrow during the pre-war period lacked political connotations and the 
statistics can be approached with a reasonable degree of confidence, this may not be the 
case after 1917. The blatantly inaccurate population figures published by the 
Corporation after this date inevitably call into question the reliability of Barrow's 
medical statistics. However, Barrow's Medical Officer furnished the Ministry of 
Munitions with population figures far in excess of official estimates, suggesting his 
statistics can offer some degree of reliability, although the inflation of population 
statistics would have the effect of deflating mortality levels. Thus where possible, 
published statistics will be analysed in conjunction with other documentary evidence, 
and also used in a comparative analysis of health trends in Barrow and Middlesbrough. 
Such an analysis will help to highlight any apparent anomalies in Barrow's medical 
statistics, and discrepancies between the towns, in the form of major health gains or 
losses, can be assessed in relation to varying local health provision or differences in 
poor relief policies. Of particular value to the comparison of working-class health and 
living standards are the studies of Elizabeth Roberts on pre-war Barrow, and Katharine 
Nicholas on Middlesbrough in the inter-war period. Both works are based on oral 
evidence and provide valuable insights on diets and consumption patterns, whilst 
Nicholas's budgetary analysis illustrates the hardships of life on unemployment benefit 
and outdoor relief. 
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FACTORS INFLUENCING HEALTH 
(i) The Environment 
Despite Banow's modernity, an absence of the slum areas that typified older industrial 
towns and cities, and a modem 'double sewer' sanitation system 28 , the town was fraught 
with health hazards. In addition to deteriorating housing conditions and overcrowding 
that were increasingly giving cause for concem, raw sewage was pumped directly into 
Walney Channel. However, owing to the failure of tidal movements to wash it all out to 
sea, sewage was left rotting on the banks at low tide, creating a major health hazard, 
particularly for the residents of the east side of Walney, and Hindpool. The swarms of 
flies thus generated were increased by the popularity of pig keeping in the town centre, 
and together with the use of open ashpits and collection carts, suggests that urban horses 
(cf Morgan) were in fact just one aspect of the house fly problem. The impact of 
wartime manpower shortages, which reduced the frequency of waste collection, was 
perpetuated in the post-war years by lack of funds, with the result that ashpits were 
emptied just once every three or four weeks and posed a very real health threat 29 . Oral 
evidence bears witness to the nuisance of flies coming directly off the middens and 
settling in food30 and also more general environmental problems. For example, the open 
spaces around the tenements were described as 'kind of play holes. They were muddy 
and dirty, dead cats and all sorts of things. Pollution was terrible' 31 , whilst children 
swam in the warm water reservoir of the steelworks amid 'fetid slime' and drowned 
dogs 32 . 
(ii) Incomes: War and Unemployment 
In addition to an environment conducive to epidemics and general ill-health, family 
sizes were larger than the national average, whilst pre-war income levels among 
sections of the working classes could be close to subsistence levels. Additionally, living 
standards were affected by intermittent unemployment, and the scarcity of waged work 
for married women. This combined with high rents could have a severely detrimental 
impact on the family budget, and in tum, on the diets of the lower paid sections of the 
community. As a result, the working classes, and families living on low incomes in 
particular, were likely to be under-nourished in the pre-war period, which in tum 
affected their general health and ability to resist infection. However, although money 
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wages rose considerably during the war years, the working week was longer and the 
men under greater pressure, whilst inflation and high rents could counter-balance wage 
improvements. Although the relationship between wages, rents and prices is difficult to 
analyse due to lack of information, Todd asserts that evidence from the Commission of 
Enquiry, the Labour Party and Trades Council, and the local press suggest 'that a great 
many families did experience real hardship during the war' 33 , reflecting Bryder's 
warning on the need to differentiate between the incomes of workers in different 
sectors, and also the difficulties experienced by servicemen's families trying to survive 
on army pay remittances. 
However, any wartime gains were quickly eroded in the post-war economic climate, and 
in addition to falling wages, the high levels of unemployment experienced in both 
Middlesbrough and Barrow necessitated cuts in the scales of poor relief. By July 1921 
the out-relief scale in Barrow had been reduced from 30/- to 26/- per couple, although 
the 4/- for each child remained unchanged 34 , whilst from May 1921 the Middlesbrough 
scale was 20/- per couple, and 5/- for each child, to a maximum of 35/- per week 35 . By 
1923 both Poor Law Unions had been forced to reduce their relief scales even further: 
Table 3.1: 	 Out-door Relief scales 1923 
Barrow Middlesbrough 
25/- per couple 20/- per couple 
3/6d for the first child 3/- per child 
2/6d the second to a maximum of 35/- 
2/- 	 each of the rest 
to a maximum of 35/ -  
Source: Internal minute, 14 February 1923, PRO, MH 681102; K. Nicholas, The Social Effects of 
Unemployment, 45. 
Thus throughout the period, most Barrow families with up to four children were 
considerably better off than their Middlesbrough counterparts, but from 1923, larger 
families were in a desperate situation in both towns. 
(iii) Diet 
Studies of working-class diets in Barrow and Middlesbrough over the period reveal a 
close similarity. A diet of home baked bread, stews and hot pots made from vegetables 
and cheap cuts of meat, dumplings, suet puddings and vegetable dishes, plus the use of 
margarine and condensed milk, was common, although in contrast to Barrow, the 
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Middlesbrough study does indicate the reliance of 'a substantial minority' of families on 
ready cooked foods 36 . Thus with the possible exception of the war years, the work of 
Elizabeth Roberts and Katharine Nicholas suggests a continuity in the basic working-
class diet in Middlesbrough and Barrow from the turn of the century to the 1930s. 
However, Elizabeth Roberts' view that there was 'no reliance on convenience food 
in Barrow' 37 , with items such as fish and chips being an occasional treat, is challenged 
by John Walton. He argues that fish and chips provided a cheap and nutritious meal, and 
by the early twentieth century 'was becoming part of the mainstream family economy of 
the industrial working-class' 38 , Barrow being no exception to this trend. 
Elizabeth Roberts also argues that during the pre-war period, despite large families, low 
incomes and high rents, Barrow possessed 'a healthier than average population' 39 , a 
factor she attributes to the skills of local housewives in selecting and cooking food that 
was both economical and nutritious 40 . Whilst using oral evidence to support this view, 
she also quotes the School Medical Officer's figures 4 ' based on a sample of 1,912 
(15.7%) elementary school children and concludes 'these figures do not suggest a 
significant problem of malnutrition' 42 . However, the School Medical Officer drew 
further conclusions. Using anthropometric techniques based on the comparison of each 
child to a given height and weight standard in order to assess levels of nutrition, the 
report for 1912 revealed that all the children examined in the 6-7 year old age group 
failed to meet these standards. Whilst some of this was attributed to 'hereditary taint', 
most instances of malnutrition were blamed on poor standards of nutrition rather than 
insufficiency of feeding. Much of this was seen as preventable, and he believed the 
parents needed a better understanding of food values, 'especially the value of old-
fashioned oat-meal porridge as bone and muscle former' 43 . 
Such medical evidence undermines Elizabeth Roberts' interpretation of the health of 
pre-war Barrow. She describes the consumption of porridge, beans, lentils, peas and 
pasta (macaroni) for example, as widely contributing to a healthy diet". Although she 
acknowledges the School Medical Officer's enthusiasm for these foods, in his report of 
1913 he is clearly of the opinion that such enthusiasm was not shared by Barrow's 
working-classes as described, and he also fails to accredit the majority of Barrow's 
housewives with high culinary skills: 
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'one is still confronted by the problems of unsuitable feeding and the 
sad lack of knowledge among the working-classes, of the value of 
such foods as lentils, peas, beans, cheeses, macaroni, oatmeal, 
margarine etc. If porridge and milk were substituted for the bread and 
tea which in too many cases are the staple constituents of breakfast, a 
big change would soon be evident amongst the children.' 45 
The 1913 report states that all the 2,171 children examined were underweight, and of 
nutritional levels in general he writes: 'a fair proportion of children of all ages were 
below the normal standard of nutrition'. Oral evidence provides further examples of 
poor nutrition among sections of Barrow's working classes, one respondent describing 
the youths of 'rough' areas as 'good but half-starved', many of whom, after leaving to 
join the Lancaster militia, 'grew up like saplings' after a couple of months on an army 
diet. Thus it appears that Elizabeth Roberts has tended to make broad generalisations 
based on asmall sample, and a sample healthy enough to survive into old age. In 
contrast, the School Medical Officer's reports are based on evidence seen at first hand, 
and although based on subjective clinical examinations open to personal interpretation, 
it can be argued that this very problem is itself likely to be indicative of under-reporting 
rather than exaggeration. It can thus be concluded there was a very real, if 
unquantifiable, element of under-nourishment, if not outright malnutrition, in Barrow in 
the years immediately preceding the First World War. 
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 
(i) Birth and Death Rates 
However, Winter has argued that 'the Great War created conditions which helped 
eliminate some of the worst features of urban poverty which lay behind the high death 
rates of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century' 47 , but when analysing the 
demographic impact of war and depression, it is necessary to identify the long term 
trends within which these changes occurred. At a national level, birth and death rates 
showed a steady decline in the first thirty years of the century, but this was more 
marked during the second decade, and the war years in particular. 
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Chart 3.1: 	 Comparative Death Rates 1912-1926 
Source: Annual Reports of the Registrar General; Annual Reports of the Chief Medical Officers of 
Barrow and Middlesbrough 
A comparison of the crude death rates of Barrow and the national average (including all 
ages and occupation groups) (Chart 3.1) demonstrates that prior to the war, Barrow's 
death rate was higher than the national level, housing conditions and poor diets being a 
likely cause. However, the clear improvement during the war years, excluding 1915 
which was a bad year nationally 48 , and also 1918 with its flu epidemic, appears to 
support Winter's contention that the war played a significant role in increasing civilian 
life expectancy. It is also important to note that during the depression the crude death 
rate in Barrow did not return to the pre-war level and remained consistently below the 
national average. Death rates in Middlesbrough on the other hand, although more 
closely reflecting national trends, remained much higher, a pattern repeated by the 
town's birth rate. However, a comparative analysis of Barrow's birth rate is revealing 
(see Chart 3.2). 
Although following the basic trend to decline,Barrow's birth rate was nevertheless 
higher than the national average and remained so until the end of the war. The absence 
of a post-war baby boom is indicative of the high number of men in reserved 
occupations, but the national baby boom of 1920 was the first time that the local and 
national birth rates coincided. What is significant is that from 1920 Barrow's birth rate 
plummeted, falling and remaining below the national average from 1923, demonstrating 
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that the inter-war years had the greatest influence on local demographic trends. Whilst it 
is possible that the poverty arising from long-term unemployment necessitated the 
conscious limitation of family size, it is impossible to quantify this. However, another 
important factor was migration, which resulted in a decennial reduction of the 
population by 17.4% by 19309 ,further emphasising the cataclysmic impact on local 
demography and the birth rate in particular. 
Chart 3.2: 	 Comparative Birth Rates 1912-1926 
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Source: Annual Reports of the Registrar General; Annual Reports of the Chief Medical Officers of 
Barrow and Middlesbrough 
(ii) Maternal and Infant Mortality 
However, as already discussed, crude death rates are of limited value when analysing 
health trends, and infant and maternal mortality levels are generally accepted as more 
accurately reflecting the health of a community, high death rates here being 'indicative 
of a submerged mass of ill-health' 50 . 
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Table 3.2: 	 Maternal mortality rates per 1,000 live births registered 1912-1926 
Year Barrow National Middlesbrough 
1911 1.2 1.0 2.7 
1912 1.2 0.9 3.2 
1913 2.1 0.9 6.0 
1914 1.0 0.9 2.7 
1915 0.0 1.1 3.9 
1917 0.5 0.9 5.9 
1919 1.1 1.9 2.3 
1921 0.0 1.1 1.4 
1923 0.0 1.0 3.2 
1925 0.8 1.1 4.5 
1926 0.9 1.0 5.3 
Source: National: J. Campbell in J, Winter, The Great War and the British People, p.136 
Barrow & Middlesbrough: Chief Medical Officers Reports 
Beginning with maternal mortality, Table 3.2 illustrates that the rate in Barrow, with the 
exception of 1913, was slightly above the national average before the war. Nevertheless, 
the rate fell dramatically during the war years, and despite the sudden rise in 1919, the 
town could boast a 100% survival rate in the four years between 1921 and 1924. 
Although rising again in 1925, the table provides a clear indication of sustained health 
gains in Barrow as maternal mortality remained below the national average. The health 
of Middlesbrough is a stark contrast, indicating enduring economic hardship and poor 
living conditions, a situation which is further reflected in the town's infant mortality 
figures. 
Chart 3.3 demonstrates that whilst infantile mortality in both towns was higher than the 
national average, Middlesbrough's rate was exceptionally high, and despite plummeting. 
in 1916, increased significantly throughout the war years. Nicholas attributes this rise to 
environmental conditions, the prevalence of infectious diseases, poor diets and a lack of 
education 51 . In Barrow however, as a result of a spate of epidemics in the first half of 
the year, the number of infantile deaths reached a peak in 1915. The fact that the rate 
fell to a record low in the following year raises the issue of the reliability of the 
statistics, particularly as they would have been compiled retrospectively, in the wake of 
the Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest. Nevertheless, the Medical Officer 
attributes this fall to increased health visiting and the work of the Voluntary Welfare 
Committee. However, these reductions were not consistent and infant mortality 
struggled to stay down throughout the inter-war period, pointing to an underlying trend 
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of ill-health that persisted despite apparent health gains in other spheres. Nevertheless, if 
the figures are reliable, although infantile deaths in Barrow continued to be erratic, after 
1915 they never returned to the pre-war level. Middlesbrough on the other hand, with 
the exception of 1924, shows a more sustained fall over the same period. 
Chart 3.3: 	 Infant Mortality Rates 1912-1926 
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Source: Annual Reports of the Registrar General; Annual Reports of the Chief Medical Officers of 
Barrow and Middlesbrough 
THE ROLE OF THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT 
Winter describes improved domestic environments and nutrition as the key to these 
gains, arguing that 'the period points almost in one direction: towards environmental 
improvements during the war yielding increased survival chances not only for young 
children and mothers, but also for the bulk of the civilian population' 52 . However, prior 
to the war, much working-class housing in both Barrow and Middlesbrough was of poor 
quality and subject to overcrowding, and in both towns conditions deteriorated further 
as a result of lack of repair and intensification of the overcrowding problem during the 
war years. Although it is impossible to establish the level of wartime overcrowding, 
accurate data is provided by the 1921 census, and demonstrates that the percentage of 
the population of both towns living in cramped conditions is strikingly similar (see 
Table 3.3). 
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Table 3.3: 	 Percentage of the population in families of 3 or more persons 
living in one or two roomed accommodation, 1921 
Barrow 
Livinginlroom: 	 1.6% 	 1.5% 
Living in 2 rooms: 	 7.9% 	 6.7% 
Total 	 9.5% 	 8.2% 
Source: Census of EngZavuland Wales. 1921, Table 11 
Thus both towns had a roughly equal proportion of the population living in one roomed 
accommodation, but a slightly higher percentage of large Barrow fimilies had the 
marginal advantage of two rooms. However, Barrow did suffer from increasing 
homelessness in the inter-war period, and this is reflected in the numbers living in barns 
and other unsuitable structures. Whilst Middlesbrough in 1921 had only 72 persons or 
0.05% of the total population living in makeshift structures, Barrow totalled 224,01 
0.3% of the population, a proportion six times greater, which was to rise steadily as the 
number of evictions continued. Additionally, Middlesbrough had a more successful 
house building policy, 2,300 new houses being constructed by 1927, which had no 
parallel in Barrow (see Table 2.3). 
Thus whilst infant and maternal mortality rates indicate that health levels did improve, 
this can scarcely be attributed to the domestic environment as housing conditions in 
both towns continued to deteriorate. Additionally, whilst Middlesbrough was to benefit 
from sanitation improvements from the mid 1920s (to be discussed later), Barrow's 
external environment remained unchanged, making it necessary to examine higher 
levels of nutrition as offering a more plausible explanation for these gains. 
NUTRITION-LINKED MORTALITY 
(i) Dianhoeal Diseases 
Turning to nutrition-linked mortality, diarrhoeal diseases fell nationally during the war, 
and Table 3.4 illustrates that deaths in both Barrow and Middlesbrough followed this 
trend, but again, these gains were considerably greater in Barrow. 
Table 3.4: 	 Deaths from diarrhoea per 1,000 population 
Barrow Middlesbrough 
1913 0.4 1.1 
1917 0.01 0.9 
1921 0.1 0.9 
1925 0.0 0.3 
Source: Annual Reports of the Chief Medical Officers of Barrow and Middlesbrough 
(ii) Contagious Diseases 
The prevalence of contagious diseases is also closely related to nutrition, but 
comparison in complicated by changes in diagnosis and reporting, and consequently it 
has not been possible to illustrate a national average in Chart 3.4. However, 
Middlesbrough's Medical Officer gives a national average of .99 deaths per thousand in 
1910, a rate which continued to fall steadily, although infectious diseases (including 
respiratory TB) still accounted for approximately 20% of all deaths 54. Chart 3.4 
demonstrates that Barrow's death rate fell dramatically during the war years, in line 
with Winter's assertion that improved nutrition raised resistance to infection. However, 
the radical and sustained improvement after 1916 requires explanation in light of 
potential problems with statistics and the effects of long-term unemployment on health. 
Comparison with Middlesbrough is particularly useful at this point, and there, death 
rates from contagious disease, although following a similar pattern, are nevertheless 
much higher and the decrease far less stable. 
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Chart 3.4: 	 Death Rates from Contagious Diseases 1912-1926 
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Convincing evidence of improving dietary levels in Barrow is provided by the School 
Medical Officer's reports, which demonstrate that the health and condition of 
elementary school children was radically altered during the war. From 1915 there was a 
dramatic change in the health of local children. 
'No serious cases of malnutrition were observed and the great number of 
cases of slight malnutrition were due to improper feeding rather than to 
insufficiency. This improvement can no doubt be accounted for by the lack 
of unemployment, and higher wages earned by the working classes in the 
Borough. There is no doubt that higher wages are benefiting the children as 
regards their general physical condition.' 55 
Visible health gains continued throughout the war. In 1916 'no cases of malnutrition 
due to insufficiency of food were noted', and by 1917 'the children are well clothed, 
well-fed and present a generally healthy appearance', clearly demonstrating that the war 
resulted in major health gains for the working classes. However, as Chart 3.4 indicates, 
the opposite was true of Middlesbrough, where 'the war had a debilitating effect upon 
the health of children and adults, and produced a higher mortality rate from diseases 
than would have occurred in normal times' 56 . 
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(iii) Comparative Perspectives 
The disparity between the towns continued into the inter-war period. Middlesbrough's 
Medical Officer wrote that in 1920 the town's health looked 'noticeably favourable' 
with a large decrease in infectious disease, a trend which continued despite high levels 
of unemployment and housing problems. In Barrow on the other hand, wartime health 
gains were short-lived, and the School MO's reports give a clear picture of both 
wartime gains and the impact of depression. By 1919 the School MO, reporting on a 
large sample of 6,667 school children, concluded that 'there were ... indications during 
the autumn, that a considerable number of children were not obtaining sufficiency of 
food, due to bad economic conditions in the homes on account of Labour troubles' 
(1919). This may account for the slight increase in deaths from contagious diseases in 
that year. Into the 1920s, his reports illustrate a steady decline in the condition of the 
children examined, as they became increasingly dirty and verminous, with a parallel 
deterioration in the condition of their clothing. However, despite the immediate impact 
of worsening economic conditions in the borough, the low death rate for these diseases 
continued throughout the period, and it is significant that these reports do not describe 
increasing malnutrition in these years. 
As previously stated, working-class diets in both towns were strikingly similar, as was 
the scale of out-relief received after February 1923, with the result that large families on 
maximum relief experienced the greatest hardships, which inevitably impinged on diets. 
Following the reconstruction of an average working-class family budget of the 1930's 57 , 
Nicholas enlisted the help of dieticians from North Teesside General Hospital to analyse 
its nutritional value. Whilst most categories of adults were judged to have consumed 
sufficient calories, a significant minority did not, particularly expectant and nursing 
mothers, active men and teenage boys 58 . Thus Nicholas is able to conclude that a 
significant number of Teesside people who lived on the standard unemployed budget 
were likely to be underfed, although she differentiates between the two decades: 
'Whereas it was possible for the unemployed of the thirties to manage, for 
most of the time, to provide a reasonably good diet for all but special 
categories of people, this was clearly not the case in the twenties. The cost 
of living index shows that the unemployed of the twenties must have been 
able to buy much less food than those of the thirties, and therefore they will 
have been less well nourished' 59 . 
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She goes on to expand this statement, arguing that rather than eating a fundamentally 
different diet during the twenties, 'people simply ate less, with a greater emphasis on 
bread and less animal protein' 60. As a result, the diets of the poor in the 1920s were 
likely to be quantitatively and qualitatively inferior. 
In the light of the close economic similarities between the two towns, it seems 
reasonable to apply the same analysis to Barrow, and conclude that sections of Barrow 
population were suffering dietary deficiencies both before and after the First World 
War. Further insights into inter-war nutrition levels in Barrow are provided by an 
examination of the bankruptcy register. Between the years of 1914 and 1926, 29% of 
the total number of bankruptcies in the town were of food retailers, including grocers, 
butchers and bakers 61 . Additionally, four fish fryers were declared bankrupt between 
1920 and 1924, suggesting that the depression hit the trade hard. These figures indicate 
that a significant proportion of the population were forced to economise on basic 
foodstuffs during the depression, which clearly would have had serious implication for 
the borough's health. These conclusions however, call into question the other evidence 
for improved health in post-war Barrow, and it is important to identify the factors 
influencing this. 
In Middlesbrough, although health improved, the Medical Officer did not debate the 
links between health and long-term unemployment. It appears that 'poverty was an 
accepted feature of the town, and the members of the health department felt no need to 
regard it as anything but an unfortunate ever present difficulty' 62 . Free school meals had 
been introduced in the immediate post-war period, the figure rising from 250 in April 
1921 to 2,300 by June, but falling to an average of 1,000 per month by the end of the 
year. However, a systematic purge was begun early in 1922 to ensure that free school 
meals did not supplement poor relief. As a result, only 30 children, medically 
certificated as suffering from malnutrition, received school meals, but this was totally 
suspended in 1925 and not re-introduced until the 1930s, despite the claim of the town's 
Labour MP that a large number of Middlesbrough's children were undernourished. 
Although the MO accepted that some diseases arose as a result of malnutrition, he did 
not feel free school meals were necessary, denying that a large proportion of the 
population were ill-fed despite widespread poverty. 
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In Barrow, free school meals were also introduced in 1919 in response to the economic 
downturn, and between 19 November and 31 December of that year provided 18,858 
dinners for necessitous children, an average of 510 daily at a cost of 5d per meal 63 . By 
1921 conditions had deteriorated further, (again reflected in an upturn in the contagious 
disease death rate), and out of a sample of 4,379 children examined, as many as 2 1.9% 
were found to be under-nourished. In contrast to Middlesbrough, this prompted a 
thorough investigation of child poverty in the town, which involved the Corporation, the 
Education Committee, the Labour Party and Trades Council and head teachers (see 
Chapter Seven). As a result of the inquiry, school meals provision was extended from 
six to seven days a week, and was to include breakfasts as well as dinners (see Table 
3.5), although provision declined sharply from 1923 as a result of falling unemployment 
(Chart 1.2). However, between 1921 and 1926 Barrow's School MO was able to report 
an absence of serious cases of malnutrition, which he directly attributed to the continued 
provision of free school meals. 
Table 3.5: 	 Total number of free school meals 
Year No. meals 	 A 
1921 997,000 
1922 1,259,000 
1923 630,136 
1924 223,168 
1925 183,499 
in Barrow 1921-1926 
no. children 
2,231 
2,419 
1,153 
411 
335 
1926 	 172,415 	 308 
Source: Barrow School Medical Officer's Reports 
Another important welfare measure was the supply of free or reduced price milk to 
expectant and nursing mothers and young children. However, in 1921, as a of result of 
the excessive expenditure incurred by many local authorities, the Ministry of Health 
revoked the 1919 Milk (Mothers and Children) Order and compelled local authorities to 
apply for Ministry sanction before supplying milk, to enable more effective control of 
expenditure. Entitlement was means-tested and the price calculated on a sliding scale, 
but the interviewing of new applicants and the monthly re-assessment of all cases 
became expensive and unwieldy to administer, whilst the MO believed the milk to be of 
little benefit to the recipients. Nevertheless, despite tightened Ministry of Health 
control, 67% and 73% of the milk was supplied free in 1921 and 1922 respectively, 
which provides an indication of the extent of hardship at that time, although figures are 
unavailable for subsequent years. 
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Table 3.6: 	 Number of milk orders issued in Barrow 1921-1926 
1921 1,401 1924 1,571 
1922 2,514 1925 1,758 
1923 2,481 1926 2,312 
Source: Barrow Medical Officers Reports 
Table 3.7 places Banow Corporation's expenditure on milk and free school meals into 
perspective by presenting it in relation to other expenditure generated by unemployment 
for the financial years ending 31 March 1923 and 1924: 
Table 3.7: 	 Barrow Corporation expenditure on unemployment to 1924 
	
1923 	 .1924 
	
£. 	 £ 
Directrelief works 	 26,813 	 26,813 
Feeding necessitous school children 	 21,533 	 25,384 
Annual loan charges on Relief Works 	 6,722 	 16,403 
Milkto expectant and nursing mothers 	 1,253 	 1,602 
Bridge tolls for the unemployed 	 1,088 	 1,538 
Source: Borough Treasurer's Memoranda, Unemployment Correspondence 1923-24, 
BA/C 511146 BOX 51 P2 
Whilst the cost of milk was a moderate proportion of Banow Corporation's annual 
unemployment relief budget, the benefits to the recipients, despite the Medical Officer's 
opinion, would have been tangible nonetheless. However, free school meals were the 
second highest item of expenditure to 1924 and indicate that the health of the borough's 
school children was given a high priority, constituting an important facet of local efforts 
to minimise as far as possible the impact of the depression. These efforts on behalf of 
the children of the destitute would also have had a significant impact on the health of 
their families, enabling a greater proportion of unemployment benefit or out-relief to be 
directed towards the needs of other family members than would otherwise have been 
possible. 
It can thus be argued that local authority intervention and the directing of welfare 
policies towards the needs of these two particularly vulnerable groups during the 
depression played an important role in sustaining Barrow's wartime health gains. This 
argument is further supported by comparison with Middlesbrough, where there appears 
to be a greater acceptance of poverty. The charts comparing infant mortality, contagious 
diseases, bronchitis and TB mortality rates indicate a general decline in 
Middlesbrough's health from 1922, when supplementary welfare provision was 
abandoned, culminating in the high death rates of 1924. Although the death rates for 
contagious disease and infant mortality had improved by 1926, these gains have been 
accredited to improvements in the town's sanitation system 64. Thus there is a significant 
contrast in the welfare provision of the two towns, and Barrow's poor relief struggles 
and changing attitudes towards poverty, an important facet of this study, will be dealt 
with in detail in later chapters. 
RESPIRATORY DISEASES 
(i) Pulmonary Tuberculosis 
Turning to tuberculosis, from September 1915 Barrow Corporation leased a number of 
beds at High Carley, a sanatorium some five miles distant, administered by Lancashire 
County Council. In addition, a dispensary was opened in Barrow in 1917, whilst the 
Devonshire Road pavilion was used as an isolation hospital for acute and advanced 
cases, and by March 1918 steps were taken for the compulsory removal of cases which 
could not be isolated at home. However, there were no local facilities for children, and 
although they could be treated at the dispensary, success was often undermined by 
home conditions, whilst the premature return of patients to their old environment would 
often result in a relapse. Indeed, environmental factors were given serious consideration 
in Barrow. As a result, from October 1916 the Local Insurance Committee pressed for 
the establishment of farm colonies to provide after-care facilities, and in June 1917 
requested the Corporation to investigate the housing and sanitary conditions in 
Hindpool and Ramsden wards where, despite not pre-dating the rest of the borough and 
being only fifty years old, there was a higher than average incidence of TB. 
Unfortunately, the wartime manpower shortage prevented this and attempts to establish 
an open-air school and farm colonies made little headway during the war. Additionally, 
although the immediate post-war climate favoured the expansion of the service, this was 
short-lived, and after 1921 the government did not consider new schemes owing to the 
need for retrenchment. 
The retention of patients at the Sanatorium could be problematic despite the 
combination of fresh air, good food, systematic rest and supervised exercise. Patients 
were apt to discharge themselves for a variety of reasons; including the draconian 
discipline, too much spare time or complaints about bad food, particularly in the hot 
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summer of 1916. More significant however, are the letters from working-class 
consumptives declining sanatorium treatment for economic reasons. For example, worry 
over the family left to survive on 10/- per week Insurance Benefit could compel a man 
to discharge himself in order to find light work to support his family 65 . Additionally, 
others were unable to supply the clothing required for admission, and so declined 
treatment. The list was so extensive as to be beyond the means of many working class 
patients, a problem which became even more acute inter-war, when poverty drove many 
families to pawn clothing, bedding and other essentials in order to survive. To address 
this, the local Insurance Conmñttee was allowed to provide these items for insured 
patients if necessary, whilst the Council was urged to do the same for the uninsured. 
Chart 3.5 compares deaths from pulmonary tuberculosis in Barrow and Middlesbrough. 
Throughout the period, Barrow's TB death rate was remarkably stable despite the harsh 
conditions, and it should be noted that the figures were not artificially lowered by deaths 
in sanatoria outside the area. However, in an unpublished report of 1919, Barrow's MO 
expressed his doubts as to the value of sanatorium treatment, believing: 
'that the beginning was made at the wrong end, that is, at the curative 
end, instead of at the preventable end of the problem. I am strongly of 
the opinion that actual treatment will be futile until better housing 
conditions are provided, and consequent excuses for overcrowding 
eliminated, a better standard of living, improved hygienic conditions 
in workshops and factories, every encouragement given for healthy 
recreation in the open air and a higher standard of personal hygiene 
taught by vigorous educational campaign' 66 . 
Thus, privately, the MO saw nothing short of a radical reform of working-class living 
and working conditions as capable of reducing the prevalence of the disease. By 1925 
however, TB deaths had been halved and compared favourably with the national rate, 
which averaged 0.858 per 1,000 in England and Wales between 1921 and 1926 67 . The  
MO attributed this fall to successful intervention by the health authorities over a five-
year period, in the form of the constant supervision of patients and the cumulative 
effects of treatment 68 , whilst the economic conditions of 1926 were seen as responsible 
for the sharp increase in deaths that year 69 . 
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In contrast, with the exception of 1919 and 1922, TB death rates in Middlesbrough were 
considerably higher. The town's TB Officer believed most of his problems were caused 
by the depression, attributing the high death rate of 1924 to 'the cumulative effect of 
almost four years of unemployment and the consequent poverty among the working-
classes [which] are unquestionably the immediate cause of increased mortality' 70 . 
Overcrowding combined with the increasing death rate to give an additional cause for 
concern, as TB sufferers in many families were unable to be isolated, and continued to 
share bedrooms and beds with other family members 71 . However, Middlesbrough 
Council, whilst acknowledging the need to focus on the treatment and prevention of TB 
and improve housing conditions, was badly restricted by the inter-war economic 
climate. Between 1923 and 1926, the Corporation built few new houses and private 
building was aimed at the owner-occupier. Although TB death rates fell on the new 
estates, it was the better off that lived there, the rents for the new houses being beyond 
the reach of the poor. Thus overcrowding and insanitary conditions, particularly in the 
north of the town, were left virtually untouched, and as in Barrow, bad health and high 
death rates were endemic to certain areas. St Hilda's ward is a good example, where 
traditionally poor environmental conditions, population density and proximity to 
works72 bore close resemblance to Barrow's Hindpool. Thus in both towns, efforts to 
treat TB were continually undermined by the inability to substantially improve housing 
conditions. However, the lower death rate in Barrow, which remained steady throughout 
both war and depression, suggests that overcrowding and deteriorating housing 
conditions, contrary to Winter's view, were less influential than levels of nutrition. 
(ii) Pneumonia and Bronchitis 
Similar conclusions can be drawn for other respiratory diseases, and a brief examination 
indicates that instead of increasing as a result of housing problems during the war years, 
deaths from both bronchitis and pneumonia actually fell in Barrow during 1917. 
However, as Chart 3.6 demonstrates, the bronchitis death rate rose after 1918 and then 
became wildly erratic, but at a time when pressure on housing decreased, thus pointing 
away from housing conditions as a major contributory factor. Uncharacteristically, 
bronchitis was far less of a problem in Middlesbrough, although deaths in both towns in 
the inter-war period were above the national average. 
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However, the death rate from pneumonia (Chart 3.7) in Middlesbrough was extremely 
high, the town having the highest death rate of all north east towns and also the second 
highest for all respiratory diseases 73 . In contrast, Barrow compares very favourably to 
the national average and, with the exception of 1915 and 1918, never exceeded pre-war 
levels, despite the town's housing conditions. Thus this comparison fails to support the 
assertion that war generated an increase in deaths from TB and other respiratory 
diseases, whilst the situation in Barrow suggests overcrowding was less influential than 
deteriorating economic conditions, and their corollary of poorer nutrition. 
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CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the health of Barrow's population in the years between 1914 and 1926 
has called into question the established interpretation of the town's health in the pre-war 
period. The evidence that levels of malnutrition among local schoolchildren was 
comparable to levels giving cause for concern nationally, combined with a crude death 
rate and infant and maternal mortality levels above the national average, demonstrate 
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the assertion that the population was 'healthier than average' to be untenable. However, 
Medical Officer's Reports and statistics reveal considerable health gains during the war 
years, the result of the higher earnings of a large proportion of the workforce engaged in 
war-related industries. There is little doubt that in Barrow better wages resulted in 
improved nutrition, which in turn increased resistance to disease, supporting Winter's 
contention that the war generated major health gains for the working classes. This was 
not the case for Middlesbrough however. 
The charts indicate that Barrow's crude death rate broadly follows the national pattern, 
although falling, and remaining, below the national average after 1914. However, infant 
mortality levels, less stable than other statistics and struggling to stay down, indicate 
that the young remained vulnerable, and although pointing to underlying levels of ill-
health, the overall trend was downward, and mortality never returned to pie-war levels. 
However, the study fails to support Winter's argument that overcrowding and 
deteriorating housing conditions resulted in an increase in deaths from tuberculosis and 
other respiratory diseases, whilst the combination of low death rates and poor housing 
conditions demonstrates that nutrition played a key role. 
The importance of analysing the health of the borough over the whole period rather than 
artificially segregating the impact of war and depression is most clearly indicated by the 
birth rate and deaths from contagious disease. The birth rate, drastically and irrevocably 
reduced by migration from the area and, quite possibly, affected for the first time by the 
planned limitation of family size by the working classes, demonstrates that the 
depression had a far more significant demographic impact than the war. The low 
incidence of contagious diseases throughout the inter-war period raises important issues, 
such as the validity of the statistics and why Barrow's health gains were not eroded by 
long-term mass unemployment. The comparative analysis of Barrow and 
Middlesbrough reveals contrasting health levels despite similar rates of unemployment, 
out-relief and housing problems, and suggests that in Barrow, other forces were coming 
into play to sustain these gains in the post-war period. Whilst Middlesbrough's smaller 
and less stable health gains have been attributed to environmental improvements 74 , the 
comparison reveals very different attitudes towards poverty. Although poverty was 
accepted as the norm in Middlesbrough, Barrow sources indicate that during the post-
war period, the raising of working-class living standards was regarded as an essential 
precondition to better health, particularly with regard to TB. This had an important 
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influence on poor relief and welfare policies in Barrow. The efforts to mitigate the worst 
effects of poverty were substantial enough to make a considerable contribution to the 
health of the borough and thus validate the statistics, but such a radical change in 
attitudes and responses to social problems necessitates thorough investigation in itself. 
Thus the comparison of these two towns demonstrates the problems inherent in attempts 
to generalise on a national scale, and the importance of individual case studies to 
ascertain the true impact of war and depression. This comparative analysis demonstrates 
that, despite fundamental similarities between two towns with similar histories and 
employment structures, the interplay of so many variables can result in widely differing 
experiences. 
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THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE POLITICS OF DISTRESS 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will examine the influence of war and mass unemployment on municipal 
politics and the labour movement in Barrow between 1914 and 1926, building on and 
developing in new directions Todd's detailed analysis of the growth of the town's 
labour movement from 1890 to 19201.  The period was one of considerable upheaval for 
local politics, and the examination of recurring left-wing divisions, in raising the most 
important and distinctive issues, will provide the chapter's analytical framework. 
The previous chapter has demonstrated the problems inherent in generalisation across 
regions and localities, and national patterns of political change are at best aggregates 
which obscure the diversity of working class politics. The analysis of local factors 
through regional case-studies is central to a greater understanding of political 
developments, and in addition to determining how closely Barrow conforms to broader 
national trends and existing historiographical interpretations, the chapter will compare 
the town's political developments to those in other localities. The value of 
Middlesbrough in a comparative study with Barrow has already been discussed, and its 
inclusion here will provide an additional facet to this analysis, whilst the similarity of 
Barrow's background to that of 'Red' Nelson, with its well organised and active labour 
movement and a tradition of militant trade unionism, will provide further useful 
insights. Additionally, the close similarity of Barrow to other localities dubbed 'Little 
Moscows', with their predominantly working class populations, close family and 
recreational ties, and close links between work and residence, also warrants closer 
analysis. 
Similarly, the tentative conclusions drawn by Davies and Morley in their studies of 
county borough elections will enable Barrow's political experience to be viewed in the 
wider context of municipal trends, which will further illustrate the distinctive aspects of 
Barrow's political developments. However, the data available for such studies are 
problematic as the recording, analysis and publication of electoral results was limited. 
Each local authority was responsible for recording its own results and they were 
published only in the local press, and in varying detail 2 . An additional problem is the 
difficulty of identifying the political persuasion of individuals owing to the lack of 
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detailed evidence, particularly at a time when political divisions and party allegiances 
were fluid. This is reflected in the discrepancy between the number of seats per party 
reported in the local press, the statistics used by Davies and Morley, and consequently 
the conclusions within this chapter. This being equally true of both councillors and 
aldermen, it proves difficult to determine precisely which party was in control or held 
the balance of power. Given the fluidity of political divisions, another important aspect 
of this chapter is therefore an examination of the influence of socialist ideology on 
Labour Party unity, political affiliation and the polarisation of local politics. 
Additionally, the chapter will begin to trace the emergence of a communal identity 
which the competing factions sought to mobilise, a strand of enquiry developed further 
in subsequent chapters. 
The rise of the Labour Party has been the subject of much debate, and whilst some 
historians describe this as an almost inevitable consequence of social and economic 
change in the thirty years preceding the First World War, others describe the war itself 
as the significant influence. Within the fonner body of opinion, the formation of 
political identity and allegiance has been variously attributed to the expression of class 
identity3 , the political mentality derived from shared work experiences 4, to responses to 
political and industrial crises 5 , and, in particular contexts, the impact of economic and 
social change more generally 6 . Other historians have described the profound social and 
economic repercussions of the war as the significant factors behind political change 7 , 
particularly as a result of the changed relationship between the trade unions and the 
state, and increasing ties between the Labour Party and the trade union movement 8 . An 
alternative view however, argues that for many, the war was seen as an interruption, and 
the desire to return to the social and economic conditions of 1914 is equally applicable 
to politics9 . Additionally, Labour's limited success in the 1920s has been attributed to 
its failure to build on the foundations laid during the war 10, whilst regional variation 
inhibited Labour's attempts to adapt to local cultural and political traditions". 
The extent of working class politicisation is also subject to interpretation. For example, 
whilst Macintyre describes the majority of the British working classes as apolitical, 
Kirk argues that the strength of the labour movement and the wide variety of social and 
political institutions on which it was founded was consolidated by the war 12 . Cronin 
goes further however, and describes the working class militancy of 19 17-20 as 
transcending wages, inflation and dilution, to become 'a mobilisation of the workers as 
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a class and of their institutions and 13 .In a similar vein, though from a 
contrasting political perspective, McKibbin describes the Labour Party's perception of 
its function as 'the political mobilisation of an already industrial class consciousness' 14 , 
but seeking to exploit the 'diffuse, but intense, social conscience of its adherents with a 
policy which was not much more than a collection of shrewdly contrived slogans 
attached to the deeper and more subtle calls upon class loyalty' 15 . Drawing on the class 
conflict model, such interpretations relate to the organised and largely masculine 
working class, and in the wider community, Davies and Morley assert that the 
polarisation of 'the often fiercely expressed language of class that dominated the 
discourse of municipal politics' was formally manifest in the municipal anti-socialist 
alliances of the period' 6 . Despite the considerable successes of 1919, they describe 
Labour's municipal fortunes as declining in the County Boroughs between 1920-25, but 
improving from 1926 in strong Labour boroughs where unemployment was high. In 
such boroughs, unemployment was a political issue which Labour could use to 
advantage 17 , which suggests that class polarisation was an important influential factor. 
However, Macintyre argues that radical left-wing politics was not necessarily 
synonymous with class antagonism. He concurs with Davies and Morley that left-wing 
gains on local authority bodies stimulated the middle class ruling elite to organise on the 
same lines as the militants, and that 'political differentiation can be clarified by looking 
at how these two competing groups identified themselves and defined their relationship 
to the community" 8 . By this analysis, the ruling group in such areas, calling themselves 
Moderates, defined community in terms of a shared financial interest, for example as 
ratepayers, creating a common identity regardless of occupation and place in the social 
hierarchy. The Communists, identified with the under-dog, and in some close-knit, 
militant working class communities, were accepted as part of the Labour Party' 9 . 
However, despite tendencies towards political polarisation, Macintyre argues that in 
times of crisis, people turn to those best able to defend them 20. Thus, as the inter-war 
crisis deepened and affected all social groups, the Communists, in areas where they 
were able to identify with community interests, were able to draw on the residents' 
willingness to unite against an external threat, gaining influence because they spoke for 
and defended a 'mutually-dependent community that was threatened by economic 
collapse' 21 . An important and distinctive feature of these 'Little Moscows' was 'the 
democratic thread that ran through the life of [these] communities', particularly the 
preference for open and collective decision making. In such localities, the elected 
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representatives of the labour movement 'were seen as delegates who should be 
responsible to those who had elected them, and the limited size of the localities 
strengthened the preference for direct, face-to-face democracy' 22 . 
On a national scale, Communism was to have significant implications for labour 
politics, widening the gulf between the political and industrial wings of the first Labour 
government23 , brought down in 1924 through increasing fears of Communist influence. 
Additionally, following the government's intervention in the coal dispute, the General 
Strike of 1926 had a significant effect on the relationship between the trade unions and 
the Labour Party. The Communist Party, together with some Labour Party politicians 
believed it impossible to separate industrial and political objectives 24, and saw the strike 
as inherently political, whilst the government turned the confrontation into a 
constitutional issue in an attempt to rally the nation behind the government as defenders 
of Parliamentary democracy. The surrender of the TUC General Council however, 
demonstrates the absence of political motives on the part of the labour leadership 25 , but 
whilst their capitulation was seen as a betrayal and further boosted Communist Party 
membership, the unions remained more concerned for their own internal organisation 
and discipline than for long-term political and social reconstruction 26 . 
THE RISE OF LABOUR TO THE EVE OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
Returning to the pre-war period, Todd has demonstrated that Barrow's labour 
movement was typically rooted in diverse political, industrial and consumer 
organisations, which, by the late nineteenth century, included strong trade unions, Co-
operative and Fabian Societies, the Trades Council and the Independent Labour Party 
(ILP). These institutions provided a firm base for popular support, and were to be 
influential in the growth of the Labour and Socialist Parties, the latter being described as 
the driving force behind efforts to build an independent and cohesive working class 
movement, crucial in a political climate where the attitudes of the middle class ruling 
elite remained rooted in an earlier epoch. This is not to suggest however, that the labour 
movement was without its tensions at the turn of the century. In addition to focussing on 
Parliamentary politics, the ILP also channelled its energies into organising the 
unemployed and unskilled. These strong links with the general unions conflicted with 
the strong craft union presence on the Trades Council and generated considerable 
antagonism between these two bodies. However, by the early twentieth century, an 
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integrated labour movement had developed from the piecemeal collection of disparate 
working class organisations 27 , and relaxing tensions within the Trades Council, together 
with its greater co-operation with the ILP, contributed to the development of 
independent labour representation in Barrow. From this point, Todd asserts that 
Barrow's labour movement entered its political phase 28 . 
Barrow's Labour Representation Committee (LRC) was founded in 1903 and from the 
outset was an independent body to which other organisations, notably the ILP and the 
Trades Council, affiliated. However, Barrow's Co-operative Society was 'probably not 
connected with the LRC', and remained unaffiliated, despite the wider Co-operative 
movement's increasing alignment with working class interests during the war 29 . Indeed, 
following the proposed national affiliation of the Co-op to the Labour Party in 1917, the 
Barrow Society did not follow the trend to field candidates for municipal election. 
Additionally, as the leftward movement lost its impetus in the early twenties, the 
distinctive apolitical stance of the Barrow Society was confirmed in minutes which state 
that 'the Committee had no intention at the present time of taking any active part in any 
political action or of delegating power to any other body to do so' 30 , whilst the use of 
their buildings for political meetings by any political organisation was prohibited 31 . 
Barrow's labour movement achieved considerable political success in the pre-war 
period. Charles Duncan, Labour's first Parliamentary candidate and 'a man with very 
cautious views' 32 , drew considerable support from both trade union Conservatives and 
also the Liberal Party. However, the Liberals were weak and easily eliminated by 
Labour's advances, encouraging Labour to regard themselves as the real opposition to 
the Conservatives 33 . During this period, Barrow became a model Labour Party 
constituency, organised on a ward basis, with an efficient registration system and fee 
paying membership34 , gaining the Parliamentary seat in 1906, and holding it in three 
successive General Elections until 1918. 
With regard to municipal politics, 1905 witnessed the first Labour candidate's success, 
and the start of a trend towards greater Labour representation, culminating in a group of 
eight Labour councillors by 1914. Labour candidates were particularly successful on the 
Board of Guardians, beginning in 1904 with the election of six candidates. As the only 
organised group within that body, Labour was able to gain and maintain control, until 
the organisation of an anti-Labour group in 1910. Nevertheless, these gains testify to the 
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strength of Barrow's labour movement on the eve of the First World War, and 'behind 
these impressive advances was ranged a body of workers and their families organised in 
a fairly united framework of trade unions, political parties, social and educational 
organisations and women's groups' 35. 
Picking up on the comparative theme, we begin with Middlesbrough. Despite its similar 
industrial base and predominantly working class population, the town's pre-war labour 
movement was less cohesive, with many of its larger branches remaining aloof from the 
Trades Council, a moderate body content with Liberalism. Indeed, the Liberal Party 
remained strong through to the immediate post-war period. However, whilst 
Middlesbrough had only once returned a Labour MP (in 1892), there were eight Labour 
councillors (out of a total of thirty three) on the Corporation by 1914. Similarly, 
throughout the pre-war period there were 'a handful' of Labour members on the Board 
of Guardians, and as in Barrow, Guardians' elections raised little public interest 36 . 
In contrast, Hill describes Nelson as a locality which supports the concept of the 
inevitable rise of Labour37 . In addition to a deeply embedded radical, progressive 
culture, the town's labour movement was broad-based and cohesive whilst the 
considerable involvement of women in both the workforce and the political arena 
contributed to its distinctive character. Labour first gained control of the council in 
1905, but was ousted in 1909 by an anti-labour alliance opposed to rate increases and 
arguing for the replacement of Labour councillors by men with business experience, and 
Labour were unable to regain control. Although some contemporaries described this 
election as being fought on a class basis of capital versus labour, other factors were also 
influential, such as religion and competing ideologies within the labour movement 
itself38 . However, as already demonstrated, Barrow Corporation did not share Nelson's 
commitment to progressive municipal policies in the pre-war period. 
THE WAR YEARS 1914-1919 
The combination of the report of the Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest, 
1917, which condemned Barrow Corporation's lack of provision of even basic 
amenities, and wartime hardships had considerable implications for labour activity at a 
time when Labour organisations were becoming increasingly intolerant of deteriorating 
social and working conditions. Additionally, the Shop Stewards' movement, boosted by 
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the influx of workers and ideas from other centres, gained influence as both trade union 
and Labour Party leadership, restricted by the Defence of the Realm Act, lost the 
confidence of a large proportion of the rank and file. Thus Barrow's tradition of rank 
and file independence was reinforced, whilst the shop stewards, increasingly 
disillusioned with the labour movement leadership and stimulated by the Russian 
Revolution, turned to Marxism for new perspectives, combining 'revolutionary socialist 
politics [and] industrial organisation' 39. The Shop Stewards were further strengthened 
by support from the IILP and those unions similarly opposed to the war, and by its end, 
the stewards were able to extend their influence to the Labour Party, changing its 
composition and replacing old-style officials in the process. Thus the war strengthened 
the left-wing of Barrow's labour movement, but whilst Todd credits the Shop Stewards' 
movement as laying the foundation for a strong socialist movement, he asserts that the 
Labour Party remained Barrow's most important working class organisation into the 
post-war period, gaining strength as its membership and the number of affiliations 
grew40 . 
However, the issue of the war deeply divided the Party into two rival factions: the far-
left 'pacifists', who in this context were those sympathising with Russian and German 
workers and opposed to British imperialism, and the supporters of the war, who 
included Charles Duncan, Barrow's Labour MP. It was the avowed intention of the shop 
stewards to oust Duncan owing to his pro-war stance, and the strength of their influence 
within Barrow's Labour Party is demonstrated by its refusal to support his candidature 
in 1918, but whilst the National Labour Party's order to reinstate him was ignored, the 
anti-Duncan group withdrew their alternative candidates 41 . Thus Duncan was forced to 
stand as the 'National Labour Party and Trade Union Candidate', without the backing of 
the local Party. Tensions ran increasingly high, to the point where in-fighting over the 
choice of Parliamentary candidate eclipsed all other considerations and prevented 
Labour from offering an effective challenge to the Unionist version of a post-war 
Utopia. 
As a result, Labour lost its Parliamentary seat to the Unionists, a defeat which Duncan 
attributed directly to Labour divisions and commented: 'it does seem to me to be a 
disgrace to a great Labour constituency like this, where probably you have a better 
organised band of trade unionists than almost any other part of the country, to throw 
over the Labour representative and turn back to 1906 and return a Tory ship-owner' 42 . 
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Thus increasing Socialist influence and attitudes towards the war, divided Barrow's 
Labour Party and brought the once 'well-oiled machine' of a 'model' constituency 43 to 
division and defeat. But although increasing conflict provided an early indication of 
potentially serious divisions simmering within the Left, they did not, as yet, appear to 
have damaged external perceptions. Similar trends were evident in Nelson. The Labour 
Party's moderation contributed to increasing tensions with the ILP, and the war had 
deepened existing ideological divisions between the two bodies. As in Barrow, the 
ILP's anti-war stance generated frictions concerning the choice of Parliamentary 
candidate, but unlike Barrow, despite considerable in-fighting, Labour's strength held 
and their victory in 1918 'neatly encapsulated' the long term political trends". 
However, although there was a marked shift towards the Left among Barrow's 
organised working class, this should not be overstated to the exclusion of the vast body 
of the apolitical and non-committed waverers. During the war there was little evidence 
of socialist ideology beyond the workplace, and any evidence of anti-capitalist rhetoric 
was largely confined to the Labour Party and Trades Council minutes. Even there, a 
resolution that the Labour Party should focus on food control issues and the 
nationalisation of key industries rather than act as recruiting agents for the capitalist 
class, although mild, was immediately diluted to an expression of disappointment in the 
government's lack of attention to essentials such as food, fuel and wages 45 , suggesting 
that at that time, the Labour Party and Trades Council handled ideology with caution. 
In the immediate post-war period, left-wing ideology was equally low key, and in the 
Labour Party newspaper of 1919, The Northern Beacon, ideology and class rhetoric 
were generally minimal. Two examples will make the point. The Labour Party 
manifesto for the 1919 Board of Guardians election called for the replacement of the 
Poor Law with a more humane system, the transfer of the care of the needy to the 
relevant local authority committee and the prevention rather than the amelioration of 
poverty46 . Yet although radical in its content for its day, it was nevertheless non-
confrontational in its delivery. Similarly, another article expounded the consequences of 
middle class control of the council and its inevitable failure to meet the needs of all 
citizens, particularly with regard to the provision of adequate health and education for 
the working classes. Yet although emphasising social divisions and stressing that 'the 
cure is with ourselves' 47 the ideology is again non-confrontational and there is no 
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rhetoric of class struggle. Instead the emphasis was placed on the need for non-violent 
change by ballot and industrial action. 
But neither such articles nor the damning indictment of the Commission of Enquiry into 
Industrial Unrest were able to politicise the town's working classes. Contrary to broader 
national trends48 , Labour failed to gain a Corporation majority in 1919, suggesting that 
Barrow's working classes were not particularly susceptible to ideology. Indeed, there is 
evidence of frustration with the populace as a whole, who were increasingly criticised 
for apathy, indifference and of having 'as much imagination as a grasshopper' 49 . Such 
insults would not endear the Left to its readership, and despite stressing the importance 
of the working class press, the paper was short-lived. 
Both Middlesbrough and Nelsen were similarly out of step with national trends. In 
Middlesbrough, although Labour gained three more seats in 1919, rising unemployment 
did not increase their support and despite a greater degree of organisation, they made no 
further gains until 1927. The same is true of Nelson, where the anticipated breakthrough 
of 1919 failed to materialise despite the strength of the labour movement, and again, 
Labour were unable to regain control until 1927. 
LABOUR DIVIDED: 1920-1926 
(i) The First Labour Council 
In Barrow however, municipal politics was to prove far more volatile in the period to 
1926. Communist ideology was becoming more influential, and in the bye-elections of 
February 1920, Communist candidates won two of the three wards contested. This 
represented a massive leap forward for the far left 5° and was attributed by Alfred 
Barrow (Conservative Mayor between 19 13-19), to electoral apathy and a lack of 
alternative organisation. In addition to demonstrating that frustration with the electorate 
was not confined to the left and the existence of a large body of moderate opinion that 
both sides needed to court, Alfred Barrow realised the need for a parallel level of 
organisation to prevent a left-wing majority, which he believed would leave local 
government 'in the lap of the gods' 51 . Thus the Citizen's League was formed, an early 
anti-socialist alliance which has escaped the scrutiny of Davies and Morley. 
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The League's objectives were straightforwardly presented: to promote sane and 
reasonable local government, which would function in 'the proper manner' and pursue 
policies for the benefit of the majority. However, the ex-Mayor emphasised that whilst 
he had no objection to Labour representation of the working man, he was uneasy about 
the development of 'a compact, energetic and highly organised body, who were there, as 
far as he could judge, not for the benefit of the whole town, but only a certain section of 
it' 52 . This claim was endorsed by the opposition to Labour, and the initiative supports 
Macintyre's observation that the traditional elite would begin to organise on similar 
lines to the radicals. 
In the mn-up to the1920 municipal election, political tensions continued to mount, and 
by October, public meetings would end with the simultaneous singing of the National 
Anthem and the Red Flag 53 . Excluding the Aldermen, Labour gained their first 
municipal majority of 14 seats to 10, and the turnout of 75%, far in excess of the 
national figure of 50%, contradicts all allegations of apathy. Additionally, the result was 
contrary to wider trends whereby Labour's share of the vote fell to its lowest point 
during the inter-war years 54 . Significantly, although it is difficult to pinpoint the 
political stance of individuals owning to a lack of evidence, these councillors included 
at least five with strong Communist sympathies 55 . 
However, following the elevation of three Labour Councillors to the Aldermanic Bench, 
Labour lost three seats in the bye-elections of late November, but, contrary to Davies 
and Morley's conclusions56 , as a result of their Aldermanic strength, the Labour group 
were able to sustain their influence. Nevertheless, although in control for the first time, 
the Labour group proceeded with caution, aware of sending out mixed messages by a 
refusal to wear their robes of office or to stand as a demonstration of respect for the ex-
Mayor. Thus they were careful to suppress radical imagery and issued the statement 
that, although not prepared to maintain meaningless customs, they would nevertheless 
uphold the highest possible traditions of civic duties. Additionally, the first Labour 
Mayor made an important innovation. In view of the abnormal economic situation, he 
saw the need for abnormal procedures, and introduced the full reporting of council 
proceedings in the press, in an attempt to show openness and build confidence. This 
represents the first step towards the development of the public democracy that was to be 
a definitive feature of Macintyre's 'Little Moscows'. Although an unprecedented step 
and not universally approved, this remained an important feature of local administration 
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throughout the period, and as a result of verbatim reporting, the press became both a 
decisive political influence and a valuable source of information. 
Other evidence supports the impression that radical zeal and municipal authority were 
not thought to mix, and although the new Labour council lost no time in using its 
authority to act on earlier Trades Council resolutions, it did so with caution. For 
example, a Corporation resolution sent to the Prime Minister and Minister of Labour 
asserting that unemployment was a national problem and demanding immediate 
legislation to provide every citizen with either work or sufficient maintenance, despite 
being a direct quote from the original Trades Council resolution of the previous year, 
took care to omit the many references to the failure of capitalism and the prediction of 
revolution if the government failed to take responsibility for unemployment 57 . 
(ii) Schism: 1921-1922 
Despite their gains, by 1921 divisions within the Left, growing throughout the war and 
evident in the 1918 General Election, were coming to a head. Communist ideology was 
increasingly debated at public meetings and fully reported in the press, and the rhetoric 
of class conflict was becoming more evident as left-wing speakers argued against 
British imperialism and capitalist exploitation, describing the capitalist class as a threat 
to trade unionism. 
The chain of events that was to finally rupture Barrow's labour movement began in 
April 1921. As on Clydeside and in Nelson, Barrow's Communists, still within the ILP, 
supported the adoption of certain points set out in the Third International, but this was 
over-ruled at the ILP national conference and the Communist groups were defeated. 
However, unlike Clydeside where the Communists were increasingly marginalised 58 , 
the left wing of Barrow's ILP called a special meeting to discuss their secession from 
the ILP and the formation of a Barrow branch of the Communist Party. Only a select 
140 out of a total membership of 400 were informed of the meeting, enabling the vote to 
secede to be carried by 88 votes to 5359• 
 The second vote, taken after the moderates had 
walked out, was carried unanimously. In contrast, the far left of Nelson's ILP did not 
defect to the Communist Party in 1921 60 . 
1W 
Although the vote to sever was illegal as the required seven days notice of the meeting 
had not been given and the ILP constitution could only be amended at an AGM, the 
Communists seized the entire assets of the ILP, including furniture, membership and 
accounts books and cash, changing the locks and occupying the premises owned by the 
IILP. These events were given a high profile in the local press, as were the resulting 
court cases starting in June of that year, and created considerable rumour and interest. 
Both sides spoke little and with caution. The IILP played down the effects of the coup 
and announced that their principles were opposed to those of the Communists, pledging 
to continue their historic mission of converting the masses to socialism. The defectors, 
for their part, maintained the legality of the vote and asserted the Communist Party was 
now in legitimate possession and control, but stressed that defecting councillors would 
continue to perform their civic duties 61 . The judge described the case as difficult and 
novel, but particularly interesting as there was no legal precedent, the only similar case, 
before the Manchester Judges of the Chancery Division, having been adjourned. He 
ultimately ruled in favour of the ILP who repossessed their property and assets, thus 
discrediting the Communists whose coup, although short-lived, was to have far-
reaching consequences for local politics. 
This was perhaps the first time that many Barrovians became aware of the ideological 
conflict within the local Labour movement, whilst the illegality of the Communists' 
actions created an impression of devious, under-hand left-wing manoeuvrings, whose 
practitioners (who included several Labour Councillors and an Alderman) appeared ill-
suited to handling the current climate of fast rising unemployment and depression. The 
political repercussions of the rift were immediate and unequivocal. In response to this 
and further left-wing bye-election gains, the Citizen's League re-doubled its efforts to 
broaden its base and mount an effective, unified opposition, emphasising that it was a 
non-party, non-sectarian organisation open to a11 62. Additionally, the Communists 
remained closely aligned to Labour, and despite the events of April their representatives 
fought the local elections as Labour Party candidates. 
An examination of Labour Party election pamphlets 63 demonstrates the tensions and 
issues of the early twenties' electoral campaigns, and indicates that defection from the 
Party began early. For example, C. Mycock, a member of the Barrow Labour Party 
Executive Committee and a barrister by profession, campaigned in 1920 as a Labour 
candidate and active Citizen's League member. However, by 1921, the divisions had 
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hardened and Labour pamphlets clearly indicate that the Party identified such defectors 
as the main enemy. Ignoring the Conservatives, Labour publications focussed on these 
new 'Independents', attempting to discredit them as having failed the people, accusing 
them of being Conservative controlled and of supporting an anti-socialist alliance 
dominated by vested interests. 
Thus the two sides were drawn up for the 1921 municipal elections in November, but 
whilst Labour candidates were organised with military precision, the Citizen's League, 
despite membership boosted by recent events and now including many Independents, 
still lacked an efficient organisation. At this point the press, progressing from the 
reporting of council business, began to take an important partisan role in the campaign, 
where every ward was contested. As candidates seldom canvassed, the paper asked 
questions on key issues such as council expenditure, the state of the local economy and 
significantly, whether they would follow their own judgements or a dictated party line. 
Of a total of seventeen candidates, the answers of only seven 'safe' candidates were 
published, effectively denying the left wing a voice 65 . However, the election brought no 
numerical change. Labour and Independent councillors still numbered 11 and 13 
respectively, whilst each group had four Aldermen, but Labour's loss of the Mayoralty 
suggests the Independents had a marginally greater claim to control. 
However, although the loss of the Mayoralty was a setback, this pales into 
insignificance in comparison to what followed in the Board of Guardians election of 
April 1922. By this time the Labour Party was divided between moderates on one hand 
and its radical and Communist members on the other, who advocated the adoption of 
the National Relief Scale as demanded by the National Unemployed Workers' 
Movement. According to this scale, out-relief would include the payment of 36/- a week 
for a couple, and 5/- a week for each child, bringing relief levels to well above local 
labourers' wage rates, but a very dangerous policy at a time when unemployment was 
approaching 73% and the Board of Guardians were already on the brink of bankruptcy 
when paying out-relief at a rate of 26/- a week per couple. 
This is the crucial point where Communist ideology confronted the people, 
transforming the issue from an ideological debate among a minority to one that affected 
the entire population. A comparison with the 1919 situation will put the impact into 
context. The proposed National Relief Scale represented a radical change from the 1919 
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policy, in addition to which the Communist controlled Labour Party voted to force all 
Guardians opposed to the National Relief Scale to resign from the Board 67 . This and the 
belief that the policy of the far left would be fatal for the economic health of the town 
stimulated a flood of defections from the Labour Party, polarising local politics, as 
politicians of all persuasions buried their differences to mount a unified opposition 
against a local Labour Party controlled by Communists and radicals. Thus a distinctive 
aspect of Barrow's politics during these years was an anti-socialist alliance that 
recruited directly from the Labour Party. 
As regards the election itself, in 1919, the last Board had sat for 5 years, so a 
considerable change of personnel was expected. However, relief had never been a 
contentious issue and thd elections were low-key affairs, and although only a quarter of 
the electorate voted, they returned eleven Labour candidates to a total of sixteen 
places68
. In contrast, in 1922, the election generated an abnormal amount of energy and 
interest, and was bitterly fought on the key issues of anti-Communism and the National 
Relief Scale. Again, the press played a key role, making a public appeal to the electorate 
to return Guardians who would act in 'common sense and justice', with responsibility 
towards both the ratepayers and the needy, publishing a list of 'safe' candidates and 
urging everyone to vote and keep out the Communists 69 . 
The situation demonstrates the level of support and the unusual strength of the radical 
left, which needed the combined efforts of the other contenders to constrain it. 
Following the most bitterly contested election campaign in the town's history (and 
unheard of for the Board of Guardians), Labour lost control of the Board in a massive 
landslide away from the Left, with only one Labour Guardian returned and the majority 
of the other seats going to Labour Party defectors in various guises. The returning 
Chairman, a Labour defector who fought the election as an 'Anti-Communist', declared 
the result clearly demonstrated that the electorate endorsed the Board's policies of 
stringent administration and control of expenditure 70. This outcome could have severe 
implications for poor relief policies and the material well-being of the unemployed. 
The November municipal election confirmed the April verdict. Press reports stated that 
the 'striking figures', a total majority of 2,800 votes and defeats in six out of eight 
wards, 'demonstrate the people of Barrow are not prepared to put control of the 
municipal machinery into the hands of the so-called Labour Party', and heralded the 
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result as 'a great moral victory'. However, the high turnout of 79% and the even 
distribution of seats, with Conservatives and Labour having fourteen each, and the 
Independents holding the balance with four71 , suggests that from 1922 Barrow became a 
community with two competing identities, making it possible to offer two different 
interpretations. On one hand the political situation supports the concept of a community 
identity based on shared financial interests, but rather than being the product of class 
antagonisms as suggested by Davies and Morley, it can be argued that many of 
Barrow's working classes were in fact ratepayers, and from this standpoint, the 
threatened community can be said to have closed ranks and rallied in self-defence. 
Crucially however, this was led by 'moderates'. Conversely, the radical left, together 
with its advocacy of the National Relief Scale, might be thought unable to identify with 
the interests of a considerable proportion of the populace. However, the far left was 
powerful and able to mobilise a considerable body of support, arguably rooted in a 
class-based identity derived from unemployment and the demand for work or sufficient 
maintenance. These diverse interpretations demonstrate the importance of looking 
beyond politics into the wider social and economic arena to fully inform a discussion on 
the politics and social dynamics of distress, and these issues are discussed further in 
subsequent chapters. 
(iii) Aftermath: 1923-1926 
From this point Barrow's politics entered a new phase. The Board of Guardians 
elections returned to being low-key affairs, and Labour did not risk contesting the 1923 
elections, focussing instead on attacks on defectors and regaining their influence on 
Corporation committees. From 1923, whilst the Ministry of Health continued to be the 
focus of the Board of Guardians' struggles, municipal politics became the key 
battleground. Labour's obsession with 'party' continued to interfere with council 
business as every question, resolution and vote was dubbed as 'electioneering' or a 
'party' move. Given the economic condition of the town, Alderman Ellison, to the right 
of Labour at this point and soon to become the town's only Independent, warned that 
'there was never a time ... when it was so necessary to drop, or lay aside, our political 
differences, and all pull together for the common good, as today ... To me it is 
appalling that we should be bickering over municipal politics, while there is every 
danger of the whole civic structure collapsing about our heads.' 72. However, Labour 
persisted with its relentless infighting, comprehensively reported in the press, and thus 
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continued to undermine its own credibility to the detriment of the Party's municipal 
prospects. This was sufficient to maintain the balance of power between the parties, and 
the Citizen's League, having fulfilled its function, gradually faded into the background, 
enabling traditional party identities to reappear. Additionally, although the expulsion of 
all Communists from the Labour Party in 1924, helped heal the rift within the Barrow 
Party, the distinction between Labour and Independent remained a fine one. As late as 
1926 for example, the Labour Party expelled two elected councillors and fought them at 
the municipal elections later that year with two other Labour candidates, demonstrating 
continuing tensions. But despite fighting hard and making significant gains in 1925, 
Labour failed to regain control of the council and was unable to equal the number of 
Conservative councillors until 1926. Thus whilst Barrow reflects wider long-term 
municipal electoral trends, not only do Labour's gains fail to correlate with periods of 
high unemployment, their severe reversal of fortune occurred when unemployment 
peaked in 1922. Similarly, by 1926 the employment crisis had lessened, but Labour's 
gains from this date reflect its breach with the Communists and a more stable political 
climate. Additionally, Labour did not achieve parity with the Conservatives on the 
Board of Guardians until 1925, when each had seven members, with the balance of 
power in the hands of the one Liberal and one Independent member 73 . 
Initially, the Labour Party fared little better in the Parliamentary elections. John 
Bromley had replaced Duncan as the Labour candidate, but his approach to the 
campaign appeared to be half-hearted, and in 1922 he was absent from two campaign 
meetings, speaking instead in Lancaster, on behalf of another candidate. The press again 
played an active role and their coverage of the Parliamentary election campaign was 
equally partisan. Whilst press reports suggested that Bfomley had little to offer in the 
way of coherent policy, the paper also published the candidates' replies to a 
questionnaire presented by Barrow's Chamber of Trade. The answers of D.G. 
Somerville, the Conservative candidate, were printed first, and were lengthy and well 
reasoned, whilst Bromley's appear ruthlessly edited, often comprising of a little more 
than short sentences or a single word 74 . The disparity was marked, and in 1922 
Somerville polled a record majority of 1,927 votes 75 . However, by 1923 press coverage 
of political debates and public meetings was becoming increasingly impartial 76 , but in 
the General Election that returned the first Labour Government, Barrow's Labour Party 
was denied victory. The first Liberal candidate for twenty-eight years had split the vote, 
but had reduced Somerville's majority to just 420. 
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In contrast, Labour regained the Parliamentary seat in 1924, with a 110 vote majority", 
again indicating Barrow was out of step with national trends 78 . Yet whilst the national 
turnout, at 77.7%, was the highest since the war 79, a massive 89.9% of Barrow's 
electorate voted. The result was announced to a vast crowd amid scenes of 'wild 
pandemonium'. 'Never has such a deafening roar rent the air in Barrow. The crowd 
went well nigh frantic'. Barrow's electorate evidently had different criteria for national 
and local government eligibility, and although Bromley could assert 'the workers in this 
great industrial constituency have shown their faith, in spite of the "Red Plot", in the 
integrity of the Labour Government' 80 , it is likely the expulsion of the Communists 
from the Labour Party was a decisive factor. 
In addition to dividing the Labour Party, Communist ideology similarly affected the 
wider labour movement. Returning to 1921, although the majority of unions affiliated to 
the Trades Council supported Communist affiliation at that time, a significant minority 
did not81 . The issue became increasingly contentious, reflecting the current political 
situation, and by March 1923, the Communists had lost control of the Trades Council, 
which had voted to sever its links with the still Communist controlled Labour Party 82 . 
However, this decision was modified, and from April 1924, whilst both bodies would 
continue to hold separate meetings, and have separate Executive Committees and 
Secretaries, all funds would remain centralised 83 . However, whilst reflecting the wider 
trend whereby unions increasingly ignored the Labour Party without severing their 
connections 84, Barrow's Communists still wielded considerable influence. 
However, whilst this suggests attempts to separate political and industrial objectives, 
analysis is limited by lack of detailed evidence, and following the expulsion of the 
Communists from the Labour Party, relations within Barrow's labour movement 
became increasingly complex. In order to maintain their links with local industry, 
Barrow's Labour Party initially proposed the formation of an Association of Trade 
Union Secretaries as a parallel organisation to the Trades Council 85 , but later opted to 
infiltrate the existing Trades Council with Communist Labour Party representatives 86 . 
Additionally, Barrow's Labour Party had been overwhelmingly in favour of Communist 
affiliation, and it is unclear how far or how soon they complied with the National 
Executive's expulsion order as Minutes make few references to their working 
relationships. However, unlike the Rhondda Borough Labour Party, which was 
disaffiliated by the Labour Party Executive for refusing to expel its Communist 
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delegates in 192787, 
 by 1926 the break between the Barrow Labour Party and the 
Communists was complete. The complexity of these events is demobstrated by the 
Trades Council, which, despite earlier attempts to sever its links with the Communists, 
became their last foothold. 
The General Strike had little political impact in Barrow, but in its aftermath, tensions 
ran high between the political and industrial wings of the labour movement. The bitter, 
recriminatory battles in the local labour press indicate that the divisions of 1921/22 had 
hardened, the intense animosity reaching its peak when the Trades Council invited A.J. 
Cook to speak in Barrow. However, this had little significance beyond the leadership of 
the official labour movement, and the issues, given the condition of the town, could be 
said to be trivial. For example, in addition to the factions meting out responsibility for 
undermining the unity of the town's labour movement, the ILP was accused of 
attempting to sabotage A.J. Cook's speech by refusing to lend chairs to the Trades 
Council 88
. A letter from the Barrow branch of ASLEP possibly spoke for the majority of 
the rank and file, suggesting there were lessons to be learned from the General Strike, 
but it was time that 'all this back-biting and slandering of various trade union leaders 
and others ceased', calling for co-operation and the re-organisation of the various trade 
unions89
. In addition to suggesting that nothing had been learned from 1922, this 
supports Phillips's contention that the unions remained more concerned for internal 
discipline and organisation than long term political and social reconstruction 90 . 
Thus left-wing ideology proved equally divisive for the industrial wing of Barrow's 
labour movement. Although the evidence in sparse, it appears that no compromise was 
possible between the factions, and their struggles were also genuine battles for control. 
However, whilst this is true of the leadership, it is probable that a significant proportion 
of the rank and file were moderate, creating further divisions during a period of great 
economic uncertainty when labour unity was essential. 
CONCLUSION 
The period 1914-1926 was one of transition from strength, through disaster, to partial 
recovery for the political wing of Barrow's labour movement. As might be expected in a 
town dominated by traditional heavy industry and an important munitions centre, the 
war accelerated the trend towards closer links between the trade unions and the Labour 
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Party, whilst the wartime growth of Socialist ideology was instrumental in the shaping 
of political attitudes. Consequently the influence of older socialist organisations, and 
notably the ILP, declined as a result, and the militant shop stewards' movement became 
increasingly influential within the Labour Party. However, despite the discernible 
growth of left wing radicalism among the organised working class, Barrow supports 
McKibbin's assertion that existing political traditions were far from overturned, the 
wider population remaining largely unaffected, and thus the shift towards the left should 
not be over-emphasised in the immediate post-war period. Indeed, working class 
enfranchisement failed to bring the expected gains for Labour, and the Parliamentary 
defeat of 1918 under-scores the impact of left-wing ideology which reversed Labour's 
pre-war position and brought the once well organised party to division and defeat. 
Despite being a strong Labour borough, Barrow did not conform to the County Borough 
electoral trends identified by Davies and Morley, as wider Labour gains of 1919 were 
not reflected in Barrow until 1920. Additionally, Barrow contradicts the assertion that 
Labour's municipal fortunes reflected levels of unemployment. The extraordinarily high 
unemployment in the town, which peaked in 1922, failed to give Labour municipal 
ascendancy, whilst Labour's gains from 1926, when unemployment was considerably 
lower, suggests the primacy of other factors, notably the rapid growth of Communism 
and the polarisation of municipal politics. 
The influence of unemployment was also limited in Middlesbrough, where Labour 
remained the smallest single party, despite unemployment climbing to 33% in 1921 1 
. 
Thus Labour failed to increase its representation on the various local authority bodies, 
whose elected members were 'in no way characterised by radicalism' 92 . Nelson 
however, presents a different scenario. Although Labour did not control the Council 
during this period, the Party remained an established force in local government, and the 
outstanding contrast with Barrow at this time was its greater political stability. This was 
due in part to the town's established tradition of progressive municipal policies which 
remained independent of 'party' 93 , but another key factor was unemployment, which 
remained mild in comparison to Barrow, ranging from 6% in January 1919 to 30 010 in 
1930. Indeed, under-employment rather than unemployment was to.become the most 
inflammatory issue. 
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In Barrow however, the influence of left-wing ideology, the division of the Labour 
Party and its close association with the Communists contributed to the distinctive and 
volatile nature of Barrow's politics during this period. Although unemployment did not 
result in Labour gains, its influence was nevertheless profound, and it is impossible to 
ascertain whether unemployment or ideology provided the greater stimulus for the 
expansion of Barrow's Communist Party. However, whilst Macintyre asserts that the 
Communists tended to increase their influence at the expense of the Labour Party, in 
Barrow the two parties remained closely affiliated, to the point where it is impossible to 
differentiate between them. Unfortunately, due to the absence of Communist Party 
records the size of the membership is unknown, and whilst they made significant gains 
on the Corporation, their reason for fielding candidates under the Labour Party banner 
remains obscure. 
A distinctive characteristic of Barrow at this time was the formation of an anti-socialist 
alliance, and there is little doubt that left wing gains stimulated the moderates to 
organise on the same lines as the militants. However, Davies and Morley argue that 
such anti-socialist alliances were the product of 'relatively small groups [which could] 
only achieve their political interests by the fiction of non-partisan politics ... in the 
interests of all ratepayers', enabling combined efforts by providing a non-political label 
to rally wider support and avoiding the stigma of Toryism 95 . However, the Citizen's 
League made little headway until Communist control of the Board of Guardians and the 
economic consequences of the National Relief Scale became a real possibility. From 
this point it can be argued that the conflict between ideology and economic reality 
created a polarity between the radical left and a cross-party anti-socialist alliance whose 
sole aim was to keep the far Left out of local government and out of the public purse. 
Consequently, municipal elections in Barrow were genuine battles for control of the 
council, but the distinctive aspect of this alliance was its ability to recmit from the 
Labour Pasty itself. Furthermore, the population, previously not particularly susceptible 
to ideology, became both increasingly politicised and polarised, adopting two 
conflicting identities. However, whether these identities were a class-based response to 
high unemployment or, as Macintyre suggests, were an assertive means of defence for a 
mutually dependent community threatened by collapse, cannot be ascertained by 
political evidence alone and must be examined in the wider social context. 
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The brief comparison with other localities demonstrates the problems inherent in 
attempts to generalise, even across localities with similar backgrounds and economic or 
political situations. In Middlesbrough for example, the Communist Party remained 
weak and there was little evidence of working class militancy, despite rising 
unemployment. In Nelson on the other hand, short-time working and the introduction of 
more looms created intense industrial unrest, and it was the fusion of industrial and 
political conflicts in the late 1920's and early 1930's that earned Nelson the title of 
'Little Moscow' 96 . However, the title is misleading, implying a strong commitment to 
left-wing politics, mainly represented by the Communist Party and based on strong 
working class solidarity; yet despite a strong labour movement, the Communist 
influence here remained limited. However, Hill asserts that Nelson can be validly 
described as a centre of 'Red' politics by virtue of its 'progressive, socialist ideas and 
policies' and Labour domination 97 . As regards comparison to other 'Little Moscows', 
despite their comparative strength, Barrow's Communists were denied control of the 
local authorities. Nevertheless, a distinctive feature of local government in Barrow at 
this time was the introduction of direct, face-to-face democracy by the first Labour 
Council, equally significant forits continuity throughout the period. However, whilst 
this enabled local policy to be debated and formulated in the public eye, it is not 
sufficient reason to include Barrow in their ranks. 
Indeed, from 1923 anti-Communism remained a key factor in local politics. Radical 
ideology continued to divide the Labour Party, alienating the electorate and isolating the 
Left, both politically and industrially. This is further demonstrated by the steady 
improvement in the Labour Party's fortunes following the official expulsion of the 
Communists in 1924 and the regaining of the Parliamentary seat. By 1926, the local 
political situation had stabilised considerably, and the General Strike was a low-key 
affair, having little political impact outside the official labour movement. By this time, 
industrial and political objectives appear to have been separated, the Strike serving only 
to fuel further faction fighting within the labour movement, further marginalise the 
Communists and distance the trade union rank and file from their leadership. 
It can be argued that radical ideology and a crippled economy were the main agents of 
political change in Barrow during the past-war transition period, over-riding the effects 
of franchise reform and high unemployment, and serving to rupture rather than 
consolidatethe town's labour movement. However, this analysis has raised three 
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important questions: the nature of the identities adopted by the polarised electorate, the 
implications of the exclusion of the radical left for poor relief policies and the living 
standards of the unemployed, and also the reasons behind the limited impact of the 
General Strike. Additionally, the significance of the newly instigated public democracy 
also requires closer examination. These issues and themes will be analysed and 
developed further in subsequent chapters dealing with the wider social and 
administrative context. 
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THE RESPONSE OF THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
In order to illustrate the full significance of political developments it is essential to 
examine their implications for the material well-being of the large proportion of the 
town's population affected either directly or indirectly by the depression and mass 
unemployment. This and the following chapters will complete this analysis, beginning 
with the responses of the local authorities, in the form of the Corporation and Board of 
Guardians. It is in their administration that the significance of the new public 
democracy, touched on in the previous chapter, becomes apparent, especially as regards 
local taxation, relief work schemes and poor relief. Additionally, as strategy and policy 
decisions were in the hands of moderates, an important facet of this chapter is the 
examination of the relationship of the Barrow Board of Guardians with the Ministry of 
Health, and the comparison of the Board's distinctive handling of the crisis with that of 
other unions, both moderate and radical. Thus the comparison with Middlesbrough will 
be continued to provide a context for the implications of Barrow's political 
developments at this time. However, the administration of poor relief in Nelson was 
under the control of the Burnley Union, which brought together representatives from 
other neighbouring but politically contrasting East Lancashire towns as well as Nelson 
itself, and this lack of autonomy makes direct comparison impossible. In addition to the 
strategies of the Board of Guardians, the responses of the Corporation, together with its 
working relationship with the Board, will also be examined. 
The chapter will be divided into three sections, beginning with an examination of the 
Corporation's attempts to mitigate the effects of unemployment between 1919 and late 
1923. This will be followed by an analysis of the strategies adopted by the Board of 
Guardians, which bore the brunt of the poor relief burden, at the peak of the crisis 
between 1921 and 1923. The final section focuses on the period from late 1923 to 1927, 
when unemployment began to fall and steadied at an average of 17%, enabling local 
bodies to focus on the recovery of rate arrears, whilst the Ministry of Health sought to 
widen its powers over recalcitrant Boards. Although the Guardians' minute books have 
not survived, there is ample evidence within the Corporation and Ministry of Health 
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files, together with verbatim press reports of important meetings, to provide a detailed 
analysis of poor relief policies and issues. 
Unlike issues related to housing, health and politics, the historiography and debates 
surrounding unemployment and poor relief are relatively uncontentious. The Poor Law 
of 1834 was part of the tripartite strategy of workhouse, charity and self-help intended 
to encourage private initiative, thrift and responsibility, and discourage the habits that 
were believed to contribute to poverty. The image of the undeserving poor was 
powerful, and the terms under which poor relief was offered provided a deterrent to the 
voluntarily idle. As a result, few able-bodied unemployed resorted to outdoor relief, 
which was paid in return for test-work. However, as a result of the high unemployment 
and concerns for national efficiency which followed the Boer War, poverty came to be 
seen as a threat to society as a whole rather than to the individual. This raised the 
problem of reconciling the need for state intervention in the maintenance of adequate 
living standards whilst retaining 'the capacity to reform or punish the ever-present 
residuum". Faced by rising unemployment but unwilling to amend Poor Law 
principles, the Conservative Government passed the Unemployed Workman's Act in 
1905. Although doing little for the unemployed, the Act did sanction the finance of 
relief work schemes from the rates and created the machinery to co-ordinate the efforts 
of Boards of Guardians, councils and charities. 
The system was extended by the 1911 Insurance Act, which  introduced compulsory 
unemployment insurance to a limited number of unstable industries, including 
shipbuilding, iron founding and the construction industries. Under the Act, insured 
workers, but not their dependants, were eligible for 10/- per week sickness benefit, 
payable for a maximum of 13 weeks 2. In addition, the Liberal Government introduced a 
wide range of social reforms between 1906 and 1914, but rather than representing a 
coherent reform policy, these were 'undermined by the combination of confusion and 
expediency which characterised each instalment' 3 , and by the outbreak of the war, only 
a quarter of the workforce was covered by insurance. 
The 1911 Act was extended to cover all munitions workers in 1916, and although the 
war had demonstrated the need to co-ordinate social provision there was no consensus 
on either the extent or the form that reform might take. Many believed this would not be 
possible under the Local Government Board and would necessitate the dismantling of 
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the Poor Law, and the Maclean Report of 1918 asserted the entire system was in need of 
rationalisation4 . The Report identified inefficient overlapping of function, lack of 
uniformity and conflicting principles of administration, and advocated the abolition of 
the Boards of Guardians, the end of the principle of 'less eligibility', and the 
establishment of specialised provision based on types of need within a nationally 
uniform structure 5 . 
The prospects for reform looked favourable in the immediate post-war period, and in 
1919 the LGB was abolished and replaced by a new Ministry of Health, which became 
the central authority for Poor Law purposes. It was assumed that the post-war extension 
of unemployment insurance would reduce the pressure on local authorities, and the need 
fof the Poor Law was expected to decrease in the optimism of the immediate postwar 
period. However, in the deteriorating economic climate reconstruction plans were 
quickly abandoned, whilst the Ministry of Health failed to give the expected leadership. 
Given the lack of enthusiasm for change at the centre, 'there was little likelihood of 
powerful vested interests like the Boards of Guardians being disbanded' 6 . 
The payment of Unemployment Donation was introduced in November 1918 in 
anticipation of rising unemployment as wartime production levels fell. Although 
withdrawn for civilians in November 1919 and for ex-servicemen in March 1921 this, 
combined with the wartime payment of Separation Allowances for servicemen's 
families, had created the important precedent of benefit payments irrespective of 
contributions. Additionally, the Insurance Acts of 1911 and 1916 were repealed in 1920, 
and a new Act extended compulsory unemployment insurance to twenty million 
workers. However, the 1920 Act was not intended to provide sufficient maintenance but 
rather to supplement savings, six weeks of contributions being required to qualify for 
one week's benefit, payable at a rate of 15/- per week for a maximum of 15 weeks per 
year. The 'one-in-six' rule provided an in-built check against abuse of the scheme but 
was unworkable at a time of mass unemployment 7 , and was quickly abandoned in the 
face of the threat of severe unrest. The Act's successor, of March 1921 made benefit 
payable for 26 weeks in each insurance year for those normally in insured employment, 
genuinely seeking work and with a minimum of twenty weeks contributions. After 26 
weeks a claimant was eligible for uncovenanted benefit for a further 22 weeks in each 
insurance period, theoretically in advance of future contributions. However, this 
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arrangement left a four-week 'gap' during which time the unemployed had to turn to the 
Guardians for assistance 
During the course of the 1920s, over twenty Acts relating to unemployment insurance 
were introduced in efforts to adpt to changing political and economic conditions, but 
although 'governments expanded the National Insurance scheme, [they] did so whilst 
trying to balance the books' 8 . As a result, these schemes, never intended to be more than 
a supplement to the Poor Law system, were always inadequate and suited no-one. 
Throughout the period, the uninsured, those who had exhausted their contributions or 
who were caught between periods of eligibility for uncovenanted benefit, were thrown 
on to the poor relief system, the main focus of this chapter. 
Boards of Guardians were ill-equipped and ill-prepared for the scale of post-war 
unemployment, and werebeset by many problems. The Merthyr Tydfil Judgement of 
1900, for example, did not permit Guardians to supply relief to those unemployed as a 
result of strike action or lock-outs, although they were permitted to support the families 
of such men. Thus the strike wave of 1918-21, the 1922 engineering strike and the 
General Strike of 1926 created further problems. Additionally, due to the local basis of 
relief administration, Boards of Guardians 'were faced by relatively compact and 
cohesive working class communities in most towns, where housing, lack of transport 
and poverty pushed people together' 9 . Thus the Boards were open to pressure from local 
groups, which could influence relief rates, attitudes and policies, and consequently 'the 
old Poor Law system and the entire paternalistic philosophy which underlay it was 
being challenged in a radical fashion and on a national scale" ° . Additionally, in certain 
close-knit localities where Communists were influential, there evolved a 'direct, face-to-
face democracy' and a preference for open and collective decision making. In such 
communities, authority and legitimacy were drawn 'from resolutions passed at public 
meetings and ... administered by elected delegates representing the community at 
large', who were seen to be directly accountable to those they served' 1 . 
Problems were exacerbated by the growing willingness of the unemployed to apply for 
out-relief and the pressures arising from increased Labour representation following the 
1918 Representation of the People Act which ended pauper disenfranchisement. 'Such 
members were pledged to deal generously with the unemployed and their families 
whatever the cost to the ratepayer" 2, the most famous example being Socialist 
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dominated Poplar. A poor borough supporting a high number of unemployed from the 
rates, its Labour Guardians were jailed in 1921 for their refusal to contribute to general 
LCC expenditure, arguing that poorer boroughs and unions supporting large numbers of 
unemployed should be subsiclised by richer boroughs. The outcome was a compromise 
whereby the cost of out-relief was to be met from the Metropolitan Common Law Fund, 
an arrangement confined to the Metropolitan area and leaving rate equalisation a 
contentious issue elsewhere, whilst the union continued to defy the government and pay 
a high rate of relief 13 . 
Although 'it was on the local Boards of Guardians that many of the most crucial 
political battles were now being fought' 14,  the responses and attitudes of the various 
Poor Law Unions varied considerably. Whilst some officials believed they faced a 
conspiracy to subvert the Poor Law, and 'felt justified in pursuing stringent policies on 
the grounds that the "deserving" unemployed were provided for by unemployment 
insurance' 15 others adopted a more liberal approach. Rose emphasises the point that the 
generous payment of out-relief was not confined to Labour controlled Unions, and cites 
Manchester, West Derby (Liverpool), and Sheffield as examples 16. Thane supports this 
view and asserts that the Boards 'were influenced less by the political inclinations of 
their members than by local conditions' 17 ,concluding that Guardians in distressed areas 
were generally more liberal in their application of the law. The Ministry of Health for its 
part, provided little help or leadership, urging economy and reiterating the 1834 formula 
of 'less eligibility' 18 However, it was impossible for most Boards to observe both this 
and the regulation that out relief must be sufficient to meet basic needs. As a result, 
'many Guardians in the mid-1920s felt trapped by the conflicting pressures from the 
poor to increase relief and from the central government to reduce it' '. 
Inevitably, the Guardians' financial problems strengthened the hand of the Ministry of 
Health. The Goschen Committee was established to supervise the grant of loans to 
insolvent unions, whilst the Ministry attempted to control over-generous Boards by 
refusing to sanction loans or overdrafts to supplement rate income. Inevitably the 
Ministry's powers were most often exercised against those Unions with low rate 
incomes and higher numbers of unemployed to support, intensifying the debate on rate 
equalisation and demands for the funding of poor relief from national taxes and not 
local rates 20 . 
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'The experience of the 1920s had shown that local needs were more vividly appreciated 
at the local level than by central government, and that ... the unemployed had in many 
areas won the sympathy of the Poor Law administrators who had gone as far as they 
were able to help them' 21 . However, the government eventually won the battle of 
outdoor relief. The 1926 Board of Guardians (Default) Act gave the Ministry of Health 
the power to dismiss persistently extravagant  Boards and replace them with 
commissioners. Although a few boards were suspended under this Act, for example 
West Ham and Chester-le-Street, most were brought under control without the need for 
commissioners. In 1927, the Poor Law Act consolidated over one hundred Poor Law 
statutes, but in 1928 the Local Government Act abolished the Boards of Guardians and 
replaced them with Public Assistance Committees administered by local authorities. 
Public works schemes provided the other major source of unemployment relief during 
the period: Although funded by the Ministry of Transport and the Unemployment 
Grants Conmiittee, the onus was on the local authority to provide a considerable 
proportion of any costs, borrowing being regulated by the Ministry of Health. The aim 
was to provide work, paid at a rate below local wage levels, for men ineligible for 
unemployment benefit, and negotiated between councils and Boards of Guardians. 
However, the high cost of relief works restricted their use, their accumulative financial 
burden combined with falling rate incomes limiting the ability of depressed areas to 
finance them, with the effect that 'relief through public works burdened local 
communities without appreciably easing unemployment' 22 . 
BARROW CORPORATION AND RELIEF WORKS 19 19-1923 
With regard to Barrow, Chapter One has illustrated the cyclical nature of the town's 
economy and the problem of intermittent unemployment, and during such periods the 
unemployed had traditionally lived on their own resources or by applying to the 
Corporation for relief work. 23 Applications for out-relief in the pre-war period were 
unusual, and in the bad slump of 1907, for example, no applications were made, 
emphasising the effectiveness of the deterrent principle. Although the war brought full 
employment and unprecedented levels of working class prosperity, optimism in Barrow 
was particularly short-lived. As early as 1919, concerns about the economic backlash of 
the war were mounting as a result of falling production levels, rising unemployment and 
the withdrawal of out-of-work donation for civilians. 
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From January 1919 the Ministry of Labour, the Corporation and Barrow's Employment 
Exchange liaised to establish relief work schemes, but these were small scale enterprises 
which could employ only a limited number of men. Simultaneously, the growing 
numbers of unemployed were organising, marching and petitioning both the local 
authority and central government, declaring that unemployment was a government 
responsibility, and demanding national unemployment schemes and a 100% increase in 
unemployment donation24. The Corporation needed little convincing, and supported the 
demands of the unemployed. The Corporation called on the government to provide 
work or a sufficient level of maintenance for those 'thrown out of work through no fault 
of their own' 25 , and waned of the distress and unrest that would result from the 
discontinuation of out-of-work donation 26. However, the Government dismissed these 
concerns, asserting that the November unemployment figure of 2,266 men was not 
abnormal and did not warrant special attention, particularly as 1,800 of them were 
covered by the National Insurance Acts 27 . 
As unemployment rose during 1920 (see Chart 1.2), the Corporation came under 
increasing pressure to provide the customary relief works but was restricted by lack of 
money and the shortage of suitable schemes. Slum clearance and sanitation 
improvements were unnecessary due to the town's modernity, and the major schemes 
were restricted to the construction of a coastal road to Barrow, the draining of 
marshland on Walney and the provision of a lake for the local park. In response to the 
Corporation's repeated calls for assistance, the government maintained that 'the relief of 
destitution in England is, by law, a local charge, and this is one of the cardinal points of 
Local Government. The whole system ... will break down if people who are responsible 
for local expenditure are not also made responsible for raising and spending the 
necessary money' 1 . Thus from the outset, whilst the Corporation and the unemployed 
were of one mind, no compromise was possible between the Government and the Local 
Authority. 
Specific relief works schemes will not be examined in any detail, however the 
Unemployment Grants Committee were to pay a percentage of the total wage bill 29 at a 
maximum rate of 75% of the lOcal authority's rate for unskilled labour 30 . Significantly, 
the Corporation echoed the National Unemployed Workers Movement (NUWM) in 
protesting unsuccessfully against this low rate 31 . Additionally, as the terms of each 
scheme were negotiated separately with no guarantees that grants would be made, their 
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future was precarious, and they made little impact on unemployment. For example, in 
February 1921 the schemes provided work for just 300 men out of a total of 2,300, and 
by October, as unemployment approached 73% (see Chart 1.2), they provided just two 
days work per week for 270 single men, and three days work per week for 1,130 
married men, for a maximum period of three weeks 32 . 
The Corporation was 'utterly unable to cope with the volume of unemployment' 33 and 
the cost was disproportionate to any benefits. It continually pressed the Government for 
aid, having 'practically exhausted its ability to find schemes for work' 34 . For example, a 
joint deputation from the Corporation, Board of Guardians and LEC to the Ministries of 
Health and Labour in May 1922, presented Barrow's increasingly desperate financial 
and unemployment situation, emphasising that the 12,000 registered unemployed 
included neither the large numbers of uninsured men without work, nor the 6,000 idle 
due to the May engineering strike. However, the Government, although expressing a 
reluctance to burden ratepayers, stated it 'could not be helped, it was the result of the 
war ... [and] it was now absolutely essential to some extent to mortgage the future to 
theet the present needs, however undesirable it may be' 35 . 
Table 5.1 illustrates the high cost of relief work schemes, and the severity of the 
financial burden on the local authority. The Table also demonstrates the inability of the 
rates to meet this demand, and the consequent heavy reliance on loans which, despite a 
government contribution, would remain a significant burden on the town for at least the 
next decade. 
Table 5.1 	 Cost of Relief Work Schemes to June 1923 
Estimated cost of relief works 
	 £250,118 
Met by: 
government grant 
	 66,371 
from current rates 	 26,813 
from loans 	 156,934 
Estimated annual loan charges 
	 14,440 
Government contribution 	 4,170 
Annual charge on the rates 	 10,270 
(for 10 to 15 years) 
Borough Treasurer's Report, 30 June 1923, BA/C 511146 Box 51 F2 
Is1 
To finance the rising expenditure on unemployment the Corporation, including the 
Labour council of 1920-21, had increased the Borough and Poor Rates on three 
occasions between 1919 and 1922 (Table 5.2). However, from 1922 it had become 
'impossible to levy and collect heavier rates when practically the whole of a working 
class [was] unemployed' 36 . 
Table 5.2 	 The Borough and Poor Rates 1920-1923 
Year Borough Rate Poor Rate Total 
in I in f in 
Pre-war 7/- lOd 7/10d 
1920-21 10/6d 1/6d 12/- 
1921-22 11/- 2/6d 13/6d 
1922-21 12/6d 2/6d 15/- 
24 May 1922, BA/C 511142 Box 46 P2 
In addition to the impossibility of further rate increases, the Corporation's problems 
were compounded by falling rate incomes. Table 5.3 illustrates the rapidity with which 
arrears mounted at the peak of the crisis in 1922-23, and perhaps more significantly, 
shows that this figure more than trebled the following year. 
Table 5.3 	 Domestic Rate Arrears 1921-1924 
Year 	 Borough Rate 	 Poor Rate 	 Total 
£ 	 £ 	 £ 
1921-22 848 0 848 
1922-23 13,600 1,600 15,200 
1923-24 42,443 5,807 48,250  
Sources: 1921-23: 24 May 1922, BA/C 511142 Box 46 P2 
1923-1 924: Borough Treasurer's Memoranda, BA/C 511146 BOX 51 P2 
Rising unemployment simultaneously reduced the value of industrial rates, which were 
in part assessed according to the number of employees. That this amounted to a 
considerable sum is indicated by Table 5.4, which illustrates the loss of rate income 
from the town's three largest employers during 1922 alone, a situation compounded by 
the closure of increasing numbers of shops and boarding houses. 
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Table 5.4 
	 Loss in Industrial Rates 1922-1923 
Borough Rate 
	
Poor 	 Rate 	 Total 
£ 	 £ 	 £ 
Vickers: 	 18,526 	 3,725 	 22,251 
Steelworks 	 2,790 	 558 	 3,348 
Furness Railway 
	 6,314 	 2,011 	 8,325 
Total 	 34,024 (sic) 
(Actually 33,924) 
Source: Borough Treasurer's Memoranda, BA/C 511146 BOX 51 P2 
The above tables demonstrate the accumulative financial burden of unemployment and 
the May 1922 deputation warned the Government that, if all the money had to be found 
from the local rates 'the burden will be so serious as to ruin the town and prevent any 
prospect of recovery' 37 . After assessing the situation, the government responded with 
better terms from the Unemployment Grants Committee, an undertaking to attract a 
Cunard order for the shipyard, and the less positive suggestions of sending the town's 
juveniles to the Dominions and urging action against ratepayers in arrears 38 . 
Nevertheless, these measures were ineffectual and the estimated rate arrears for 1923-24 
(Table 5.3) were quickly exceeded. By July 1923 Borough Rate arrears had risen to 
£60,000, whilst Poor Rate arrears had increased on a pro rata basis, the proportion of 
ratepayers in arrears almost doubling, from 20.2% in March 1922, to 39.8% in March 
1923. 
The Corporation was caught between pressures from the unemployed and an impassive 
government. The Mayor, presented with a 2,000 signature petition strongly condemning 
the inadequate grants made by the Board of Guardians and the failure of the Council to 
provide relief works for the unemployed, declared he was 'sick and tired of going to 
London with ... cap in hand and begging for help' which was never forthcoming 40. By 
July 1923, the Corporation stated that 'it is impossible to further mortgage the Rates of 
the Borough for the relief of unemployment', and again insisted that 'the problem with 
which the Local Authorities are faced is one that cannot possibly be dealt with by them 
alone and that unless the government come to their aid immediately the consequences 
may be very serious' 41 . The government remained unmoved however, and following the 
loss of 1,500-1,800 jobs at the steelworks, another joint deputation was sent to the 
Ministries of Health and Labour in October 1923. The Ministries were berated for their 
empty aid promises and crippling loans, the Corporation arguing that relief work 
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schemes were uneconomic and ineffectual, and that the worsening economic conditions 
were driving the town to bankruptcy. 
This marked the end of attempts to provide large-scale relief works, and Ministers 
pledged themselves to attracting work for the town. However, 'no self-interested body 
would readily wish to invest in economically crippled areas ... where there were few 
prospects and where the high level of both local rates and rent arrears gave poor 
promise of security for a loan' 42 . Consequently, unlike Middlesbrough and Nelson, 
Barrow's industry was unable to diversify, and the Corporation and the Board of 
Guardians remained under intense pressure. 
Table 5.5 illustrates where expenditure cuts were made. Significantly, whilst the 
education budget was drastically reduced, the Corporation simultaneously directed 
substantial sums towards the most vulnerable sections of the community, the amount 
spent on the feeding of the Borough's school children for example, being exceeded only 
by expenditure on relief works (see Table 3.7). 
Table 5.5 	 Cuts in Corporation Expenditure 1922-1923 
1922-23 	 1923-24 
Total Economies £19,327 £38,572 
%SavedFrom: 
Education 34.1 52.5 
Health 9.4 3.8 
Highways 29.5 30.0 
Source: Borough Treasurer's Memoranda, BA/C 511146 BOX 51 P2 
This demonstrates that the attitude of the local authority had changed significantly since 
the Commission of Inquiry into Industrial Unrest of 1917, and by the early 1920s 
Barrow compared favourably to the more 'progressive' Nelson. Nelson's council 
'seemed determined that, as an elected body, it should exercise as much responsibility 
as possible over the welfare of its citizens' 43 , and provided leisure activities for the 
unemployed, together with reading rooms and reduced admission costs for public baths 
Barrow's Corporation, despite the exclusion of the far left, introduced similar measures, 
including a weekly rates payment systemU,  and free permits to enable the unemployed 
to use the toll bridge connecting Walney Island to the mainland (see Table 3.7). These 
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permits were a necessity in the interests of civic harmony, given the unwillingness of 
Vickers to waive its tolls and the refusal of the unemployed to accept a credit system 
and repay the tolls at a later date 45 . However, despite the Corporation's efforts, this 
remained a contentious issue and was to spill into riots in May 1922 (see Chapter Six). 
THE BOARD OF GUARDIANS AND POOR RELIEF 192 1-1923 
(i) Towards Crisis 
With mounting social tensions and the economy in disarray, the main burden of poor 
relief and the task of compensating for the inadequacies of the insurance system fell to 
the Board of Guardians. This section will analyse the strategies adopted by the Barrow 
Board at the peak of the crisisbetween 1921 and 1923. 
The Labour Party had predominated on the Barrow Board from 1904 and had 
maintained an efficient administrative system, interviewing individual applicants and 
visiting homes. However, working class self-sufficiency had ensured that staffing levels 
and expenditure remained minimal, and comprised one Relieving Officer and his 
assistant with a weekly out-relief budget of between £40 and £50 during the pre-war 
period. Consequently, pobr relief was an uncontentious issue and aroused little interest 
at this time. 
However, unemployment rose rapidly from 1919, and despite the widening of the 
National Insurance system, the 600 receiving out-relief in 1920 had increased to 3,669 
by September 1921, whilst the workhouse was full 4  (see also Table 5.6). The cost also 
multiplied, and despite a reduction in the relief scale in April 1921 (see Chapter Three), 
by October out-relief payments averaged £1,030 per week. Ministry of Health records 
begin in October 1921, with the Guardians' initial request for the authority to raise a 
£20,000 loan, and another if necessary, thawing attention to the increase of the Poor 
Rate in April 1920 and reduced relief scales. The Ministry replied that they were not in 
a position to give any assistance and, interestingly, that it was not their function to 
approve or disapprove relief scales. The Guardians continued to press for a loan and a 
five-year repayment period, and ultimately the Ministry modified its hard line and 
sanctioned a £15,000 overdraft to be repaid within two years. 
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The money was quickly exhausted, and by January 1922 the Guardians were requesting 
the extension of their overdraft and a minimum five-year repayment period, stressing 
the difficulty of raising sufficient relief revenue from the rates, particularly as business 
rate income, which normally provided a third of the rates, was drastically reduced 47 . 
However, although the Ministry 'fully appreciate[d] the grounds for treating Barrow as 
generously as possible', they took a very different view of Barrow's financial problems 
and possible options. Their preference for rate rises and the two year repayment period 
made it 'difficult to meet [the Barrow Board] even half way', and the Ministry refused 
to sanction the overdraft 48 . Ultimately, a Guardians' deputation in February 1922 
convinced the Ministry that the relief burden was too great for the town to sustain, and 
the overdraft was sanctioned, but again, with a two year repayment period. 
Throughout 1922 the number of applications to the Guardians increased (see Table 5.6), 
and weekly out-relief payments, at around £2,200, were almost equivalent to the total 
annual pit-war out-relief bill. Under increasing pressure, the Guardians approached the 
Ministry for a further overdraft in April, arguing that 'unless the sanction is given, the 
Guardians' cheques will be dishonoured at the bank and the position will become very 
serious'. They insisted that 'the bulk of the ratepayers have no income out of which 
rates can be paid' 49 , local traders were facing bankruptcy, and that the extension of the 
repayment period to ten years was as essential as the overdraft itself. Regarding Barrow 
as one of the hardest hit unions by this point, the Ministry sanctioned the overdraft and 
allowed a five year repayment period 50 . 
Table 5.6 	 Specimen figures for out-relief applications to May 1922 
Date Number of cases 
December 1919 587 
December 1920 680 
December 1921 3,429 
January 1922 4,880 
February 1922 5,117 
March 1922 6,357 
April 1922 9,363 
May 1922 11,000+  
Source: Barrow News, 26 August 1922 
The Guardians however, were fighting on two fronts, and faced considerable pressure 
from the local unemployed. The Guardians sympathetically received the Communist-lcd 
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deputations, and although these became increasingly unruly, the Board, still Labour 
controlled at this point, remained remarkably tolerant. However, the Chairman 
ultimately ruled: 'we cannot, as a public body, continue to go along like this. It is not a 
case of disrespect, but absolutely setting us up to contempt and defiance', and from 
December 1921 delegations led by extremists were no longer received 51 . 
The strengthening of the moderate section of the Board and the mounting agitation had 
not escaped Ministry attention, and the Ministry sought to take advantage of the 
situation as the crisis approached its peak in 1922. As stated above, following the Joint 
Deputation in May, the Ministry sent two representatives to Barrow to assess the 
situation, but it proved impossible to estimate the sums needed. Whilst the Guardians 
suggested a figure of £500,000 if the shipyard closed, the Ministry more conservatively 
estimated a minimum of £100,000, but realised that the half crown Poor Rate would not 
raise £50,000, even if it could all be collected. On the other hand, Barrow's 9% rate of 
pauperism was low compared to the 19% in some Unions52 , whilst the municipal rates, 
at 15/- in the £, were also comparatively low (see Table 5.7). Whilst high 
unemployment prohibited rate increases, the Ministry suspected the Guardians were not 
repaying as much as they could, and were trying to shift the entire burden onto the 
future 53  (although they had advised the Corporation to do just that only five months 
earlier). The Ministry turned to relief scales, which, although not extravagant, were 
supplemented by free school meals, war pensions and trade union superannuation 
benefit. However, whilst the Ministry privately agreed to the 'utmost concession' 
towards the town 54 , it continued to press for a reduction in the relief scale and to delay 
its decision on a ten-year repayment period. 
Table 5.7 
	 Comparison of rates in four industrial towns at February 1923 
Town 	 Poor Rate 	 Total Rate 	 Weekly Out-Relief 
in the £ 
	 in the £ 	 Per couple 	 Maximum 
Barrow 	 2/6d 
	 15/- 	 25/- 	 35/- 
Sheffield 	 10/2d 
	 21/lOd 	 25/- 	 50/- 
Middlesbrough 	 6/5d 	 19/5d 	 20/- 	 35/ 
W. Hartlepool 	 4/7d 	 17/4d 	 20/- 	 35/- 
Source: February 1923 PRO, MH 681102 
With funds due to run out within weeks, the Guardians believed they were not getting 
'the sympathy and aid which they have a right to expect in view of the difficult position 
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they have to face', and informed the Ministry that they were 'contemplating resigning in 
a body and leaving to the government the duty and responsibility of affording relief to 
the unemployed of Barrow' 55 . The banks had refused to extend the Guardians' 
overdraft, but the Ministry, confident after the April election, declined to meet a 
deputation in July, advising the Board to arrange a loan as already sanctioned, and if 
unsuccessful to approach to the Goschen Committee. The Guardians stressed that the 
'sanction of an extension of the Guardians' borrowing powers does 
not meet the difficulty. It is not right that this town should have to 
bear the consequences of Government cessation of armament work 
and maintain for an indefinite period a mass of men now unemployed 
as a result of that cessation. When the principle was established that 
each parish should maintain its own poor it was never contemplated 
that the whole of a large town might be unemployed and with no 
income coming in the town should still have to maintain its 
unemployed. Unless the Guardians take a stand now, the burden will 
be such that there can be no recovery. The rates will prevent it. The 
problem is a national and not a local one' 56 . 
Again they spelt out the situation. There were no funds, no possibility of a loan and no 
relief, and the consequences were unimaginable, leaving resignation as their only 
realistic option. 
Local tensions were also mounting, and at the Guardians meeting on 2 August, an 
UWM deputation occupied the hall until relief scales were increased. The Guardians 
explained the impossibility of increased scales when there were insufficient funds to 
pay relief at the current rate, and that funds would be exhausted by next Saturday (12th) 
Unless the Government approved a £90,000 loan and a fifteen year repayment period at 
the meeting on the 11th, the Barrow Guardians would cease to function 57 . They then 
departed, leaving the stunned deputation in occupation of the empty building. 
Throughout the period, poor relief issues were debated and UWM deputations received 
at public meetings, and these, together with the outcomes of Guardians' deputations to 
London, were comprehensively reported in the press. As Macintyre suggests, this 
openness bolstered the authority and legitimacy of the Barrow Board at a time of 
considerable uncertainty and unrest. If the UWM frequently expressed their distrust of 
the Board, the Chairman believed it had the support of the majority of the 
unemployed58. There was further evidence of a developing communal solidarity. The 
Ratepayers and Property Owners Association had long been lobbying the Ministry in an 
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effort to prevent further rate increases 59, and the Guardians were also supported by a 
letter from the bank which had refused a further overdraft. A director of the bank 
advised the Ministry that it would be extremely difficult for the Guardians to raise a 
loan on the open market and drew attention to 'the unique position of Barrow even 
amongst other industrial towns', emphasising that in times of national crisis the town 
was a national asset and it was the Government's duty to assist. Crucially, the 
Government was unmoved, and ignoring the evidence before them, suggested the 
Guardians raise a £60,000 loan on the open market. The Board debated the offer but the 
Chairman proposed they inform the Ministry that their 'proposals were utterly 
inadequate to meet the position, and that failing other more reasonable proposals, they 
[the Guardians] cease to function in a fortnight'. The lack of funds made continuation 
for any length of time impossible. Others argued that 'if we cease to function the 
Government will have to step in, because the unemployed of the town will make them 
put their studying cap on and toe the line. We ought to cease to function at once'. By 
nine votes to five, it was moved 'that unless the Government improve their offer, the 
Board will cease to function next Wednesday [16 August]' 60 , in effect removing 
themselves as a buffer between the government and the unemployed. 
The Ministry however1 had made contingency plans. Prohibited from direct 
intervention, they requested the Mayor take over the Guardians' administration in the 
event of their resignation 61 , but significantly, prepared to make the money available 
immediately on favourable terms, extending the loan repayment period to the legal 
maximum, stressing that 'in no other case has so long a period been allowed' 62 . 
Whilst the mayor, who had no knowledge of the Guardians' administration, prayed for a 
settlement, in a flurry of telegrams at the eleventh hour the Guardians were offered 
£15,000, personally delivered by Snowden 63 , as a temporary measure, pending further 
negotiations. At a special (and public) meeting on 15 August, the still militant 
Guardians debated the offer. Needing grants not loans, they believed that 'to ask the 
Guardians to go on as they were doing, to go on creating debt for the future generation, 
was not right. Parliament should have been forced to face the issue before now'. On the 
other hand, the Mayor anticipated a major breach of the peace, whilst the unemployed 
and the Guardians feared the Government would take control using the Mayor as a 
screen, and it was suggested that the Corporation go on strike to prevent this. TMtimately 
the vote, to resign or accept the loan pending the outcome of a conference, was equally 
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divided, but the Chairman used his casting vote to accept the proposals, temporarily 
averting the crisis". 
It is clear from the Ministry's report on that meeting that the Guardians had the upper 
hand. Ministry negotiators were advised that, 'the Guardians ... are unreasonable, and it 
would be unwise to appear to concede to a threat of a strike what could not be granted 
by persuasion' 65. Eventually, although they were 'a most difficult lot' 66, an agreement 
was reached. The Goschen Committee was to advance £60,000 to clear the overdraft, 
with a 5% interest rate and a ten year repayment period commencing in September 
1924, whilst the Government undertook to supply future relief funds as necessary 67 . A 
major triumph for the Barrow Board, it was a source of Ministry unease for the future: 
'The fact that there is now a more or less definite split on the Board and that they have 
once withdrawn their resolution [to resign] makes me hope they will not really mean to 
resign again - but I am not quite confident' 68 . 
(ii) Comparative Perspectives 
It becomes evident that the political battles fought out on the local Boards could take 
very different forms. For example, although Nelson's Labour Guardians were 
outnumbered by a Conservative majority on the Burnley Board, encouraged by Poplar's 
example in 1921 they were able to reverse the Board's decision not to pay relief to 
cotton strikers69. Whilst Hill describes them as adopting a 'distinctive truculent 
stance' 70, the Burnley Board was dominated by factional disputes 71 , whilst Poplar 
provides an example of conflict between a left-wing Board and the government. In 
contrast was Middlesbrough's Corporation and Board of Guardians' orthodox approach, 
and 'it must be remembered that neither the Guardians nor the Town Councils of 
Teesside were essentially political bodies. Guardians were not elected on any political 
ticket, and many councillors were not either' 72 . Indeed, the Middlesbrough response 
was markedly different. The Guardians accepted 'poor law wisdom and submerged 
principles', and 'given its current indebtedness and desperate need to borrow further, the 
Union was forced to comply with the Ministry's wishes'. Scales were cut in return for 
loans73 , whilst existing claims were investigated for economies, and all income was 
taken into account when assessing claims. However, despite their orthodoxy, they were 
not always unsympathetic, and in 1922 ex-servicemen's disability pensions were 
disregarded in relief calculations 74 . Nevertheless, 'the [Middlesbrough] Guardians' 
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capitulation was complete by the end of 1922 and policy decisions were ... increasingly 
made on the basis of what was financially and administratively expedient, with 
applications being assessed less and less ... on the basis of need' 75 . In contrast, 
following the decisive election of April 1922, the exclusion of the radical left and the 
elimination of faction, the Barrow Board could focus exclusively on conflict with the 
Ministry of Health. From this point there was a marked shift in the relationship between 
the Board of Guardians and the Ministry, and the struggles of the Barrow Union began 
to assume their distinctive characteristics. 
(iii) The Struggle Resumes 
Within a month, changes in unemployment benefit legislation increased the 'gap' in 
periods of unemployment benefit to eight weeks and negated any benefits the Guardians 
had derived from the recent negotiations. The Guardians' refusal to sign any more loan 
documentation until the issue was settled frustrated the Ministry, who described the 
Barrow Board as 'kicking over the rails again on the pretence that men may cease to 
draw benefit for more than a single week's "gap" is in breach of the agreement made 
with them' 76 (sic). 
The recent victory encouraged the Guardians' confrontational stance, whilst the 
Ministry began to take a harder line. The Ministry privately acknowledged that the relief 
scale was insufficient to meet the needs of the long-term unemployed, as well as the 
great hardships experienced by shopkeepers and property owners, mounting rent and 
rate arrears, and the rising numbers of bankruptcies. But whilst stating 'the position here 
really does seem pretty hopeless', they were convinced there was 'nothing approaching 
starvation in the town', and whilst 'the unemployed are getting into a state of despair', 
they did not believe they were altogether dissatisfied with the present scale, but were 
trying to forestall its reduction 77 . Additionally, the Ministry believed that the Guardians 
over-stated the threat of the UWM, but following accusations of being 'murderers', the 
Barrow Board finally closed their doors to their deputations in March 192378.  The 
Ministry's real concern however, was the increasing numbers of influential moderate 
men, such as George Basterfield, the (previously Labour but now Independent) ex-
Mayor, and Tyson, the AEU District Secretary, joining the UWM and calling for the 
National Relief Scale. The Ministry took this far more seriously, as the backing of a 
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large number of moderates legitimised the demands of the UWM, and they began to 
regard Barrow as 'a somewhat dangerous Board' 80 . 
In an effort to restore control, the Ministry demanded rate increases and the elimination 
of overlapping sources of relief, the high cost of free school meals making them a 
priority. The Guardians conceded to these demands and reduced the relief scale. 
However, unlike Middlesbrough, where consultations between local bodies resulted in a 
list of children receiving free school meals being passed to Middlesbrough Guardians 
and the scales adjusted accordingly 81 , similar efforts in Barrow collapsed. Frictions 
between local bodies restricted these co-ordination initiatives, and they were simply 
abandoned. As a result, no uniform scale or means of avoiding overlapping were agreed 
and the Guardians remained detached from the school meals issue 82 . More significantly, 
once the loan was finalised, the original relief scale was reinstated 83 , a tactic first 
adopted in October 1922 when the scale for single men in lodgings was reduced, but 
returned to the previous level once the loan was finalised 84 . Thus the Guardians stood in 
open defiance of the Government, and from this point the conflict broadened to include 
relief scales and municipal rates. 
RATES, RELIEF AND LOAN REPAYMENTS 1923-1926 
During 1924 the economic condition of the town improved and attention turned to the 
repayment of out-relief, rate arrears and the Guardians' loans. Beginning with out-relief, 
any out-relief paid to the able-bodied unemployed was officially regarded as a loan 
which had to be repaid by the recipient on return to employment, and inevitably, as men 
gradually returned to work, the issue became increasingly contentious. It also created 
friction between the Corporation and the Board as many ratepayers would be unable to 
repay rate arrears and out-relief simultaneously 85 . 
Somerville, the town's Conservative MP, supported the deterrent principle and stated 
that the Guardians 'must, in order to demonstrate that the recovery of relief.., is an 
enforceable regulation, insist that when the position of the recipient of relief improves, 
the man must recognise that he has incurred obligations, and must ... make some effort 
to meet them' 86 . Significantly, he was ousted by a Labour MP in the General Election 
two months later, but the issue reveals considerable divisions among left-wing 
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moderates. A section of the Board stressed the importance of maintaining the repayment 
principle, and argued that to wait for the borough rate to be repaid would weaken their 
ability to collect87 . However, the Corporation argued that the Guardians had never 
previously attempted to reclaim relief, even if it was officially 'on loan', and queried the 
introduction of new procedures for over 6,000 'very much more deserving cases'. 
Others pointed out that men returning to work had amassed considerable debts, and to 
rush into the collection of arrears would give the government the impression that the 
Guardians were able to collect, and set an unfortunate precedent. 
At a meeting with the Ministry in September 1924, the Guardians argued that work 
which brought a crippling burden of debt repayment had a bad psychological effect 88 . 
They were supported by local trade unions, who wrote to the Ministry describing 'the 
tragic hopelessness of the individuals who after two, three of four years unemployment, 
at last secure a job, which in all too many cases only yields sufficient money to obtain 
the bare necessities of life, and still the burden of repayment of relief money hangs 
heavily upon them'. The diversity of this support is significant, and included appeals 
from craft unions such as the AEU, general unions such as the National Amalgamated 
Union of Labour, and the white-collar union, the National Amalgamated Union of Shop 
Assistants, Warehousethen and Clerks 89 . This support strengthened the resolve of the 
Board, who introduced an ingenious repayment policy. No repayments were due until a 
man had been employed for a minimum of six months and paid off all his rate arrears, 
whilst those earning less than 40/- per week, or who had one or more children were 
exempt90 . 
With regard to the Guardians' own loans, Ministry records indicate that the Guardians 
repeatedly used Ministry loans to pay off their bank overdraft, thus keeping interest at 
commercial rates minimal whilst accruing large debts with the government on more 
favourable terms. As the Ministry observed, 'Barrow, whilst undoubtedly hit very hard, 
has shown considerable commercial instinct in the uses made of her adversity and 
seems now likely to reap ... the fruits of that commercial sagacity'. Nevertheless, the 
Ministry was anxious that the loan repayments, due to begin in 1925, should be 
introduced as smoothly as possible, but it was also aware that this would force 
municipal rates up. The Guardians still needed considerable financial support, and the 
Ministry sought to prepare the ground by making future relief loans dependent on rate 
increases. However, the Corporation maintained that it was impractical to increase the 
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rates so soon after three years of severe unemployment, and the Guardians and 
Corporation out-manoeuvred the Ministry by proposing to reduce the rates in an effort 
to collect some arrears. This proved surprisingly successful, and the Ministry continued 
to advance loans on condition that existing rate levels were maintained 91 . 
Nevertheless the anxiety in some quarters to begin repayments and demonstrate their 
good faith to the Government suggests that again, the Board had begun to falter. Some 
urged they take 'advantage of the psychological moment with the [Labour] Government 
in power at the present time ... and say ... you have preached for years that 
unemployment of this kind ought not to hamper a Town - put it into practice now'. 
Others argued that not only was it unfair not to repay the money, it amounted to 'a 
matter of the restoration of the moral standard of citizenship'. However, Alderman 
Ellison stressed that the collection of this money would negate both the Guardians' 
'great moral victory' of 1922 and the concessions they had since wrung from the 
Government. Councillors argued that repayment details had never been finalised and it 
was unclear whether the government would require repayment or not. Again they 
emphasised that to collect some arrears would give the government a good case for 
collecting the rest, whilst the repayment of the £173,000 borrowed by the Guardians 
could finish the town off, concluding that 'if the Government press for money the best 
thing you can tell them is to comb and do the job themselves' 92 . 
With the support of the Corporation, the Barrow Board continued to press the Ministry 
to waive its loans. The Ministry had to consider Barrow's situation in relation to Unions 
in a similar position, some of whom had begun or nearly finished their repayments, and 
any concessions would have considerable repercussions. It also proved difficult to 
present the town as a special case, particularly as Barrow had always had better terms 
than the rest and its economic prospects were improving. The Ministry maintained that 
it was the Guardians' duty to recover the sums spent on relieving the destitute for the 
benefit of the ratepayers where this could reasonably be done and was not likely to 
create hardship for those returning to work 93 . 
Commander Craven, Director of Vickers, also supported the Guardians on this issue, 
asserting that the position of Vickers as the main employer was of central importance to 
the fate of the town, and being geared to anns production, should have government 
support. High taxation, both locally and nationally, reduced the firm's competitiveness, 
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and any additional local tax would be crippling, whilst any additional burdens placed on 
the town to repay loans could only create further stagnation of trade. He argued that 
rather than pay 'dead money' by way of relief, the government should subsidise its 
industries to bolster their international competitiveness 94 . Additionally, Mayor Fairbain 
(an Independent), held in 'considerable respect' by the Ministry, advised delaying 
definite steps for repayment as unemployment was still high, and that 'too firm a 
handling of the debt repayment problem would ... have very evil results, as there are 
extremely awkward elements both on the Town Council and the Board of Guardians' 95 . 
Although the Guardians pressed for the loan to be deferred for another ten years, the 
Ministry delayed the repayments until 1927. 
Despite anticipating the present Poor Rate would cover Barrow's needs, rising 
unemployment necessitated the sanctioning of temporary overdrafts throughout 1925. 
However, in December the Guardians' application for a loan met a different response. 
Ministry records describe the Guardians' repeated requests for loans, delayed payments 
and 2/6d Poor Rate as 'wholly unreasonable, as indeed the attitude of Barrow has 
been for a long period' 96 . However, whilst the Ministry could see no justification for 
further concessions, the relief scale could not be considered extravagant, and a further 
overdraft was sanctioned. 
Although the General Strike had little impact on poor relief issues, 1926 witnessed a 
significant change of attitudes. The Ministry felt that 'the town has been spoon-fed long 
enough', having 'received exceptionally favourable terms as a result of their threat in 
1922 to throw up their administration', which had been repeated whenever pressure was 
brought to bear97 . Additionally, local organisations presented a united front and opposed 
the Ministry at every turn. For example, when the Ministry tried to force a rate rise, the 
Manager of the Midland Bank stepped in, describing 'the average circumstances of the 
people of this town [as] worse than at any period during the twenty five years of my 
managerial experience in Barrow', and emphasising the constant drain on the resources 
of the thrifty. Similarly, the Chamber of Trade described traders as 'being crushed out 
of existence by the weight of adverse circumstances', and joined with the Ratepayers 
and Property Owners Association in their insistence that the rates be reduced 98 . 
For example, in February the Ministry pressed for a 6d in the £ Poor Rate increase, but 
this tougher line roused local popular opinion. The press argued the people were being 
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penalised for their economy and efforts to keep rates low. Unlike some notorious 
Boards, the stringent administration had deterred many, and had they acted like West 
Ham or Poplar, they would be looked at differently. 'The people of Barrow had been 
too conscientious. Their scale had been on the low side and the Ministry were not 
appreciating it'. In view of the strong representations from local bodies, the Ministry 
backed down. It firmly believed that funds could be raised locally, but feared the 
response to an enforced rate rise 99 . 
Meanwhile, the requests for overdrafts continued, and Ministry records note that 
'perhaps it is only to be expected that Barrow should write in this strain, calmly 
assuming that we will give them anything they choose to mention', but again sanctioned 
the overdraft 100 . The Board's increasingly cavalier attitude is demonstrated by their 
response to the Ministry's later request for a reduction in the married couples' scale. 
The Board's Chairwoman, Mrs Ward, advised they make a mild protest rather than give 
a flat ultimatum, 'after all, they did not wish to kill the goose that laid the golden 
egg" ° '. Despite Ministry insistence, the Guardians twice refused to cut the scale for 
married couples and a Ministry memo notes: 'having given us as much trouble as 
possible in the matter, the Guardians now admit, what we knew all the time, that they, 
as ever, did not intend to take any notice of our suggestions. I suppose we wait for their 
next request for funds and then make them swallow the 	 102 
The Board of Guardians (Default) Act of 1926 changed the situation radically. In 
response to the Guardians' request for funds in December, the Ministry announced it 
would provide no more money. All relief was to be financed solely from the local rates, 
which might have to rise to 20/10d in the £, and any further defiance would result in the 
arrival of Commissioners in Barrow to take over the Guardians' administration. This, 
and the Commissioners in particular, was a potent threat. Mrs Ward argued that the 
Guardians had to consider the thousands of ratepayers who were just above destitution 
level, as well as the destitute themselves. She urged they accept the inevitable and 
moved 'that with great protest agrees to accept the decision of the Ministry'. Although 
divided, the Board remained defiant and the motion was lost by seven votes to eight. In 
a very grave and uncertain atmosphere, the motion to apply for another loan was 
carried' 03 , whilst a joint meeting of the Guardians, the Corporation and the Labour Party 
and Trades Council voted to oppose any reduction in the relief scale 104 . Fighting to the 
end, Barrow's Guardians sent a deputation to the Ministry of Health in January, 
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accompanied by the town's NIP, John Bromley, and the Mayor. In a long meeting, 
where the Guardians withdrew frequently for discussions, they presented evidence of 
the town's situation, but received a terse reminder that no good purpose could be served 
by prolonging the discussion, but help could still be forthcoming if conditions, 
including a considerable increase in the Poor Rate, were complied with. Although the 
idea was mooted, Commissioners had made resignation an ineffectual threat and the 
best the deputation could hope for was a moderate rate increase. Thus they accepted the 
Ministry's offer under protest, reducing the scale to 23/- per couple and introducing a 
graduated scale for the number of children, giving a maximum per family of 38/- per 
week, while agreeing to increase the Poor Rate by the still relatively low figure of 9d. 
Mrs Ward however, warned of the importance of not unnecessarily antagonising the 
Ministry as there was still the question of loan repayments to consider. Far from seeing 
the Guardians' capitulation as a total defeat, many believed they were lucky to get 'off 
as light as they 	 and significantly, they were congratulated 'on their stand in 
opposing the reduction of the scale' by local branches of the AEU, the Co-op and the 
Trades Council' 06 . 
At the AGM of the Barrow Board of Guardians in April 1927, the Board appraised its 
achievements over recent years, which had amounted to considerably more than poor 
relief and employment related issues. Wider use had been made of the infirmary, which 
now admitted needy cases other than the destitute, in addition to the opening of an out-
patient centre and the re-organisation of the mental wards. Additionally, tennis courts 
for staff and a bowling green for the convalescent and the elderly had been provided 
through relief work schemes, whilst the Cottage Homes had considerable success in 
fostering children. Given the economic condition of the town, these were substantial 
successes. With regards to poor relief, Mrs Ward saw their great achievement as the 
maintenance of a balance 'between the claim of the individual and the claim of the 
community'. Although the future was uncertain due to the pending abolition of the 
Boards of Guardians, 'whatever may take place, it is certain that destitution will have to 
be defined afresh ... the present system has outlived its usefulness.' 'The maintaining of 
numbers of able-bodied men without return is breeding disaster ... The Poor Law 
cannot remain the panacea for all industrial ills: it can only bear the burden of assistance 
- not maintenance. A rate will never meet the needs' 107 . 
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CONCLUSION 
In many ways the crisis in Barrow was typical of industrial areas in the 1920s and 
illustrates the inadequacy of traditional poor relief methods in the face of long-term 
mass unemployment. Local authority relief work schemes required a substantial 
financial outlay and proved increasingly difficult to finance as rate income fell, and 
coupled with the limited number of suitable projects, were ineffectual in relieving 
unemployment. The burden therefore, fell on the Board of Guardians. However, if the 
general pattern was typical, the response of the Barrow Board was not. 
The historiography suggests that Boards were influenced more by local conditions than 
the political inclinations of their members, and in distressed areas tended to be more 
sympathetic to the unemployed and more liberal in their application of the law. 
Barrow's case-study however, broadens this debate further and it becomes apparent that 
whilst generous relief scales were not confined to left-wing Boards, neither was 
defiance of the government. 
Barrow provides an example of a moderate Board attempting to function in a volatile 
political climate and facing pressures from the unemployed to increase the scales and 
from central government to reduce them. Although the Board refused to tolerate the 
excesses of the UWM, Barrow's working class society was cohesive and organised, and 
the Guardians faced mounting pressure from many local bodies, but the Board's 
authority and legitimacy was bolstered throughout by the openness of the decision 
making process. Beginning with the unemployed, the Ratepayers and Property Owners 
Association and grocers, these pressure groups eventually included powerful and 
'respectable' bodies such as Banks, Vickers and the Chamber of Trade. Significantly, 
these disparate groups supported the Corporation and Board of Guardians, and united in 
a collective defence against an external threat. Ministry records confirm that this was an 
influential factor in the success of the various deputations and repeated Ministry 
capitulations. 
The Guardians employed a variety of tactics. Although providing a buffer between the 
unemployed and the Ministry, the threat of resignation effectively removed the Board 
from that equation at a time when the Ministry was not empowered to take over at a 
local level. Indeed, over the next four years, resignation was to prove an effective 
155 
weapon in the fight to force the government to take responsibility for poor relief, and 
created a pattern of Ministry and Guardian relations which would continue until the 
passing of the Board of Guardians (Default) Act of 1926. The settlement of the loan 
repayment issue however, and the introduction of Public Assistance Committees, are 
beyond the range of this thesis 108 . 
The threat of resignation, which rendered the Ministry powerless, was the cornerstone 
of the Guardians' successful defiance, but although they had the upper hand from that 
point, they nevertheless proceeded with caution. The Board's moderate politics, 
stringency and efficient administration restricted the Ministry's opportunities for 
counter-attacks, and in addition to resignation, the Board's tactics included the 
temporary reduction of scales until loans were finalised, and the threat to reduce the 
municipal rates. Ministry records also acknowledge the commercial sagacity of the 
Barrow Board and reveal their distrust of them. Events also demonstrate that the 
Ministry had scope to be considerably more generous than it appeared, and concessions 
could be made if local opposition was determined enough. Furthermore, in addition to 
indicating the government's ignorance of local conditions and needs, it is clear from this 
case-study that the government actively ignored evidence placed before it by 
professional and independent bodies such as the banks. 
The diversity of responses at a local level becomes evident even within this brief 
comparison and raises some interesting questions. For example, if a moderate Board 
such as Barrow could successfully defy the Ministry of Health with such apparent ease, 
why did other badly hit Unions, such as Middlesbrough, bow to Ministry dictates? This 
case-study also demonstrates that a Board's attitude must be measured by factors other 
than relief scales alone. It could be argued for example, that Barrow's relief scales, 
which were not generous, coupled with the battle to keep the rates low, suggests that the 
Board favoured ratepayers above the unemployed. On the other hand it can be argued 
that this was a response to extremely high unemployment among ratepayers, many of 
whom, whether tenants or owner-occupiers, were from the working classes, coupled 
with concern for the future economic condition of the town. Nevertheless, although the 
scale was far from extravagant, Ministry demands for a reduction were strenuously 
resisted, in addition to which, other income such as pensions and superannuation was 
ignored throughout. This was also true of relief in kind, particularly free school meals, 
and whilst a comparison of relief scales in Barrow and Middlesbrough shows Barrow's 
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to be slightly better, the comparative health of the two towns clearly demonstrates the 
beneficial effects of Barrow's refusal to take account of other sources of income. The 
handling of the relief repayment issue was equally significant, and although appearing 
to take steps for the recovery of relief on loan, the criteria adopted effectively excluded 
the majority of the town's working population. 
However, the Guardians' support for the unemployed encompassed more than the 
various forms of out-relief. In the tense political atmosphere of 1922, the anti-
Conmunist and anti-far-left Board supported the local unemployed on the national 
Hunger March to London. Indeed, Ministry of Health Intelligence Reports create a far 
more radical picture of this 'moderate' Board, which was described as encouraging the 
march to support their own efforts to get the burden of relief moved from the rates to 
taxes. Additionally, the Barrow Union was one of the few unions to perform the illegal 
act of providing boots and clothes for the marchers, and in addition to feeding and 
accommodating a contingent from Govan, allowed them to collect money in the 
town 109 . 
Although more local studies are needed in order to put Barrow's experience into a better 
perspective, the Barrow Board was neither radical nor orthodox, but was perceived as 
particularly dangerous because it had found, and fully exploited, an area of Ministry of 
Health vulnerability. The fluidity of local political divisions, the exclusion of the radical 
left and increasing divisions among the moderates, clearly supports the argument that 
political label was less influential than local circumstances in a crisis of this magnitude. 
However, although unemployment and relief scales generated considerable local 
tension, the principal conflict was between local and central government. The Barrow 
Board relentlessly opposed the Ministry whilst attempting to balance the needs of the 
distressed and the ratepayer, and the evidence, particularly the praise for the Board from 
the Trades Council, suggests the evolution of communal solidarity, and cohesion rather 
than antagonism" ° . Public democracy also played an important role, and this, together 
with social attitudes, will be examined further in later chapters. 
D. Vincent, Poor Citizens: The State and the Poor in 20th Century Britain (London, 1987), 24. 
2 P. Thane, Foundations of the Welfare State (Harlow, 1982), 85. 
Vincent, Poor Citizens, 37. 
M.E. Rose, The English Poor Law (Newton Abbot, 1971), 288-90. 
157 
Thane, Welfare State, 140. 
6 Rose, Poor Law, 291. 
A. Briggs & J. Saville (eds), Essays in Labour History 1886-1 923 (London, 1971), 13-14. 
R. Croucher, We Refuse To Starve In Silence (London, 1987), 19. 
Ibid. 20. 
Ibid,46. 
S. Macintyre, Little Moscows: Communism and Working-class Militancy in Inter-war Britain (London, 
1980), 172. 
' 2 Rose, Poor Law, 292. 
13 Ibid,293. 
Mj Liddington, The Life and Times of a Respectable Rebel: Selina Cooper 1864-1946 (London, 1984), 
342. 
15 Thane, Welfare State, 187. 
16 Rose, Poor Law, 294. 
17 Thane, Welfare State, 186. 
' Rose, Poor Law, 292. 
' 9 Thane, Welfare State, 187. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid, 188. 
R.Pope, Unemployment and the Lancashire Weaving Area 1920-1 938 (Preston: University of Central 
Lancashire, Harris Paper No. 3), 52. 
Extract of Ministry of Health report on Barrow, July 1922, Barrow-in-Furness Union: overdrawn 
Treasurer's Account 1921-1923., 23/1122, National Archives, Kew, MR 68/102. 
24 Telegram from Mayor to Lloyd George, 19 November 1919, Unemployment Correspondence 1919-
1923, Cumbria Records Office, Barrow-in-Furness, BA/C 5/1/44 BOX 48. 
25 Letter from the Distress Sub-Committee to the Prime Minister & the Minister of Labour. 8 December 
1919, Distress Sub-Committee Minutes Book 1905-1921, Cumbria Records Office, Barrow-in-Furness, 
BA/C 1/3/1. 
Letter from Mayor to Prime Minister, 1 December 1919, Unemployment Correspondence 1919-1923, 
CRC, BA/C 5/1/44 BOX 48. 
27 Letter from Ministry of Labour to the Mayor, 5 December 1919, Unemployment Correspondence 1919-
1923, CR0, BA/C 5/1144 BOX 48. 
Poor Law Authorities to Prime Minister, 6 December 1921, Relief of Necessitous Areas 1925, Cumbria 
Records Office, Barrow-in-Fumess, BA/C 5/1/46 Box 51 Fl 
29 The percentage was subject to negotiation, but stood at 60% in the first half of 1921. 
30 Letter to the Prime Minister, & Ministries of Health and Labour, 18 October, 1921, Unemployment 
Correspondence 1919-1923, CR0, BA/C 5/1/44 BOX 48. 
158 
W. Hannington, Unemployed Struggles 1919-1936 (London, 1977), 60 
32 Corporation to Unemployment Grants Committee, 2 February 1921; Town Clerk to Labour Exchange, 
10 October 1922, Unemployment Correspondence 1919-1923, CR0, BA/C 5/1/44 BOX 48 
" Letter to the Prime Minister, & Ministries of Health and Labour, 18 October, 1921, Unemployment 
Correspondence 1919-1923, CR0, BA/C 5/1/44 BOX 48. 
' Letter from Board of Guardians to Ministry of Health, 22 May 1922, Financial and Unemployment 
Position 1922, Cumbria Records Office, Barrow-in-Furness, BA/C 5/1/42 Box 46 F2. 
Snowden, Ministry of Health Inspector, first official visit to Barrow, Barrow News, 10 December 
1921, Cumbria Records Office, Barrow-in-Furness. 
36 Letter from Board of Guardians to Ministry of Health, 22 May 1922, Financial and Unemployment 
Position 1922, CR0, BA/C 5/1/42 Box 46 F2. 
Ibid. 
38 Ministry of Health Report, 3 August 1922, Unemployment Correspondence 1919-1923, CR0, BA/C 
5/1/44 BOX 48. 
Borough Treasurer's Memoranda, 30 July 1923, Unemployment 1923-1924, CR0, BA/C 5/1/46 BOX 
51 P2. 
° Letter to Mayor from Joint Committee UWM, Labour Party & Trades Council, 5 March 1923; Mayor 
at meeting with Labour Party & Trades Council, 9 March 1923, Unemployment 1923-24, CR0, BA/C 
5/1/46 BOX 51 P2. 
' Letters from Town Clerk to Unemployment Grants Committee 31 July 1923 & 17 August 1923, 
Unemployment 1923-1924, CR0, BA/C 5/1/46 Box 51 F2. 
42 Ryder, 'Council House Building, County Durham' in Daunton, Councillors and Tenants, 55. 
J. Hill, Nelson: Politics, Economy and Community (Edinburgh, 1977), 94. 
Collection of Rates by Instalments file, Cumbria Records Office, Barrow-in-Furness, BA/C 5/1/41 
BOX 44 Fl. 
Letter from Town Clerk to IJWC, 14 March 1922, Unemployment Correspondence 1919-1923, CR0, 
BA/C 5/1/44 BOX 48. 
46 Internal memorandum, Ministry of Health, 1 November 1921, Barrow Union: 1921-1923, NA, MB 
68/102. 
Letter from Barrow Guardians to Ministry of Health, 12 January 1922, Barrow Union: 1921-1923, NA, 
MI-I 68/102. 
48 Internal memorandum, Ministry of Health, 27 January 1922, Barrow Union: 1921-1923, NA, MH 
68/ 102. 
Letter from Barrow Guardians to Ministry of Health, 22 April 1922, Barrow Union: 1921-1923, NA, 
MH 68/102. 
50 Internal memorandum, Ministry of Health, 3 May 1922, Barrow Union: 1921-1923, NA, MM 68/102. 
SI Barrow News, 10 December 1921, CR0. 
52 Ibid,30 May 1922 
1W] 
"Internal memorandum, Ministry of Health, 27 May 1922, Barrow Union: 1921-1923, NA, MU 68/102. 
Ministry of Health Report, July 1922, Barrow Union: 1921-1923, NA, MH 68/102. 
Letter from Barrow Guardians to Ministry of Health, 6 July 1922, Barrow Union: 1921-1923, NA, MU 
68/102. 
56 Letter from Barrow Guardians to Ministry of Health, 28 July 1922, Barrow Union: 1921-1923, NA, 
MH 68/102. 
57 Barrow News, 5 August 1922, CR0. 
58 Barrow News, 5 August 1922; 10 December 1921, CR0. 
See for example, 26 July 1922, Barrow Union: 1921-1923 NA, MH 68/102. 
60 Barrow News, 12 August 1922, CR0. 
6! Internal letter from Francis toSnowden, 10 August 1922, Barrow Union: 1921-1923, NA, M}1 68/102. 
62 Draft Response of Ministry of Health, August 1922, Barrow Union: 1921-1923, NA, MH 68/102. 
63 Ministry of Health Inspector. 
Barrow News, 19 August 1922, CR0. 
65 Report by Snowden on his meeting with the Barrow Guardians, 16 August 1922, Barrow Union: 1921-
1923, NA, NIH 68/102. 
Snowden briefing Aubrey Symmonds in preparation for conference with the Barrow Guardians, 18 
August 1922, Barrow Union: 1921-1923, NA, MB 68/102. 
67 Ministry of Health Conference with the Barrow Guardians, 24 August 1922, Barrow Union: 1921-
1923, NA, NIH 68/102; Barrow News, 26 August 1922, CR0. 
68 Report by Snowden on his meeting with the Barrow Guardians, 16 August 1922, Barrow Union: 1921-
1923, NA, MIll 68/102. 
69 Liddington, Respectable Rebel, 340. 
 J. 
70 Hill, Nelson, 92. 
7! Liddington, Respectable Rebel, 341. 
72 K. Nicholas, The Social Effects of Unemployment on Teesside, 1919-39 (Manchester, 1986), 168. 
J.J. Turner, 'Poor relief and unemployment in Middlesbrough 1919-26', MA Dissertation, Teesside 
Polytechnic, 1982, 20; 25. 
Nicholas, Unemployment on Teesside, 158. 	 - 
Turner, 'Poor relief and unemployment', 25. 
76 Letters from Barrow Guardians to Ministry of Health, 31 August 1922 & 14 September 1922; Letter 
from Barrow Employment Exchange to Ministry of Health, 11 September 1922; Ministry of Health 
internal memorandum, 18 September 1922, Barrow Union: 1921-1923, NA, MIII 68/102. 
" Report by Snowden on Barrow Corporation Finance Committee meeting of 12 February 1923 dated 13 
February 1923, Barrow Union: 1921-1923, NA, MB 68/102. 
78 Barrow News, 31 March 1923, CR0. 
Letter from Barrow Guardians to Ministry of Health, 7 February 1923, Barrow Union: 1921-1923, NA, 
MU 68/102. 
° Ministry of Health internal memorandum, 14 February 1823, Barrow Union: 192 1-1923, NA, MH 
68/102. 
St Turner, 'Poor relief and unemployment', 27. 
8230 May 1923, Co-ordination of Relief— feeding Necessitous School Children 1923, Cumbria Records 
Office, Barrow-in-Furness, BA/C 5/1/44 Box 49 P2. 
Letter from Board of Guardians to Ministry of Health, 30 May 1923, Barrow-in-Furness Union: 
overdrawn Treasurer's Account 1923-1926, National Archives, Kew, MIII 68/103. 
84 Ministry of Health internal memorandum, 1 November 1922 Barrow Union: 1921-1923, NA, MH 
68/102. 
85 Town Clerk to Board of Guardians October 1923, Recovery of Rate Arrears 1923, Cumbria Records 
Office, Barrow-in-Furness, BA/C 5/1/45 Box 50 P3. 
86 Press cutting from an unspecified paper, 6 September 1924, Press Cuttings Scrap Book 1924-1925, 
Cumbria Records Office, Barrow-in-Furness, BA/C Vol. 24. 
87 Discussion between Barrow Corporation and the Board of Guardians, 12 May 1924, Recovery of Rate 
Arrears 1923, CR0, BA/C 5/1/45 Box 50 F3. 
Guardians' request to send deputation to Ministry of Health, September 1924, Barrow Union: 1923-
1926, NA, NIH 68/103. 
89 National Union of Vehicle Builders to the Ministry of Health et al 16 July 1924; AEU Branches , 5 
August 1924, Barrow Union: 1923-1926, NA, IvifI 68/103. 
° Statistics, September 1924, Barrow Union: 1923-1926, NA, NIH 68/103. 
' Ministry of Health internal memoranda, 10 December 1925; 15 February 1924; 5 February 1924; 29 
February 1924; 1 March 1924, Barrow Union: 1923-1926, NA, MH 68/103. 
92 Report of loan repayments debate, Recovery of Rate Arrears 1923, CR0, BA/C 5/1/45 Box 50 P3. 
' Ministry of Health internal memorandum, 5 August 1924, Barrow Union: 1923-1926, NA, MI-I 68/103. 
Letter from Commander Craven to Ministry of Health, 8 September 1924, Barrow Union: 1923-1926, 
NA, NIH 68/103. 
Ministry of Health internal memorandum, 12 November 1924, Barrow Union: 1923-1926, NA, Mil 
68/103. 
9696 Ministry of Health internal memorandum, 10 December 1925, Barrow Union: 1923-1926, NA, NIH 
68/103. 
Ministry of Health internal memorandum, 25 January 1926, Barrow Union: 1923-1926, NA, MH 
68/103. 
98 Letters to Ministry of Health from Midland Bank, 21 January 1926; Barrow Chamber of Trade, 3 
February 1926; Barrow Ratepayers' Association, 2 February 1926, Barrow Union: 1923-1926, NA, MI-I 
68/103. 	 - 
99 Barrow News, 27 February 1926, CR0. 
'°° Ministry of Health internal memorandum, 23 March 1926, Barrow Union: 1923-1926, NA, NIH 
68/103. 
1141 
101 Barrow News, 3 July 1926, CR0. 
102 Ministry of Health internal memorandum, 28 October 1926, Barrow Union: 1923-1926, NA, MH 
68/103. 
103 Barrow News, 11 December 1926, CR0. 
104 13 December 1926, Barrow Labour Party and Trades Council Minutes, Executive Committee 
Meetings 1919-1931, Cumbria Records Office, Barrow-in-Furness, BDSO 7 10-16. 
105 Barrow News, 27 January 1927, CR0. 
106 26 January 1927, Barrow Labour Party and Trades Council Minutes, Executive Committee Meetings 
1919-1931, CR0, BDSO 7 10-16. 
107 Barrow News, 23 April 1927, CR0. 
108 The Local Government Bill, 1928, proposed a generous settlement to the Guardians' debts, waiving 
interest payments for Ministry loans and extending the repayment period to fifteen years. In September 
1929 it was proposed that the County take over Guardians' assets and liabilities. 
109 Ministry of Health Intelligence Reports, 27 November 1922; 29 November 1922, Poor relief and 
unemployed marches 1922-1923, National Archives, Kew, MH 57/105. 
110 Despite the Board's continuing efforts to support both ratepayers and the unemployed, increases in the 
Poor Rate and cuts to relief scales necessitated by the Board of Guardians (Default) Act, 1926, put these 
social relationships under increasing strain. 
162 
WEATHEPJNG THE DEPRESSION: VICKERS, THE 
CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY AND THE TRADE UMONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Building on the earlier analysis of the role of the local authorities during the depression, 
this chapter will continue with an examination of the responses of three other important 
local organisations: the Vickers shipyard, Barrow's Co-operative Society and the trade 
unions. Whilst Vickers was the town's major employer, the Co-op fulfilled a threefold 
role, being a major retail organisation, a large employer, and an important working class 
self-help institution. Additionally, with its membership accounting for 88% of Barrow 
households in 1913 (assuming one member per household), the Co-op was an 
organisation of considerable local significance. The chapter will be in two sections and 
begin with an examination of changing management strategies adopted by these 
organisations throughout the period, followed by the implications of these changes for 
Barrow's labour movement during periods of intense industrial unrest. Industrial 
relations will not be examined in any detail, but the chapter will build on the small but 
useful body of existing research 1 , and examine the membership of the two largest local 
unions, the AEU and the Boilermakers, between 1920 and 1926. Their relationship with 
both the NUWM and the Co-operative Society will also be examined, together with 
sources of local friction and methods of control. This analysis of what are arguably the 
most important bodies in local life will provide a multi-faceted view of the impact of the 
depression on both the nature of these organisations and their inter-relationships. The 
examination of changing self-help and informal mutual assistance strategies is 
consigned to the following chapter. 
To provide the background and context for these organisations, we begin with the Co-
operative Society. Late nineteenth century Co-operative ideology sought to organise the 
working classes as consumers rather than producers, and transform capitalist society 
into one of mutual co-operation, but the 'ideology of consumption' was not a theory of 
social change based on the concept of class. Instead, by re-investing its profits in other 
financial investments and education, it was anticipated that the Co-operative 
Commonwealth of knowledge and trade would gradual diffuse through society and 
swallow up capitalism 2. This was an overwhelmingly working class movement, based 
on locally-run societies with democratic structures and a great deal of autonomy, with 
its largest membership in regions of heavy industry 3 . Local Co-ops, like other shops, 
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provided a meeting place, but they also fulfilled many wider functions. Local societies 
often owned and rented out terraced houses, and provided a range of valuable social 
services including child welfare, libraries and cultural activities, discussion groups 
(including the Women's Guild which gave a voice to working-class women on their 
own terms), the distribution of food aid and donations to local charities: multiple roles 
which demonstrate that Co-operative Societies were integral parts of their local 
communities. Additionally, local societies would lend their halls to other working class 
organisations such as trade unions 4, many of whom banked with the Co-operative 
Wholesale Society, receiving competitive rates of interest and secure in the knowledge 
that the Co-op could not be pressured by employers into withholding strike funds 5 . 
Both the Co-operative Society and trade unions were conceived as democratic 
movements for the protection of working class interests. Nevertheless, although the Co-
op sought to maintain close links with both the Labour Party and trade unions, the 
voluntary goodwill was not sustained in the face of economic adversity' 6 . In the 
downturn of the early 1920s, the wage cuts and economies imposed by many societies 
were opposed by the militant leadership of the Union of Distributive and Allied 
Workers (UDAW), culminating in the bitter conflict of 1925 which centred in the north-
west. The dispute exposed the inner contradictions of the Co-op ethos and 'the 
overriding lessons ... were clear: the interests of the workers as producers and 
consumers were not easily reconciled, especially in a hostile economic climate' 7 . 
Gurney's view that the national industrial disputes of the early 1920s exacerbated these 
divisions is not shared by Southern, who argues that economic hardship and 
unfavourable government policies compounded existing inter-dependencies and brought 
the movements closer together. Whilst acknowledging significant differences and often 
strained relations, she asserts that the close Co-op and trade union relationship during 
the Railway Strike of 1919, the Coal Strike of 1921 and the General Strike of 1926 
demonstrates 'the pervasive nature of Co-op support both over time and over a range of 
industries' 8 . Gurney argues, however, that the Co-op / trade union relationship 
continued to degenerate in the wake of the 1921 Miners' Strike, with unpaid loans being 
a continual source of friction, and that by the late 1920's the Co-operative Movement 
was increasingly side-lined by both the Labour Party and a defensive trade union 
movement9 . 
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Vickers, by far the largest Barrow employer, wasanother important institutional 
influence in the town. The Vickers group of companies took over Barrow's Naval 
Construction Company in 1897 and by the first decade of the twentieth century over 
80% of the Barrow yard's turnover was allocated to naval work, a specialisation which 
inhibited attempts to diversify into commercial shipbuilding. The Vickers group's 
dependence on international tensions left the firm vulnerable to harsher and more 
unpredictable market swings than experienced by civilian industries, a problem 
exacerbated by the restricted number of potential customers and a dependency on the 
British government for two thirds of its contracts. This, combined with erratic demand 
and fluctuating profits, demanded highly developed financial control and market 
management skills, together with technological innovation, modem machinery and 
production methods. An unconventional firm, by 1914 the Vickers group did not fit any 
entrepreneurial model lo , but was run by a talented Board of Directors of varied social 
origins and areas of expertise. Trebilcock describes the 'different but mutually 
reinforcing talents" of the Board as the key feature of Vickers' evolution, enabling the 
firm to meet pressures with bold and innovative responses, with the emphasis on 
technological leadership of the domestic and military markets' 2 . 
The war brought armaments firms under government control, but regulation was 
confined to prices and profits, and 'it was specifically agreed that there should be no 
government 'interference' in direction or management" 3 . However, severe post-war 
problems were anticipated, not least because the Board was weaker than previously and 
accounts audits were years in arrears, but in common with many British companies, 
Vickers entered the post-war period in a 'buoyant and expansive mood'. Anticipating 
that peace would require boldness and ingenuity, and foreseeing the need to diversify, 
peace products were discussed during the war, but diversification varied considerably 
across the group. The sudden slump and the high cost of materials, heavy taxes, and 
disordered foreign exchanges, coupled with labour unrest and disrupted production, 
created increasingly serious problems for the company. As a result the Board suspended 
the shareholders' dividend in 1920, and in 1923-24 the Company's reserves were 
reduced twice, although Scott contends that this 'falling back to prepared positions' was 
carried out under good control. Nevertheless, Vickers' problems continued as a result of 
bad debts, foreign competition and a slump in shipbuilding, and in June 1925 experts 
were consulted to advise on the Company's position. The report, described by Scott as 
'a clear-sighted glance at the future', advised splitting the firm into four groups to 
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redistribute shares and identify the most profitable, and also the reorganisation of 
management' 4 
An outline of the broad trends of wartime industrial relations that were of particular 
significance for Barrow's post-war transition period must emphasise high levels of 
conflict. Industrial unrest, and particularly the militancy of the engineers and their 
concerns over dilution, (i.e. the de-skilling of the engineering trades), pre-dated the war, 
as did the superior organisation of the employers. Despite strong views, Vickers' main 
Board left industrial relations to the discretion of local management. However, 'because 
the management was so directly concerned with technical developments ... the process 
of conducting industrial relations was almost contracted out to the officials of the 
Shipbuilding Employers' Federation (SEF) and the Engineering Employers' Federation 
(EEF)' 15 . Although competition made collaboration difficult, employers' organisations 
represented the collective interests of capital, and despite varying in function and 
structure, characteristically combined industrial relations with trade regulation and 
political activities, with the aim of maximising members' profits. The real significance 
of these organisations lay in the way they bolstered the employers' power within the 
labour market and provided access to the organisations' strike breaking machinery. 
Although collective bargaining had advantages for the trade unions, it came at the price 
of their recognition of the employers' right to manage, the enforcement of which 
became a key management strategy' 6 . 
'During the First World War all the stresses inherent in this position were vastly 
increased' 17,  as rising prices and the shortages of labour and materials necessitated 
industrial co-operation and the regulation of men and resources, which in turn had a 
profound impact on working practices and conditions. The consequent competition for 
labour, materials and government contracts undermined the solidarity of the employers' 
organisations, whilst the unprecedented level of government intervention, particularly in 
the engineering industry, resulted in 'a diminution of managerial rights and the adoption 
of a flexible, conciliatory ... defensive policy by the EEF" 8 . Paradoxically however, the 
pressure placed on employers by government intervention and the great surge in trade 
union membership and militancy, increased their capacity for co-operation and 
collective action between 1914 and 1920, and was reflected in the growth of the 
membership of their associations 19 . 
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The war also had a considerable impact on the British trade union movement. The 
steady but uneven growth of union membership from the 1890s accelerated dramatically 
in the decade from 1910, expanding from 2.6 million to 8.3 million by 1920, whilst the 
existing trend towards amalgamation among the larger unions was stimulated. The war 
also accelerated the evolution of a pattern of national bargaining 20 , but although this 
established a framework of district and national negotiating machinery, the key 
negotiating body in most areas remained the District Committee, which allowed local 
activists a degree of influence. 
Hinton analyses wartime industrial relations in terms of class struggle, with the 
government and employers uniting to strengthen their hand against the working classes 
and the labour movement. He asserts that 'nowhere was the subordination of workers' 
to employers' interests or the wartime intervention of the state more decisively 
illustrated than in the steps taken towards industrial compulsion' 21 . Hinton argues that 
the suppression of basic civil liberties by the Defence of the Realm Act, and the 
Munitions Act, which 'provided a framework for industrial slavery' 22 , represented a 
fundamental threat to the economic security of the engineering craftsman. 
Consequently nearly a third of all wartime strikes were in the engineering and 
shipbuilding industries, of which most were illegal and unsupported by the trade union 
leadership. 
Although reinforcing management's right to manage, the effect of wartime legislation 
was not as one-sided as Hinton suggests, as in addition to greater trade union 
recognition by employers, the position of the movement's leadership was enhanced by 
their greater involvement in national policy and planning decisions 23 . Nevertheless, the 
balance of power remained with the employers 24 , and as a result of their collaboration, 
the trade union leadership lost the confidence of the rapidly expanding activist rank and 
file, dividing the movement and generating a rapid upsurge in independent organisation 
led by the Shop Stewards Movement. 
Shop steward organisation in the shipbuilding and construction industries had begun 
during the late nineteenth century, and was mainly concerned with defending workshop 
standards against employer encroachments, reporting to the District Committees and 
acting as communicators rather than negotiators. However, the extension of national 
collective bargaining and the rank and file repudiation of the official leadership 
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transformed the shop stewards' role, 'driving the struggle for job control down to the 
workplace', and bringing them into the front line of resistance to industrial compulsion. 
Hyman describes the stewards as providing a more immediate response to local 
demands and a safety value which prevented the accumulation of explosive 
grievances 25 , their major victory, according to Hinton, being the maintenance of the 
right to strike 26 . 
Although unable to suppress the shop stewards, management and trade union officials 
were anxious to curb them, and peace provided the opportunity for the dismissal of the 
militants. Additionally, from 1920, the depression shifted the balance of power and 
changed the employers' strategy from co-operation to confrontation 27 , placing the trade 
unions, particularly in the engineering industry, on the defensive. By 1921 
unemployment had reached 2 million and the engineering industry was virtually at a 
standstill. 'It was a sign for the employers to resume the offensive. In one industry after 
another during 1921 and 1922, the workers found themselves fighting losing battles. 
The gains of 1918-1920 disappeared overnight' 28 . Taking advantage of the high 
unemployment of 1921-22 to force the deepest wage cuts ever, in April 1921 the BEF 
informed the engineering unions they would initiate a nation wide lock-out unless the 
unions ended all embargoes on overtime, dropped their claim to be consulted on the 
issue and recognised the employers' right to manage. The AEU, determined to resist 
this return to 1898 principles and not betray the unemployed, rejected these demands. 
The Lock-Out began on 11 March 1922, supported by 98.5% of the EEF 29, but most 
firms were still able to function. However, at the end of March the AEU called out its 
apprentices whilst the EEF confronted the other unions, demanding they declare their 
position on management prerogatives. From an employers' standpoint, economic 
conditions were ideal for a complete stoppage, and following the refusal of the other 
unions to accept the EEF terms, the lock-out became total. Despite the solidarity of the 
strikers and the support of the unemployed, the unions faced 'insuperable difficulties' 30 , 
the lock-out rapidly draining funds and forcing the men back to work. Defeated, the best 
the unions could hope for were employers concessions that would allow the men to 
return to work with dignity. Following the return to work, 70,000 AEU members 
remained unemployed nationally 31 , but although union membership levels fell 
considerably, the figure never fell below the pre-war maximum 32. In contrast, 
membership of employers' associations was sustained during the slump 33 . 
IM 
As stated above, peace also marked the end of the first Shop Stewards' Movement. 
With no choice but to organise outside the workplace, the sacked shop stewards, now 
the unemployed skilled elite, channelled their energies and organising experience into 
building the National Unemployed Workers Movement and the Communist Party of 
Great Britain 34 . ' It was soon a wry joke that the shop stewards' leaders of the war had 
become the unemployed leaders of the 1920s' 35 . 
Wartime inequality of sacrifice and rewards had created considerable tensions between 
workers and ex-servicemen, 'but it is crucial to understand that deeper feelings of class 
and community solidarity had survived the war, and largely overcame these sentiments'. 
Many, faced with eviction and hunger, were driven by 'sheer anger ... to direct and 
often violent action' 36 , generally taking the form of demonstrations, looting, squatting 
and the picketing of Guardians' houses. The local unemployed committees sought to 
channel this unrest into co-ordinated action and organised protest 37 , recognising the 
need to organise the unemployed, 'not on charitable lines, but on the basis of a militant 
working class policy' 38 . Despite attracting a cross-section of support, the movement's 
organisation was initially patchy, comprising a loose federation of local bodies 
generally lacking good bases or meeting places, and although its central organisation, 
based in London, tended to be Communist, locally this was less so. 
Although intent on maintaining close links with the trade unions and the labour 
movement, the organisation failed to attract the support of the Labour Party or the TtJC, 
and thus the NUWM developed as an independent body, becoming a national network 
in 1921. The NTJWM held its first national conference in Manchester in November 
1921, declaring its aims as the promotion of unity between workers and the 
unemployed40, and demanding 'Work or Maintenance' at union rates and the 
introduction of the National Relief Scale. 
Despite its solid support for the AEU during the 1922 Lock-Out, the relationship 
between the NTJWM and the trade unions could be hostile. In the Lancashire weaving 
area for example, the NUWIvI was seen as a rival working class organisation although it 
did not pose much of a threat, given its small membership and activities generally 
confined to organising demonstrations and social functions on behalf of the 
unemployed41 . Nationally however, the movement was more successful, particularly in 
its representations on behalf of the unemployed, fighting evictions and organising 
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hunger marches. The 1922 National Hunger March represented the high point of the 
movement's success in its early years, its discipline upholding the dignity of the 
workless against an image of criminality and degeneracy 42 . Croucher argues that as a 
result of this march the government formed a special committee to examine the 
problems of the unemployed, which 'probably' headed off attacks on their living 
standards, but despite this success, the NTJWM gained only limited recognition from the 
TUC, which rejected its affiliation request 43 . Between 1923 and 1927, having made no 
lasting achievements, the NUWM became increasingly passive, its membership fell and 
the organisation existed in little more than name. Its major period of growth from 1929 
onwards lies outside the scope of this study, and this chapter will examine the 
relationship between the NUWM and the trade unions up to 1926, leaving its role in the 
wider community to the following chapter. 
The final major industrial dispute of the period was the General Strike of May 1926, its 
origins lying in the severe problems faced by the coal industry in the wake of the First 
World War. The mine-owners' demands for longer hours and lower wages to maintain 
profit levels were strenuously resisted by the miners, who had the backing of the TUC, 
intent on upholding the right of unions to support each other with sympathetic strikes". 
Fearing an embargo on the transport of coal, the government appointed a Royal 
Conmiission to investigate the problems of the industry, and subsidised miners' wages 
for the duration of the enquiry. Ultimately, the findings of the Commission, 
unacceptable to both sides and unsupported by the Government, ensured that no 
compromise was possible45 , and following the miners' rejection of the owners' final 
offer, the General Strike began. However, by presenting the issue as a constitutional 
struggle46 , the government appeared as the defender of Parliamentary democracy 
against the political power of the combined trade unions, thus providing the justification 
for the use of the government's strike breaking machinery 47 and the opportunity for a 
final confrontation with the unions. 
During the nine month enquiry, the Government had embarked on detailed emergency 
planning and sought to demonstrate the futility of mass action, tame the unions and 
strengthen the authority of their leadership 48 . The Organisation for the Maintenance of 
Supplies (OMS) was an important part of government policy, its role to protect essential 
services in the event of a total stoppage, and appeals for citizen volunteers for the OMS 
and to enrol as special constables met with a good response. Consequently, the General 
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Strike is frequently discussed in terms of class struggle, and described as a crucial 
determinant of the balance of class forces in inter-war Britain 49 . However, 
interpretations differ considerably, and whilst Farman argues that the volunteers were 
stimulated by 'a class instinct as powerful as that which motivated the strikers' 50 , 
Phillips contends that, although it was generally believed that volunteers were from 
middle and upper class groups, 'it is probable that a large proportion ... [were] drawn 
from clerical and manual labour' 51 , particularly in the industrial north. 
In contrast to the government's detailed planning, the labour movement made no 
preparations at all. When the TUC General Council finally announced its instructions 
for co-ordinated action on 30th  April 1926 their ambiguity created confusion and 
considerable problems of organisation and interpretation 52 , and 'for all practical 
purposes, the [Trades] Councils were ... suddenly asked to take on a new and urgent 
task, without any but the vaguest suggestion of how they should carry it out' 53 . Trades 
Councils were ordered not to act on their own initiative but to await instructions from 
local union officials, yet for local strike action to be effective, Trades Councils needed 
to be the nucleus of organisation, and in the event, most did take the lead 54. Another 
ambiguity was the absence of instructions regarding liaison with Co-operative Societies, 
and whilst the size, vigour and commitment of local Societies varied, lack of sympathy 
was evident on both sides at a national level 55 . Similarly the effectiveness of the strike 
was also subject to considerable regional variation 56, but although there was a lack of 
co-operation between the unions and the Councils of Action in some areas, the majority 
of Trades Councils co-ordinated the strike, their committees sitting in continuous 
session57 . 
Strike Committee activities were wide ranging and included the issuing of travel 
permits, the organisation of picketing, entertainment, communications, while some also 
formed Workers' Defence Corps. The publication of strike bulletins was another 
important role, and in addition to bolstering morale and emphasising the importance of 
calm and non-violence, provided updates of developments and a counter to government 
propaganda58 . The strike began on the 4 Ih May, and was to be in two waves, indicating 
that a long stoppage was anticipated. The first, which included the printing and transport 
unions, despite safeguarding essential services, seriously disrupted transport as a result 
of the solidarity of rank and file support. The second wave, intended to tighten the hold 
of the strike and scheduled for 11th  May, included the engineering and shipbuilding 
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unions. Farman describes this tactic as generating considerable rank and file 
dissatisfaction by delaying their participation in the strike, whilst giving the government 
time to consolidate its position 59 . However, although the second wave had been 
instructed to strike on the 11th, the announcement of the sudden and unconditional 
capitulation of the General Council on the 12th was seen as a betrayal. The rank and 
fiie, more resolute than its leadership, refused to accept the new terms and rejected them 
without waiting for instructions from the TUC or their own executives, with the result 
that 100,000 extra men were on strike on the Thursday. Militant workers were hostile 
towards both the TUC and the employers, and briefly 'it looked like the end of the strike 
might be the beginning of the revolution', with the greatest tensions centring on the 
north60. The miners however, with their dispute unresolved, held out alone until forced 
to accept defeat in November. 
Interpretations of the consequences of the General Strike vary considerably. Phillips 
argues, for example, that despite widespread condemnation of the General Council's 
action, local allegiance to the TUC remained strong, and displeasure was increasingly 
directed towards local trade unions 61 , whilst Farman asserts that the regional variation 
of the effectiveness of the stoppage reflects the strength of local labour movements 62 . 
From within the labour movement however, the General Strike was seen as a triumph of 
solidarity and organisation 63 , as the rank and file, taking pride in their unselfishness and 
high level of organisation, rallied behind their leaders. From a left-wing perspective, 
many saw the strike as inherently political, believing the General Council had 
mistakenly assumed it was possible to separate industrial and political objectives, whilst 
a ruthless government, together with the police, army, media and employers united as a 
class to crush organised labour 64 . Conversely, Phillips describes the General Strike as 
'the echo rather than the voice of class war' 65 , a receding memory of the employers' 
offensive and industrial alliances of the early 1920s. Finally, although the continuing 
miners' strike increased unemployment and weakened the unions by continuing to 
inflict financial damage and membership loss, with the exception of the mining 
industry, the stoppage resulted in only a slight decrease in working class living 
standards 66, and the events and significance of the General Strike in Barrow will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
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THE BARROW CO-OPERATiVE SOCIETY 
Moving on to an examination of developments in Barrow in relation to these broad 
trends, we begin with business strategies and the role of the Co-op. Founded in the 
1860's, the Barrow Society was predominantly a retail organisation, but its educational 
and social facilities were expanded in 1919 with the foundation of a Collective Life 
Assurance Scheme and an Education Conmiittee 67 . The Society prospered during the 
war, its profits peaking at £95,716 in 1919, but Table 6.1 illustrates the rapid and 
substantial decline of the 1920s. 
Table 6.1: 	 Barrow Co-operative Society 1913-1926 
Year Membership 	 Nett profits Profits as % of 	 Average 
£ 	 nre-war level 	 dividend 
1913 12,015 61,829 2s10 1/2d 
1919 16,169 95,716 154.8 is 5 1/2d 
1922 14,654 12,239 19.8 6 1Ad 
1924 13,255 12,199 19.7 5 1/4 d 
1926 14,152 26,552 42.9 is 3d 
Statistics', IYJi-20 
Despite severe financial difficulties, the Co-op continued to pass falling prices on to the 
customer, and adopted strategies to protect the interests of the Society and its members. 
By May 1921, several departments were making losses as a result of falling sales, which 
left stock levels stubbornly high; thus stock buying was kept to a minimum, and market 
trends were closely monitored. For example, local surveys were conducted, the Co-op 
buying a range of goods from local traders in order to compare quality and prices 68 , and 
sending out canvassers to conduct local opinion polls 69 . However, a proposal to open a 
shop specifically selling cheap goods was rejected on the principle that the Co-op was 
not prepared to operate two different business systems, and they had 'done their best to 
meet customers who desired cheaper classes of goods, and ... to purchase any small 
quantities' 70 . 
An effective strategy was to offer customers a choice between discount or dividend. In 
selected shops for example, certain goods were sold at only slightly above cost, but 
without earning a dividend, and similarly, when purchasing goods with Guardians' 
vouchers, members were allowed a 5% cash discount if no dividend was required 71 . The 
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Society similarly supported small traders, for example, supplying bread to small shops 
at 6d per dozen less than the Co-op retail price, and allowing 2 1/2% discount on cash 
payments if accounts were settled within seven days, but again, with no dividend. 
Whilst it is not possible to ascertain how unusual these strategies were, nationally, the 
question of paying dividends on Guardians' relief tickets was to become increasingly 
contentious 72 , and suggests that the other practices adopted by Barrow's Co-op could 
have been equally so. 
From November 1921 the Society permitted unemployed members to withdraw all their 
share capital, with the exception of one shilling, and in December agreed to pay 
unemployed members a dividend of 9d in the £, an amount above the standard rate (see 
Table 6.1). Again in July 1922, the Society agreed to pay such members an interim 
dividend of 6d in the pound, with any balance to be paid later. However, the suspension 
of the Dividend in October demonstrates the unexpected speed with which the crisis 
deepened during 1922. 
These concessions and reductions in retail prices had to be compensated for, and 
inevitably, the staff bore the brunt of the economies. Staff cuts have been outlined in 
Chapter One, but other strategies included short-time working and the re-distribution of 
staff among branches to match sales levels. Throughout the period, cuts, suspensions 
and short-time working continued, but there is little evidence of militancy. The Society 
had refused to negotiate with the union on the issue of short-time working, but most 
wage cuts were voluntarily accepted. In addition to sales staff, this included heads of 
departments and the Master Bakers' Federation, which agreed both to wage cuts and the 
working of a limited amount of overtime at the ordinary rate. Further substantial savings 
were made by the replacement of horses with bicycles 73 . Horses were a particularly 
expensive overhead: their initial cost, plus harnesses, carts, feed and stabling required a 
significant annual outlay in addition to the driver's wages 74 . 
But despite making significant economies, these measures failed to avert the severe 
financial crisis of September 1923. The decision to cut all wages by 10% and dismiss all 
superfluous employees was opposed by the union, but despite stressing the necessity of 
these reductions, the Society, on this occasion, was prepared to negotiate, and ultimately 
a compromise was agreed75. More serious was the decision to suspend the repayment of 
withdrawable share capital deposited before September 15 th 1923 as a result of constant 
174 
and heavywithdrawals by unemployed members living on their savings. This was so 
severe that the Society feared it would be left with no liquid capital, which had been 
reduced from around £100,000 to £15,000b6.  Although members leaving the area were 
exempted from this rule, and unemployed members were permitted to withdraw a 
maximum of £1 per week for household expenses, this measure, and also the suspension 
of the Dividend, caused considerable dissatisfaction among members. Nevertheless, it 
can be argued that Barrow's Co-operative Society took every conceivable step to protect 
the interests of the working class consumer while making few concessions to the trade 
unions, and membership remained above the pre-war level (see Table 6.1). 
VICKERS MANAGEMENT 
implications for employees. As previously stated, despite initial post We now move on 
from Barrow's largest retailer to its dominant industrial employer, with an analysis of 
Vickers' strategies for coping with the depression, and their -war optimism, full order 
books and plans for diversification, the Vickers group was badly hit by the sudden 
economic downturn. Incomes and unemployment levels have been examined in Chapter 
One, but the depression also had a profound impact on Vickers' management and 
organisation. Despite the attention given to peace products 77 , there is little evidence of 
forward planning with regard to the Barrow yard. In 1918, although considering cargo 
and passenger vessels, the shipyard attracted little work until securing a liner order in 
1922. After than date there is no further mention of Barrow Shipbuilding in the Peace 
Products Minute Books 78 , and Barrow Engineering fared little better. Although 
branching into loco work, estimates were too high to be competitive and the work 
finished after 1920. Barrow Engineering is not discussed again in the Peace Products 
Minute Books until 1922 and 1925, in brief reports which show little activity, providing 
scant evidence of diversification in the Barrow shipyard. 
The strain is demonstrated by Sir James McKechnie's 79 verbal instructions to Senior 
Management in November 1922 regarding the recent contract for the P & 0 liner 
Orient. In a ferociously competitive market, Vickers had to undercut ten other firms 
chasing the same order, and consequently, 'the order has been taken at a price which is 
so low that it might involve a considerable sacrifice to the firm. It has been taken in 
order to keep the Works going, to keep the key members of the Staff together and 
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especially our old and experienced hands' 80. As McKechnie stressed, there was neither 
margin for error nor wastage, and speed and co-operation were vital. 
These were traditionally lacking however. Although well-suited to the demands of his 
position up to 1918, Sir James McKechnie, with a lavish life-style and absolute power, 
was 'dreaded for what he could do to people' 81 . Under his management, rivalries 
between the shipyard and the engineers caused considerable problems, each blaming the 
other for delays and difficulties. Additionally, in the thawing offices, his frequent 
absenteeism resulted in poor discipline and slow work, a situation compounded by poor 
communication between departments 82. McKechnie's management style was unsuited 
to the post-war climate, and Commander Charles Craven was appointed his deputy in 
April 1923, to take full control of the Works in his absence, and intended ultimately to 
replace him83 . 
The extensive correspondence between Craven and the London Board reveals 
considerable frictions between the two men. Resenting Craven's appointment, 
McKechnie began to take a greater interest in the running of the yard and refused to 
delegate. Despite having the full support of the Directors, Craven was excluded from all 
management processes and McKechnie refused to settle Craven's salary or give him an 
office. Additionally, any Senior Managers colluding with Craven incurred the full force 
of McKechnie's displeasure. Craven consequently spent much time in the workshops 
and offices, becoming familiar with staffing levels, work practices and conditions, but 
more significantly, with the men themselves. The Barrow yard was unable to tender 
competitively 84 , but within a month of his appointment Craven presented a 
rationalisation plan to the Board promoting standardisation, economy and greater 
efficiency, together with the reorganisation of workshops, offices and staff hierarchies. 
Although Craven's position prevented the immediate implementation of these 
proposals, a Works Investigation Report was commissioned and recommended similar 
far-reaching changes 85. The measures included closer liaison between departments to 
better monitor costs and expenditure, together with the rationalisation of estimating and 
tendering procedures. In addition to criticism of the high salaries of senior staff, staffing 
levels and bonus payments (see Chapter One), the report identified other wastes and 
abuses, including lax building maintenance which resulted in unnecessarily high repair 
bills, compounded by too many men allocated to one job, leaving many standing idle. 
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Although describing travelling expenses as unnecessarily high and identifying 'certain 
officials now being carried who are really redundant', the report was particularly critical 
of Mcicechnie's spending habits, such as three bearskin rugs purchased for his London 
apartment and paid for by the Company. The opinion that 'such a state of things is 
iniquitous and, moreover, could not have come about without connivance' 86 , implies the 
need of a thorough purge of higher management, as such blatant abuse of privileges had 
become indefensible and unsustainable in the harsh inter-war economic climate. 
Adopted in their entirety, these measures resulted in the restructuring and streamlining 
of the Barrow Company at all levels and pre-dated the 1925 restructuring described by 
Scott87 . Thus despite Vickers' reputation for innovation, expertise and modem 
management, the Barrow yard appeared badly run and mismanaged. However, the 
adoption of these proposals and the replacement of McKechnie by Craven in September 
1923 signalled the beginning of a new era. The old-style, autocratic management had 
been indifferent.to the well-being of the workers, and to the town itself. For example, 
the firm was employing men from outside the area as unemployment approached its 
peak in 1922, but the Corporation's protest received a terse reply, stating unequivocally 
that 'the question is a matter in which [the Mayor] cannot interfere' 88 . Additionally, oral 
evidence asserts that there was no attempt to create any kind of family atmosphere', but 
this changed under the new regime. The view that Craven 'really cared ... about what 
happened to everybody' is well supported: he is described as 'wonderfully good at 
mixing with everybody ... including the men in the shops, the old foremen, the staff and 
the outside people who visited Barrow', and he gained the respect and trust of staff and 
workers alike. His introduction of amenities such as sports facilities were important, and 
were 'symptomatic of the new found interest in its work people, [which] brought about 
a great change in the atmosphere in Barrow'. All the interviewees paid tribute to 
Craven's inter-personal skills, social attitude and shrewd management. He is also 
accredited with achieving a marked reconciliation of traditional rivalries, and it was 
'commonly considered that the recovery of 1923-24 owed much to Craven's 
initiative' 89 . For example, unlike McKechnie, Craven was prepared to search for work, 
and within a month of his appointment had secured several, albeit small, orders 90 , while 
his approaches to the Ministry of Health have already been outlined 
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THE ORGANISED LABOUR MOVEMENT 
(i) The Shop Stewards' Movement 
With regard to the trade unions within the shipyard, the Boilermakers' union dominated 
the shipbuilding side and the Amalgamated Engineering Union (ABU), the engineering. 
Traditionally there was considerable friction between them, whilst the large number of 
individual unions and the representation of some trades by more than one union, further 
fragmented Barrow's trade union movement 91 . Additionally, the AEU, the largest union 
in the town, with eleven branches by 1920, created considerable inter-union friction 
through its growing tendency to dominate collective bargaining 92 . However, 
Calderwood's assertion that collective bargaining restricted local militancy 93 is 
untenable. Todd demonstrates the militancy of local trade unionism, the militant 
tradition of the ASE for example, frequently leading the local District Committee into 
clashes with both the employers and its own National Executive. Significantly however, 
despite considerable inter-union tensions, local unions could unite to protect common 
interests, a solidarity which again brought the AEU into conflict with its own Executive, 
and created what was 'almost a tradition of local dissent against official decisions' 
which pre-dated the war94 . 
Inevitably, the responses to wartime compulsion varied, and Mclvor points out that, 
unlike on the Clyde, dilution generally caused little trouble in the north west of 
England, and 'a more openly co-operative relationship prevailed' 95 . This did not extend 
to Barrow however, as Vickers, taking unscrupulous advantage of the Munitions Act, 
brought industrial relations to an all time low 96. Whilst industrial militancy intensified, 
the lack of authority of Barrow's trade union leaders was exacerbated, particularly 
during the sthkes over dilution in 1916 and the Premium Bonus System in 1917. Their 
inability to satisfy rank and file demands, combined with the growing belief that the 
trade union movement had failed, widened the gulf between the leadership and the rank 
and file, boosting the influence of the shop stewards 97 . 
Elected from as early as 1897, shop stewards were not new to the shipyard, but had 
been closely controlled by the District Committee, which did not delegate negotiating 
rights to the stewards. Vickers also refused to recognise them, and this was to have 
considerable implications for the wartime shop stewards' movement. Hinton argues that 
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an independent rank and file movement did not emerge in Barrow because the necessary 
precondition of recognised workshop organisation was never established. As a result, no 
Shop Stewards' organisation could rival the authority of the District Committee, which 
was able to contain the pressures for a workshop organisation in a single industry town 
dominated by a single large company. Craft unions therefore took a particularly 
centralised form, whilst the direct relationship between Vickers and the District 
Committee inhibited the development of the workshop democracy that was so explosive 
elsewhere. Consequently Barrow was one of three munitions centres where the shop 
stewards' movement failed to evolve into a permanent and effective organisation, and 
'strong local Workers' Committees, based directly in the workshops and able to act 
independently of the local official trade union structures did not emerge' 98 . 
According to this interpretation, Barrow's revolutionaries remained isolated and the 
Shop Stewards Movement never achieved a position of mass leadership. However, other 
sources reveal a considerably more complex situation and suggest their influence should 
not be underestimated. Whilst Hinton focuses primarily on the engineering unions, a 
wider view of local shipbuilding suggests that, rather than being by-passed by the local 
District Cornniittees, 'it is likely that the shop stewards were represented on the District 
Committees; certainly the Boilermakers' Shop Stewards were' 99 . Although the position 
of Barrow's shop stewards would benefit from further research, it is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. Nevertheless, it appears that the shop stewards became a power of some 
significance, and if Vickers never recognised them, the Government did. For example, 
Lynden Macassy negotiated directly with the stewards during the major wartime 
disputes, and they were also required to give evidence before the Commission of 
Inquiry into Industrial Unrest of 1917 100 . 
Whatever the true status of Barrow's shop stewards, the movement collapsed after the 
war as many militants returned to their home towns and local radicals were dismissed. 
In addition to focusing their attentions on local politics and the foundation of Barrow's 
branch of the Communist Party, the former stewards were influential in the formation of 
other organisations. These included the revival of the Labour press in the form of the 
Northern Beacon, the founding of Barrow's labour college, and significantly, the local 
Unemployed Workers Movement' 0 ' which, as demonstrated in Chapter Four, was 
Communist-led. 
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(ii) The Engineering Strike of May 1922 
The Engineering strike of May 1922 was to have the most significant impact of any of 
the national strikes of the period. In response to the massive wage cuts demanded by the 
employers, the Trades Council called for the solidarity of the labour movement and a 
co-ordinated effort to defend working class living standards. Preparing for the Lock-out, 
a Workers' Council composed of both the employed and the unemployed was formed in 
March' °2, and the Trades Council organised a Committee to co-ordinate the activities of 
the forty seven unions involved, which included two representatives from the UWM' °3 
Initially howeyer, the AEU formed its own Lock-out Committee, which did not affiliate 
with the Co-ordination Committee until April 104 . 
Tensions were high from the outset. 'Fearing a raid by the unemployed', Vickers 
introduced night patrols, some of whom were AEU members, anned with hammer 
shafts, torches and police whistles. Additionally, some workers armed themselves with 
cudgels, and thus the spasmodic outbursts of violence between men and pickets could 
become serious. However, hardship forced growing numbers of men back to work, and 
the traditionally strict discipline of the AEU was imposed at an increasing number of 
disciplinary hearings. This generally took the form of fines and exclusions. 
Additionally, there was a considerable amount of abuse, threats and the vandalism of 
blacklegs' homes by the rank and file 105 . 
However, intimidation served to divide rather than consolidate, and some men took a 
defiant stance at their disciplinary hearings. For example, one man 'complained of the 
demonstration that had been round his house and stated that if we call that trade 
unionism he was finished with it and stating that he was going to continue at work'. 
Another with similar grievances, in addition to giving the names of his intimidators to 
the police, declared that 'he was going to await his chances to get at them" °6 . Despite a 
barely suppressed undercurrent of violence, it was believed that many were trying to 
pluck up the courage to return to work, and influential men, such as Councillor 
Jamieson, also an AEU member, expressed the view that 'any man who wanted to go to 
work should be allowed to do so107. 
The Lock-Out Committee felt that the pickets could do more to prevent men working 
and introduced mass picketing from 6th M ay tOS .  This further increased tensions and the 
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situation deteriorated rapidly as groups of men marched around the town, their military 
aspect having a significant psychological impact on the police and bystanders. The need 
to give each group a police escort ensured that the under-staffed local force was 
stretched to the limit, further hampered by the fact that if horse patrols were needed, the 
constabulary had to commandeer cab horses. This coincided with three days of serious 
violence which began on May 5th 
 and necessitated imported reinforcements of between 
thirty and forty foot and ten mounted officers. The violence continued to escalate as 
men were pulled from railway carriages and assaulted, and thousands assembled outside 
Vickers, 'marching along in military formation carrying banners and otherwise 
deporting themselves in a threatening manner'. Groups of women were also active and 
attacked blacklegs arriving for work, on one occasion leaving two injured, a third 
seriously, whilst a fourth man escaped by hiding under the seat of a traim Additionally, 
the demonstrators were faced by 'certain constables ... prepared as individuals to meet 
any two members of the Unemployed Committee and knock them both out', and the 
police themselves were accused of initiating a disturbance on Walney on the 5 th with an 
unwarranted baton charge' °9 . 
Previous chapters have referred to the bridge spanning Walney Channel and the 
unpopularity of the tolls, which became a long-term point of contention. As tensions 
increased during 1922, the bridge became the focus of working class discontent. In 
February for example, an UWM demonstration crossed without payment, and finding 
the gates locked against them on the return crossing, forced their way across, again 
without payment l 10
.Inevitably, the Bridge provided one flash point in May, whilst the 
location of the shipyard made it a focal point and vulnerable to siege (See Appendix 
One). 
Negotiations between the trade unions and the Chief Constable relating to picketing and 
demonstrations had progressed well, but without warning the police took the unilateral 
decision to cordon off the High Level Bridge and to question men crossing Walney 
Bridge, ostensibly to protect the men attempting to work. This unwarranted and 
provocative action tended 'to bring about that which the Chief Constable was anxious to 
avoid, that is, collision between the Police and the demonstrators". On 8th 
 May, a 
crowd of 3,000 retaliated and stormed Walney bridge, but at the simultaneous 
demonstration outside Vickers' main gate involving thousands more men, women and 
children, according to one eyewitness, it was 'the women who had got out of hand, 
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knowing that they bore the brunt of the wage cuts. It was the police response that 
ignited the reaction from the crowd" 2 
In response, Vickers' solicitor wrote to the Chief Constable, demanding police 
protection and intending to hold the Corporation responsible for any damage or loss, but 
stood alone in heartily supporting the use of the mounted police' '. Both the AEU and 
the Labour Party complained about the indiscriminate use of batons on pickets and 
bystanders alike, whilst Barrow Island Co-op Guild demanded an inquiry regarding 'the 
action of the police and especially the action of those in comman4', and asserted that - 
'the conduct of the police was a direct incitement to riot and nothing but the common 
sense of the crowd of disciplined men saved the town from disaster'1 4• 
Despite the many complaints" 5 , the calls for a public enquiry were narrowly defeated 
by a Corporation vote of ten votes to fifteen" 6. The Chief Constable maintained that the 
local police could ill afford antagonistic or provocative behaviour as they were so 
heavily outnumbered by protesters, but in the circumstances had no alternative but to 
act. However, the local authorities emphasised their shared dislike of the imported 
police, iot least because they could ill-afford to accommodate and pay for them" 7 . In 
the subsequent negotiations, all parties strove towards a finding an acceptable solution. 
Ultimately, the term 'mass picketing' was defined, and agreements reached on a means 
of identifying pickets and the maximum number to be deployed. The final consensus 
was that if the mass demonstrations and processions were to stop, then the imported 
police would be withdrawn, whilst the Corporation brought the NTJWM to order by 
threatening to cancel their free permits to cross the bridge. 
Tensions within the trade unions were not reduced however, and in addition to 
continuing verbal exchanges, violence between AEU members erupted on to the streets, 
and the old frictions between the shipyard and the engineers surfaced within the 
organising committees 
	 In contrast, the support of the UWM for the 
strikers was solid. In the post-riot negotiations, the Chairman of the Co-ordinating 
Committee emphasised that there were two elements active in the dispute, the employed 
and the unemployed, equally involved in the dispute and equally affected by the 
outcome, stressing that the UWIvI should not be blamed for the disturbances" 9 . Despite 
this solidarity, the HWM affiliation to the Trades Council in July 1922 was opposed, 
but did take place in March 1923, after which the UWM sent two representatives to the 
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Trades Council 120 . However, the defeat of the AEU represented a cmshing defeat for the 
labour movement, and the relative absence of strikes after 1922 pmvided less 
opportunity for the UWM to show its solidarity with the unions. 
(iii) Trade union membership 
Union membership levels were badly affected throughout the period, and in the case of 
the AEU fell by 42% between December 1921 and December 1926121.  Unemployment 
levels (discussed in Chapter One) were a key factor, and Table 6.2 illustrates how this 
was reflected in the membership figures of Barrow's two largest unions. In March 1920, 
unemployed members had accounted for just 2% of the Boilermakers' Union' 22 , and the 
table illustrates the severe impact of the depression on both the Boilermakers and the 
AEU. Although unemployment levels within these unions to May 1922 were relatively 
similar, there was a marked disparity after that date as a result of the Boilermakers' 
lock-out of 1923. Whilst unemployment within the AEU is shown to be far higher in 
Barrow than the national average, it is interesting that this was reversed following the 
General Strike. Unemployment levels in the shipbuilding trades however, remained 
critical. 
Table 6.2 	 Percentage of trade union members unemployed 1921-1926 
% 
Date 	 Boilermakers' 23 	 AEU Barrow 	 AEU Nation-wide 
Mar1921 18.0 12.6 - 
Dec 1921 33.5 38.0 - 
May 1922 67.6 68.0 47.3 
Dec 1922 69.2 61.3 22.7 
Dec 1923 51.2 21.8 14.6 
Dec 1924 35.4 12.0 8.0 
Dec 1925 40.0 12.3 8.1 
Dec 1926 53.1 3.0 12.3 
Source: Boilermakers' Monthly Journals, MRC, MSS. 1 92/BM/4/1/4 7-52; 
AEU Monthly Journals, MRC, MSS,259/4/i 42540 
Another important contributory factor to falling AEU membership was its draconian 
discipline and high subscriptions, which alienated members, many of whom defected to 
the National Union of Railwaymen, attracted by its lower subscriptions and greater 
tolerance' 24 . However, whilst at a national level, the AEU attempted to reclaim lost 
members by relaxing the penalties imposed on men who returned to work and 
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introducing more favourable terms for those in arrears with contributions 125 , the Barrow 
District Committee believed it 'unlikely' that defectors would be allowed to return, an 
attitude reflected in the continuing low membership levels of the period 
Considerable frictions were also evident between the AEU and Barrow's Co-operative 
Society. The District Committee resolved that negotiations with the Co-op for an 
agreement to guarantee food vouchers to locked-out members should be placed on the 
agenda for the National Conference. This came too late for inclusion however, but the 
Co-operative Bank's decision not to grant loans to locked-out members was considered 
'most unsatisfactory and ... excited keen disappointment and bitterness" 26 The attempt 
to negotiate such loans at a local level also failed and was strongly criticised by the 
AEU, but from the Co-op's standpoint, given the prevailing economic conditions it was 
'an unwise business step to further reduce the Society's available liquid cash by 
allowing credit on the lines proposed" 27 The AEU responded by urging its members to 
vote in the forthcoming Co-op Management Committee elections to ensure 'that the 
administrative affairs of the Co-op were placed in the hands of true co-operators" 28 
This tends to support Gurney's view that economic hardship exacerbated frictions 
between the two movements, rather than compounding their inter-dependencies as 
Southern suggests. 
THE GENERAL STRIKE 
(i) Labour movement preparation 
In contrast to 1922, the General Strike of 1926 assumed remarkably different 
characteristics. There is little evidence of union preparation for the stoppage, and with 
the exception of repeatedly postponing a discussion on forming a Workers Defence 
Force' 29 , Trades Council minutes were dominated by routine business. Similarly, apart 
from organising a bowling competition, AEU minutes were equally mundane but they 
do disclose the Trades Council formed a Central Strike Committee in April. However, 
the instruction that no notes were to be taken at meetings suggests a perceived need to 
leave no evidence for the police' 30 . 
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Inevitably, the level of co-operation within Trades Councils varied. Barrow's Trades 
Council, with the affiliation of a high number of the local unions, was the central co-
ordiitating body of the local labour movement, but its relationship with the local Co-
operative Society is unclear. Unlike many Trades Councils, Barrow did not return a 
questionnaire outlining local organisation and events, but some insights are available in 
the contribution from Ijlverston, a small market town some eight miles distant. It 
appears that, too disorganised to stand alone, Ulverston trade unions affiliated to the 
Barrow Strike Committee, and although arrangements with the Co-op are mentioned, 
mainly relating to coal, it is unclear whether this refers to the lMverston or Barrow Co-
operative Society' 31 . 
(ii) Local authority preparation 
Whilst there is no further information on labour movement organisation, the Ministry of 
Health Circular detailing the responsibilities of local authorities in the event of a 
General Strike was set out in the local press. The Corporation was responsible for the 
maintenance of utility services and co-operation with the national organisation of local 
transport for the distribution of coal and essential supplies, but Councillors shared the 
anxiety of the townspeople over the impact of a shipbuilding and engineering strike' 32 . 
Mayor Ellison adopted a position of strict neutrality and announced the intention of 
taking steps to mitigate any hardship that might arise as a result of the dispute. As Chief 
Magistrate he was also responsible for public order, but believed Barrow would remain 
a peaceful town, while warning that strict action would be taken against anyone taking 
advantage of the situation. Whilst Alderman Basterfield (Labour Mayor 1920-21) 
declared for the miners he also maintained that the best interests of the town's citizens 
were of prime importance. 'He was sure there was not a man or woman in the town who 
desired that the strike should go on. If it did, they hoped it would be short. There was no 
desire to interfere with industrial troubles. He was sure the people of Barrow would 
accept the statement he was making, that he was absolutely non-political' 133 . Other 
Labour Councillors expressed concern that in addition to the distribution of supplies, the 
Organisation for the Maintenance of Supplies was geared to defeat the aims of the 
working classes. They were assured by Alderman Fairbain however (an Independent 
and Mayor, 1921-24), Chairman of the local OMS, that it was not set up as a strike 
breaking organisation but imposed on Barrow, and in order to allay public suspicions, 
he invited two trade union representatives to sit on the committee. 
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A considerable number of special constables and volunteer workers were enrolled 
during the first week, but whilst the Barrow News asserts 'there was small demand for 
their services', Trades Council bulletins indicate that the OMS were operating their own 
courier service and handling supplies, doubtless assisting in the incident free unloading 
of a food ship which docked on Tuesday 11th 134 The Corporation also rationed coal to 
one hundredweight per household per week (except to necessitous cases and those with 
no alternative but to cook on an open fire), and this was strictly enforced. Although all 
local industries sought to keep their coal stocks for production, by the end of May, 
Vickers and the Steelworks were required to sell quantities of coal to the Corporation. 
However, local stocks were exhausted by June, compelling the Corporation to purchase 
supplies at inflated prices elsewhere. This continued for the duration of the miners' 
strike, but by November, the coal ration was increased, and all restrictions were lifted 
by the end of the month, following the capitulation of the miners' 35 . 
(iii) Events 
With regard to the labour movement, during the nine day stoppage two independent 
strike Bulletins were published in Barrow: the Furness Strike Bulletin published by the 
Central Strike Committee, and also the Workers Bulletin published by the Communist 
Party, both of which testify to the solidarity of the strike. It is impossible ascertain how 
many issues of the Furness Strike Bulletin were published but two issues survive, dated 
10th 
and 11 th May' 36 . These stress the importance of good order, discipline and the 
avoidance of confrontation with the police, together with a message from the Mayor 
commending the hitherto good conduct of the strikers. A clear sense of distrust is also 
evident, and the bulletin urges caution regarding whom strikers gave information to, and 
reveals that AEU post had been tampered with. Interestingly, they also express a 
growing, if ultimately misplaced, confidence in the TUC General Council. Four issues 
of the Communist Workers Bulletin were published, three of which survive for 101h , 11th 
and 12 th of May, and apart from a long article expounding the political meaning of the 
General Strike, were very similar in content to their rival. 
Beyond the bulletins and in the absence of any Trades Council records, it falls to the 
local press to provide details of local events for the duration of the stoppage, and in 
comparison to 1922, these were mundane. The paper reports an absence of incidents and 
no shortages of food or fuel, claiming the public experienced little inconvenience, with 
much business continuing as usual and essential services maintained. On the other hand 
it also reports the disruption of postal services, newspaper publication and particularly 
transport, although privately owned buses continued to run. The absence of trains, 
Corporation buses and trams proved a considerable nuisance for Vickers workers, still 
at work and waiting for the second wave of strikes to begin, but although Vickers 
continued to work, the effect on industry was nevertheless severe as thousands were 
thrown idle. 
Following the announcement that all AEU members were to be called out on the 
Wednesday, a Royal Navy destroyer appeared overnight and berthed by the High Level 
Bridge linking Barrow Island, and therefore the shipyard, to the mainland (see 
Appendix 1). Whilst the AEU was resolute and determined to fight to the end 137 , 
Vickers announced its intention not to close and promised to safeguard all men 
returning to work. Despite an absence of picketing the solidarity of the AEU was 
confirmed by Vickers, although many semi-skilled and unskilled labourers turned in. 
The over-riding reaction to the announcement that the strike was over was one of 'great 
enthusiasm and thankfulness in the town when the news was made known' 138 , and 
despite some AEU discontent towards the TUC, the Trades Council accepted the 
General Council circular on the calling off of the Strike' 39 . 
CONCLUSION 
To pull together the various strands examined in this chapter, it is evident that the first 
concern of Vickers and the Co-op was their own economic survival. With regard to 
Vickers, it becomes apparent that management in Barrow was not as efficient and 
forward thinking as suggested by Trebilcock or Scott, and there was no positive policy 
regarding peacetime diversification. However, a radical metamorphosis took place from 
September 1923, evident in the changing attitude towards the abuse of privilege. This is 
also reflected, more importantly, in the re-organisation of management systems and 
departments, the restructuring of staff hierarchies and, inevitably, wage levels. Perhaps 
more significant however, given the tensions in the town, were the positive changes in 
the relationship between the management and the workforce. Also badly hit by the 
depression, the Co-operative Society strove to support its members as far as possible, 
albeit at the expense of employees. Additionally, the severity of the Society's financial 
In' 
position prevented it from providing financial assistance to the unions in 1922, 
increasing the frictions within the labour movement. 
It appears however, that these frictions centred largely on the AEU and in addition to 
the Co-op, were reflected in its relationships with other unions 140 , and its own members. 
The solidarity and determination of the strikers should not be underestimated however, 
and workers and unemployed presented a united front to both the employers and the 
authorities. This is significant given the high unemployment and hardships experienced 
by these men and their families, although by 1926, Barrow's NUWItvI appears largely 
inactive. 
The contrasting responses to the1922 Engineering Dispute and the General Strike of 
1926, together with the limited impact of the latter, are striking, and a number of factors 
combined to bring local industrial and social unrest to a head in 1922. The rapid onset 
of the depression had two significant effects, providing the opportunity for Vickers' 
management to re-assert their prerogatives and bring the unions to order, whilst 
unprecedented levels of unemployment brought mass distress in a stark contrast to 
wartime prosperity. However, the crisis was far greater than a defence of working class 
living standards and the right to work. In addition to the political turmoil arising from 
the rupture of the political wing of the town's labour movement (Chapter Four), the 
local authorities Were themselves driven to the verge of bankruptcy by the levels of 
distress they sought to relieve, and drawn into a protracted battle with the government. 
Although a national dispute, its outcome, combined with the effects of the depression, 
were of considerable consequence locally, and the entire community struggled for 
economic, social and political stability. 
In a town already stabilised after the post-war crisis, the situation in 1926 was very 
different, and although local unions dutifully rallied behind their leadership in support 
of the miners, the General Strike appears to have had little popular support. In the four 
years separating these disputes, Barrow had made a slow and painful economic recovery 
as illustrated by Co-op profits in Table 6.1. However, although nett profits and the 
average dividend were more than double the 1922 level, Barrow's economy remained 
vulnerable due to the nature of its economic base, and continuing high unemployment. 
Thus the workforce and townspeople were reluctant to be drawn into a national struggle 
of little relevance locally, which would jeopardise this limited recovery and risk a return 
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to the distressed and unsettled conditions of 1922. The Strike's impact was further 
restricted by its short duration and the consignment of a large and militant section of the 
town's workforce to the second wave of strikes. 
It can also be argued that, rather than reflecting social antagonisms or class conflict, the 
success of OMS recruitment was indicative of an attempt to limit the economic 
consequences of a protracted stoppage. Further evidence of the primacy of co-operation 
and trust rather than social conflict is provided by the recruitment of trade union 
representatives to the local OMS Committee, the emphasis on the political neutrality of 
local officials and the influence of changing Vickers policies under Craven's regime. 
However, the simultaneous publication of two strike bulletins demonstrates that left-
wing political divisions, still in their infancy in 1922, were fully developed four years 
on. The inability of the factions to unite or share scant resources demonstrates little 
regard for the wider labour movement and the absence of a common cause. It is perhaps 
in the fuelling of the left-wing recriminations outlined in Chapter Four that the General 
Strike had its greatest impact locally. Unlike the events of 1922 and their aftermath, the 
General Strike had little perceptible influence on social attitudes and these, together 
with changing working-class self-help strategies, are discussed in greater detail in the 
following chapter. 
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SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF DISTRESS 
INTRODUCTION 
The final chapter will return to the analysis of Barrow society, combining the income-
based 'class' structure established in Chapter One with an analysis of the more 
subjective aspects of social identity, with particular reference to changing social 
relationships and perceptions during the post-war transition period. No research has 
hitherto been undertaken into social attitudes and the human impact of mass 
unemployment in Barrow during the 1920s. However, although not the main focus of 
her study, the evidence contained in the transcripts of Elizabeth Roberts' interviews 
provides valuable insights and will form an important basis for this analysis. These, 
together with records of local organisations and the press, will be used to assess the 
influence of war and the hardships of the depression on stereotyped images of Barrow's 
poor and the extent to which the town conforms to existing debates surrounding social 
relationships. The analysis will focus both on working class cohesion and on levels of 
friction between the various socio-economic groups, together with an examination of 
working class self-help and mutual aid strategies in the form of the effectiveness of 
support from their institutions, methods of self-sufficiency and changing attitudes to 
relief. The study will also compare Barrow's responses to mass distress to those 
communities that were dubbed 'Little Moscows' as a result of the radicalism of their 
own strategies. 
Chapter One desbribed the socio-economic structure. of Barrow's population and 
adopted a seven-fold method of classification based on income levels, but 
acknowledged that such an analysis is only one way to give meaning to the social order, 
identities being shaped by many additional factors beyond the workplace. Inevitably 
therefore, 'class' and 'social' identities overlap and make precise definition impossible, 
whilst the heterogeneity of social groups makes the development of 'class 
consciousness', with its implication of uniformity of belief, ialues and behaviour, an 
even more problematic concept. Additionally, many outside observers were often 
unaware of, or misunderstood, the richness of working class culture, networks and 
mentality, and Joyce stresses the importance of art, popular ballads and literature in 
shaping popular perceptions by promoting powerful stereotyped images. In a similar 
vein, Mayne asserts that the sensationalism of the nineteenth century press and fiction 
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writers made a particularly influential contribution to the formulation of stereotyped 
images of slums and the working class poor, and generated a fear of ill-health, crime, 
vice and drunkenness'. However, Winter asserts that 'middle-class assumptions about 
the poor were among the casualties of the Great War' 2 as a result of the visible changes 
wrought by higher incomes and manifest in better clothing and adequate diets. This 
metamorphosis demonstrated the importance of environmental factors in determining 
the condition of social groups and helped to undermine both popular stereotypes and 
hereditarian assumptions about the working classes. 
However, whilst most historians concur that the First World War had a considerable 
impact on social relationships and perceptions, the nature of these changes is widely 
debated. Cronin asserts that although the working classes did not become more 
homogeneous, they did become less sharply divided as a result of collective action and 
the unionisation of the unskilled, and also more culturally distinct from middle and 
upper class society 3 . Alternatively, Cannadine argues that one of the most pronounced 
consequences of the War was that 'ordinary people no longer saw their society 
hierarchically, nor their place in it deferentially'. The growing belief that traditional 
society no longer applied had particular appeal for the middle classes, who increasingly 
saw themselves as socially important and the setters of social standards. Other 
interpretations put the middle classes on the defensive. Cannadine himself asserts, for 
example, that in the war's inflationary aftermath 'the middle classes felt threatened on 
all sides by high taxing governments, by militant trade unionists, and by Bolsheviks 
abroad and Communist agitators at home' 4 . McKibbin identifies even greater tensions, 
and describes the rapidly the expanding lower middle classes as having no collective 
sense of class or identity, and although fairly well aware of where they stood on the 
social ladder, were 'disorganised, over-disciplined and isolated both from each other 
and the outside world', and fraught with status anxieties 5 . 
Additionally, the lower middle classes sought to distance themselves from the working 
classes, and thus most white-collar workers 'stood outside, and often in opposition to, 
the inter-war labour movement'. Middle and working class divisions were evident in 
differences of status, life-style, family background and connections 6 , but whilst existing 
class attitudes and divisions continued into the post-war period 7, awareness of them was 
intensified by the obvious inequalities of the depression 8 . Changing residential patterns 
were also influential 9 . Property related identities such as 'owner-occupier' or 'ratepayer' 
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had traditionally emphasised the distinctions between the middle and working classes 10 , 
but new municipal housing estates enhanced working-class feelings of segregation and a 
growing sense of 'a single working class bound together in a community of fate 
irrespective of its internal differences' 11 . 
Other factors have been identified as influential in bolstering working class cohesion. 
Macintyre argues that, whilst the workforce was not an undifferentiated mass, the 
divisions 'never presented an insuperable barrier to unity, and that they diminished in 
ithportance between the ar 12 Kirk supports this view, arguing that 'during the 1920s, 
[working class] differences and divisions tended to be overshadowed by common or 
similar experiences and attachments'. Thus industrial conflict, sacrifice and generosity 
among workers, family and neighbourhood loyalties, together with shared experiences 
of insecurity and survival further promoted a growing sense of working class unity 13 . 
Furthermore, in addition to there being no permanent employed / unemployed divide 14 , 
the shared experience of unemployment also had a significant levelling effect. The 
narrowing of income differentials by the payment of a flat benefit rate 'undermined an 
age-long class barrier that had divided artisan from labourer" 5 
Poor relief and state unemployment benefits have already been discussed, but other 
sources of support were also available to the destitute. Working class institutions such 
as trade unions, Co-operative and Friendly Societies had traditionally supported their 
members and their families during intermittent periods of unemployment and industrial 
action, but mass unemployment rapidly exhausted funds, forcing the suspension of 
benefit payments. 
Middle class charity was another long-standing source of relief, but was generally only 
directed towards the 'deserving' poor, and was traditionally slow and unreliable, and 
based on an unequal relationship' 6 . For contemporaries, the struggles of the poor and 
their 'endless innovation and adjustment in order to cope with external forces they had 
no hope of controlling' 17,  often appeared incoherent and created a middle class view of 
the poor as having neither concept of time nor ability to organise. Although middle class 
charity was stimulated by the depression, it was unequal to the scale of the crisis, but 
the existence of insurance benefits enabled a more efficient concentration of resources, 
and enabled private charity to provide an important supplement in the form of free 
boots, clothing, meals and clubs for example. 
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However poor relief, charity, and state and trade union benefits were generally 
insufficient to provide a minimum standard of living and, as ever, it fell to the poor and 
the unemployed to provide their own last line of defence, these strategies being 
significant for their continuity throughout the period despite state interventions' 8 . Self-
sufficiency was central to the concept of working class respectability and 'the ways in 
which money was raised and used were determined as much by social convention as by 
market forces and bodily needs'. Consequently, 'families became poor when they could 
no longer keep their stories private' ', and the various strategies adopted sought to 
conceal family hardships as far as possible. The importance of the extended family and 
working class neighbourhood support networks is well documented 20 , but whilst the 
family remained an individual's first resort, neighbourhood support, dependent on 
reciprocal relationships, was used more sparingly 21 . Consequently, such close 
neighbourhood involvement could create friction as well as solidarity 22 . Alternatively, 
poor relief was available to the destitute, but at the expense of the recipient's social 
standing. Consequently pawnbrokers were favoured over the Board of Guardians, and 
although this also revealed much about a family's financial condition, it was considered 
the less stigmatising option. The use of credit was another important means of coping 
with economic fluctuations which also left shopkeepers in a vulnerable and unstable 
situation23 , and in common with some other selfhelp strategies, was merely a short-
term expedient which increased a family's long-term poverty. 
Mass unemployment had a significant impact on social attitudes, but inevitably, 
interpretations vary considerably. A public phenomenon, the unemployed were highly 
visible on street corners, in libraries, cinemas and outside football matches. McKibbin 
argues this image of idleness and apathy confirmed the hostile middle class view of the 
working class as scroungers 24 . Conversely, Macintyre describes middle class attitudes 
as sympathetic, and Vincent also identifies a significant change of attitude. Describing 
middle class charity as an invasion of traditional self-help structures, he argues that 
'rather than retreating into their neighbourhoods and its organisations, the victims of the 
Depression were to be encouraged to see themselves as dependent but valued members 
of a benevolent national community' 25 . 
Mass unemployment was also a localised phenomenon, and could envelope whole 
communities. The worst hit areas tended to be centres of traditional heavy industry with 
well-organised labour movements, and Cronin argues that in such localities, home and 
EM 
family generally remained stable and community spirit strong 26. Croucher asserts that a 
significant contributory factor towards greater working class solidarity was the 
development of a 'Labour Exchange sub-culture' as a result of the need of the 
unemployed to register and sign on regularly. 'The fact that the system pushed people 
together created a framework within which the unemployed could organise 
themselves' 27 . Macintyre however, identifies more radical communities where 
particularly close ties of work and residence among the predominantly working class 
populations were important factors in the development of an 'extraordinary mentality' 
and a determination to unite and defend their living standards as best they could 28 . 
The formation of the NUWM was an important working class response to the pressures 
of the depression, playing a key role in encouraging the unemployed to claim benefits 
and out-relief, and as a result 'the change in consciousness among the recipients of 
relief was commonly acknowledged'. The intensity of the depression was such that the 
morality of work, thrift and self-reliance could no longer be sustained, and in a 
significant change of attitudes it became accepted that a wage earner thrown out of work 
still had a moral right to a basic standard of living. Although relief remained at a 
minimal level and the deterrent principle was maintained, the concept of the deserving 
and non-deserving poor was radically altered 29 . 
A principal aim of the NUWM was solidarity between workers and the unemployed 30 , 
but Vincent asserts that the NUWM was often at odds with organised labour and that 
these divisions were exacerbated by differing attitudes to authority. He argues that the 
perceived abandonment of the housing programme and other social expenditure cuts 
roused little trade union protest, and 'thereafter the varied incidence of conflict with the 
law by those directly affected by poverty legislation or its absence, served to confirm 
the detachment of the [official] labour movement from the interests of the poor' 31 . For 
others however, the definition of what constituted legitimate authority was radically 
transformed. In his study of 'Little Moscows', Macintyre argues that a feature of these 
localities was the 'deep-rooted character of the oppositional culture ... Over and over 
again in their brushes with the legally constituted authority we encounter the conviction 
that when the law is inconsistent with basic human rights, it should be disregarded' 32 . 
This attitude had significant implication for the psychological impact of the depression. 
Contemporary observers feared that mass unemployment would lead to isolation and 
MM 
demoralisation, and at a national level, despite considerable sympathy, the public 
activities of the unemployed were restricted and their self-esteem reduced. 
Consequently, 'many of the long-term unemployed retreated into isolation and 
passivity' 33 , but despite this demoralisation, there was only a slight increase in suicides 
and no consistent link between crime and unemployment 34 . However, although the more 
radical 'Little Moscows' also witnessed the human effects of unemployment, they are 
distinguished by their rejection of stigma and the securing of limited advances in relief. 
Macintyre argues that such communities never surrendered to their condition, and that 
the marches, the fighting of evictions and continuity of organisation 'all testified to a 
much higher level of morale than was the case elsewhere' 35 . 
SOCIAL PERCEPTIONS TO THE EVE OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
As regards Barrow, previous chapters have demonstrated that income levels and 
housing were major factors in social differentiation, and oral evidence reveals much on 
contemporary social attitudes. Beginning with housing, Chapter Two has discussed the 
poor housing conditions in the town and established that, although there was a mix of 
income groups in various housing areas 36 , some groups of streets were judged to be 
better than others. Despite widespread neglect by landlords, tenants were commonly 
blamed for the condition of the property. In the poorer areas, the bad conditions were 
often attributed to the residents not having any pride 'and consequently they just went 
from bad to worse and with nobody prepared to put money into them and make them 
more habitable. Over the years they were sub-standard families that went in them' 37 . 
Another interviewee describes them as 'that type of tenant. They mucked [the property] 
up and nobody bothered' 38 . However, even in Vickerstown, which housed a handpicked 
labour elite, hierarchies of residential status reflected the labour hierarchies of the 
shipyard. Consequently 'rougher areas' were soon identified in the eyes of 
contemporaries, not as a result of deficiencies of building or design, but through the 
social status derived from the occupations of the occupants and behaviour not meeting 
prescribed standards of the consensually respectable 39 . 
At the bottom of the housing scale, Barrow Island and Hindpool, with their forbidding 
tenements, generated powerful prejudices against the poor. For example, one 
interviewee describes Hindpool men as earning the highest wages but always the first in 
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the soup kitchens40 , and alcohol was automatically judged to be the root cause of 
secondary poverty and poor housing. One interviewee describes some Hindpool 
residents employed on the same job, some of whom might afford to buy their own 
home, whilst the children of others were going to school barefoot, their fathers 'had 
money but they used to drink it' 41 . Such images frequently appear in the oral evidence. 
For example, a great number of the poor are described as 'drinkers and fighters' 42 , the 
violence often involving women, whether on the streets or confined to the home 43 . 
However, whilst these perceptions of urban degeneracy and of slum dwellers as a 
different type of humanity represent the typical assumptions about the poor described 
by Mayne, broader social attitudes were also in evidence. Less judgemental 
descriptions of the poor included 'rough but good' and 'rough but genuine', but the 
appellation of 'good respectable ruffians' goes further and eradicates the boundary 
between the rough and respectable 45 . A baker's son, pressed on his perceptions of his 
own social class replied 'we were as good as anyone else', and when asked whether his 
family considered themselves as middle or working class replied, 'I don't think we ever 
thought about it ... It wasn't worth thinking about becaqse we couldn't do anything 
about it', indicating an acceptance of the social order. 
However, the image of run-down housing, drunkenness, neglected children and violence 
conformed to the stereotypical image of the slum and its inhabitants and these 
perceptions, being shared by those in authority, were influential. Interestingly, the 
reports of Barrow's Medical Officer of Health demonstrate that the stereotype worked 
in another way. Prior to the war, he reported that 'the houses and tenements of the 
Borough being of modern construction, are on the whole in a satisfactory condition. 
There are no slums in the sense of back to back houses in blind alleys. The streets are 
wide and windswept, anything resembling a slum area is due to the dirty habits of the 
householders' 47 . Thus the town compared favourably with the stereotyped image of the 
slum, and the use of that image as a yardstick in this way was influential in shaping 
official attitudes and policy decisions in the pre-war period. As a consequence, there 
was no impetus for reform and improvement, whilst the town's modernity fuelled 
judgements of those inhabitants who failed to live up to these standards. 
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THE INFLUENCE OF WAR 
The war brought radical change in the form of better standards of health, cleanliness and 
dress, and reduced alcohol consumption, among the working classes and should have 
undermined the stereotyped image. However, there is evidence to suggest that working 
class wartime affluence roused hostility in some quarters. Being a munitions town, the 
working class population greatly increased and the majority were in reserved 
occupations, stimulating much bitterness and a sense of injustice. A lengthy middle 
class obituary to a friend killed in action delivers a bitter attack on the injustices of the 
system. Barrow is described on a typical Saturday afternoon when hundreds of healthy 
and well-paid young (working class) men are shopping, watching a series of boxing 
bouts or flooding down Hoilcer Street after a football match. 'There seems to be 
something wrong with a condition of things which allows all those young, irresponsible 
young men to riot in careless and unstinted living while a man of middle age, and a 
father of a family - a man who had honourably filled an important official position 
should offer up the ultimate sacrifice' 48 . However, although this isa clear indication of 
hostility towards working class affluence and a resentment of the disruption of the 
established order, it is not possible to ascertain how widespread such attitudes were. 
Of greater consequence were the findings of the Commission of Enquiry into Industrial 
Unrest of 1917. As stated in Chapter Two, the Commission heard evidence from all 
classes on the overcrowded condition of the town's housing and commented that 'no 
decent person who understands the condition of housing in Barrow could do anything 
but condemn them' 49 . Faced by this damning indictment the Mayor, Alfred Barrow 
(knighted in 1921), was anxious to absolve the Council from any responsibility and put 
the Corporation's case before the people. He argued that whilst the Commission heard 
evidence from all social groups, 'the Corporation were never formally asked to appear 
before the Commission' 50. He thus claimed that the Commission's findings were based 
largely upon one-sided statements of minority groups, each pursuing their own agenda, 
and he was anxious to restore the balance. In a lengthy speech he denied that pre-war 
overcrowding was sufficient to warrant a municipal building programme and believed 
that private enterprise could have met the demand, stating the Corporation was not 
prepared to saddle the town with a huge building debt for wartime overcrowding which 
he saw as a temporary problem. He also argued that in addition to the wartime scarcity 
of manpower and materials, Vickers had commandeered the entire brick supply of the 
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district. In further efforts to lay the blame elsewhere, he argued that the Commission 
was to blame for suggesting the Corporation was negligent, the government was the 
guilty party and Barrow's housing scandal was a fabrication 
In a single blow, the Commission had undermined any claim to civic pride and 
municipal authority by stating unequivocally that the conditions to which the working 
classes were subjected were unacceptable and unjustifiable. This caused considerable 
ferment and Labour Councillors seized on this issue, stating 'The Corporation was 
responsible for having failed to realise its duty in the provision of adequate housing for 
the people' 51 . In a long speech, Councillor Ellison emphasised the need for pressing the 
issue and finding strength through numbers and unity. He argued that 'until the common 
people were prepared to organise politically to the same extent as they had organised 
industrially they would always be oppressed ...'. Significantly however, rather than 
blame the Corporation, he rhetorically 'blamed the working classes of Barrow for 
allowing these people to sit on the Council' 52 . However, despite the potency of the 
issue, housing reform was to lose its impetus and the attempt to radicalise the working 
classes was unsuccessful. 
Additionally, contrary to Winter's assertion, there is evidence to suggest that a 
prevailing middle class view of the working class as inherently inferior survived the 
war. In discussion of the first draft of a 1919 Corporation resolution to press the 
government for relief or maintenance for the unemployed for example, the word 
'citizens' was deleted and replaced by 'inhabitants' 53. Even publicly, in a debate on the 
construction of working class houses in 1922, although some councillors spoke in 
favour of giving the people decent places to live, Sir Alfred Barrow (Mayor 1913-19) 
still firmly maintained that such conditions were due to the habits of the occupants, 
claiming that if Buckingham Palace was let into tenements 'they would probably not be 
fit to live in within twelve months' 54 . Whilst the angry cries of resentment from the 
public gallery were indicative of social tensions and suggest an erosion of working class 
deference, the war appeared to have done little to reduce social divisions or reform 
middle class perceptions of their inferiors. 
Thus, as regards pre-war social divisions and attitudes little changed and there was no 
impetus for reform. Wartime affluence was rapidly followed by mass unemployment. 
Chapter Five has illustrated the inadequacies of both the Poor Law system and the 
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government's Unemployment Insurance legislation, leaving the working classes to their 
own resources. The rest of this chapter will examine the strategies adopted to cope with 
the crisis, together with the influence of these and mass unemployment on social 
attitudes and perceptions. 
DEPRESSION AND MASS UNEMPLOYMENT 
(i) Support from Working Class Institutions 
Working class institutions had traditionally supported their members and each other, but 
only brief local insights are available owing to the limitations of the sources. As regards 
the trade unions, the depression had destroyed the carefully prepared calculations which 
formed the basis of members' weekly contributions towards union unemployment and 
other benefits, and the financial strain of the 1922 Engineering Lock-Out was crippling. 
With many members on short-time working, even the large and powerful AEU was 
unable to raise the levy to compensate, and thus the lock-out rapidly depleted funds, and 
by 27 May the union was forced to suspend all benefits, except to sick and 
superannuated members 55 . Table 7.1 illustrates how the financial strain of the 
depression, and the 1922 crisis in particular, was reflected among Barrow's AEU 
branches, and the gradual and limited extent of the recovery up to 1926. 
Table 7.1: 	 Average half-yearly balance of Barrow AEU branches 1919192656 
Year 	 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 
Balances 	 566 	 342 	 294 	 16 	 39 	 92 	 82 	 72 
Source:AEU half-yearly reports, MRC 
Whilst the Co-op had proved incapable of providing support for the AEU in either cash 
or kind, some smaller unions had made loans available to them, but 'the difficulty was 
that the majority of the unions were not in a flourishing condition which would warrant 
them in assisting us materially'. The extent to which the AEU was overwhelmed by the 
crisis is demonstrated by the balance of the Distress Fund, which was reduced to a mere 
£45 by August 1922. Nevertheless, this was distributed evenly among the branches, to 
204 
be shared as they saw fit for the best advantage of distressed members, a pitiful amount 
given the scale of unemployment at this time 57 . 
Although records are sparse, similar difficulties were experienced by Barrow's Co-
operative Society and Workingmen's Club. The Co-op frequently gave financial 
assistance to members during times of crisis, but exercised considerable selectivity in 
this. For example, whilst sums were frequently granted to enable members to attend 
convalescent homes and hospitals, one member was refused assistance with the burial of 
his dead child58 , possibly reflecting the expectation that burial club subscriptions would 
be maintained. With regard to unemployment, increasing requests for relief from 
unemployed members led to the formation of a Relief Committee in February 1921, and 
notices were placed in Co-op shop windows announcing, 'The Committee are prepared. 
to consider applications from Members of the Society who are unemployed and in 
genuine distress' 59 . Although no information has survived relating to the number of 
applications or the amounts awarded, the demand was such that within seven months, 
long before the crisis had peaked, the fund was closed 60 and not re-opened. However, 
Griffiths asserts that attachment to Co-operative and Friendly Societies was largely 
inspired by financial return for the individual rather than broader mutual ideals, and 
illustrates the selfishness and materialism at the heart of working class culture 61 . 
Significantly however, despite diminishing returns (see also Chapter Six), membership 
in Barrow remained high (Table 6.1), suggesting that this was not solely based on 
materialistic considerations. 
Support for members of Barrow Workingmen's Club was similarly short-lived. The 
minutes indicate that rising unemployment was making an impact by February 1919, 
and requests for assistance were assessed on their merits and the amount paid left to the 
discretion of the committee. This also continued into 1921, and although subscriptions 
were increased to ten shillings per year to cope with the demand in February 192162,  the 
issue of relief dJsappears from the minutes at this point. Owing to the lack of research 
into Workingmen's Clubs it is not possible to ascertain how widespread this practice 
was among local branches, although national relief funds were periodically established, 
particularly after 192663. 
Although relief payments to distressed members were short-lived, both of these 
organisations continued to make donations to various charities. Frequent recipients of 
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Barrow Workingmen's Club donations included the Sailors' Home, North Lonsdale 
Hospital and Barrow Nursing Association throughout the priod. The Co-op however, 
made regular quarterly donations to both local and national charities, and available 
minutes indicate that generally over half of these donations were to organisations 
outside the area. By October 1922 however, donations were made to just two local 
causes, the Board of Guardians' Christmas Fund and North Lonsdale Hospital, and by 
October 1923 when the Society was itself in severe financial difficulty, all donations 
were suspended. Unfortunately, owing to the inaccessibility of later minute books, no 
information on the resumption of donations is available. As a result of the inability of 
formal working class organisations to relieve the effects of unemployment, self-
sufficiency strategies and family and neighbourhood networks became increasingly 
important. 
(ii) Self-Sufficiency Strategies 
Due to Barrow's location, typical self-sufficiency strategies included foraging, 
rabbiting, fishing and collecting shellfish, together with scavenging for firewood on the 
shore and raking through the large Vickers' tip on Barrow IslandM.  These were 
bolstered by neighbourhood networks which provided a vital means of working class 
support, and Elizabeth Roberts has described these in some detail. In her study of 
Banow, Lancaster and Preston she argues that the effects of migration, unemployment 
and insecurity 'seemed in some cases to break long-established customs and 
neighbourhood links', whilst the conflict between the work ethic and unemployment 
raised suspicions and prejudices towards the unemployed. As a consequence, the old 
solidarity was eroded, and she asserts that 'the oral evidence for this breakdown is most 
common in Barrow where the economic slump was the most sudden' 65  However, most 
of her evidence for neighbourhood changes is drawn from Lancaster and Preston, and 
of the two Barrow interviewees quoted, one describes the tensions within a small village 
which bears little resemblance to the Barrow environment 67 . Nevertheless, although she 
maintains that much of the old neighbourliness did survive, 'even in Barrow' 68 , the 
breakdown of solidarity is over-stated. For example, whilst one interviewee describes 
being aware of more bad feeling, people would nevertheless give what they could, and 
another describes neighbours as not always friendly, but prepared to rally round in a 
crisis. Additionally, there is a considerable body of interview evidence to suggest that 
Barrow's neighbourhood support networks were stimulated, because 'comradeship is 
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greater when you're depressed and you're starving, you all try to help one another and 
that is the way they tried to do it'. Mutual support networks could take many forms and 
aid was more often in kind than in cash. For example, the unemployed men of one 
family invested in a cross-cut saw to fell trees for firewood, and did this for other 
families, whilst other examples range from individuals such as John Whinnerah, a 
Labour Alderman, who grew vegetables in his own garden for the unemployed, to the 
generosity of local shops and farmers 69 . 
Although many would live a hand to mouth existence rather than borrow, and never 
take a free meat or have anything given despite entitlement 70, for others, credit was an 
important means of supplementing a limited budget. As early as 1921, many Barrow 
grocers had depleted their capital supporting regular customers suffering the indirect 
effects of the miners' sthke 71 , but as the depression deepened, the increasing numbers of 
customers resorting to credit added to the problems of local shopkeepers. In addition to 
running up credit in corner shops and taking Guardians' relief tickets to the 'multiples', 
customers were frequently unable to repay more than half of their debt each week 72, and 
these debts continued to accumulate. Consequently many shopkeepers were themselves 
forced to resort to credit, and by the end of 1921 the Board of Guardians reported that at 
least 75% of local shopkeepers 'were outside the Bankruptcy Court simply by the 
kindness of their creditors' 73 . Inevitably, the number of annual bankruptcies increased 
significantly during the 1920s, rising from three in 1914 and peaking at twenty seven in 
1922. Although still high at seventeen in 1925, the number fell dramatically to four in 
1926. It is significant that 27% of these cases between 1920 and 1926 were food 
retailers, in addition to vendors of a wide range of essential goods and services 74 . 
(iii) Revised Strategies and the Fighting of Stigma 
Charity was another long established source of relief, and like credit, its nature was to 
undergo a transition. The traditional soup kitchens and private charities of the pre-war 
period were unequal to the scale of distress, and successive mayors introduced co-
ordinated methods of relief. The fund opened by Mayor Basterfield to provide 
children's footwear was superseded in December 1921 by a conmittee which widened 
its scope, and sought to avoid duplication of investigation and distribution of relief. 
Rather than provide only new footwear, Mayor Fairbain's scheme introduced a clog 
repair service and was expanded to include donations in kind to enable the distribution 
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of second hand clothing. It was to be an apolitical, multi-agency venture, those pledging 
assistance including the press, the Shipyard Band, the Choral Society and various local 
societies running fund raising schemes. Additionally, the banks had agreed to act as 
collectors, whilst ladies' working parties were formed to make and repair garments. 
However, although the Committee was representative of all sections of the community, 
including the Unemployed Workers' Movement (UWM), the Chamber of Trade, the 
Co-op, Trades Council, Friendly Societies and many others 75 , any form of charity faced 
the twin obstacles of generating adequate donations in a depressed town, and social 
stigma. 
As regards donations, large subscriptions were not expected 'because they know the 
conditions not merely of the working classes, but also the professional and trading 
classes'. However, although the effects of the depression were widespread, the 
confidence that all would pull together was well founded. The various organisations 
actively sought donations. The Chamber of Trade, for example, although 
acknowledging that economic conditions were difficult, declared 'some of the cases 
were very painful, and it behoved the members of the Chamber to do all they could to 
relieve the distress in the town' 76 . Whilst claimants were to register and distribution was 
not indiscriminate, demands were heavy, and by November 1922 the fund had 
distributed 10,000 garments among 2,800 families, and footwear to 2,700 children 77 . 
However, by February 1923 donations had decreased and no longer met expenditure. A 
fresh appeal again acknowledged that everyone was hard hit, but asked 'the moderately 
poor man to help the very poor man - the man who is employed to help the children of 
the man who is unemployed; the man with some to help those who have none; ... [and] 
to remember that there are thousands in Barrow today who haven't got [the] primitive 
material conditions of life' 78 . By the end of Mayor Fairbain's period in office in 1924, 
his fund had raised £5,500, distributed over 19,000 garments, 5,590 maternity parcels, 
6,170 items of footwear, and provided fuel for the destitute 79. It represented a major 
success in harnessing the resources of the wider community. 
However, the real significance of these measures lay in distribution and the efforts to 
overcome the deeply ingrained stigma attached to the receipt of aid. Access to any form 
of relief came at the expense of privacy, and oral evidence indicates the extent to which 
poverty was concealed. For example, 'nobody knew how poor we were, we never 
showed it', and consequently Barrow had its share of those who never went to the 
Guardians because 'you had to go and sit in a room ... and everybody heard your 
business, all sitting in rows' 80. Aware 'that there were a large number of people in the 
town suffering in silence' and receiving no assistance, the Mayor sought to ensure 
'there is no man, woman or child going to bed at night not having had proper and 
sufficient food during the day' and that every household had sufficient fuel. Utilising 
the direct, face-to-face democracy that typified radical communities 81 , the new scheme 
was organised at packed public meetings with full press coverage. Continually 
emphasising his scheme was not a charity, the Mayor 'hoped that no man who might 
receive anything from the fund would feel he was loing his self-respect or anything of 
that kind' 82 . That it was no easy task to overcome the stigma and identify need is 
demonstrated by the attempts to extend free school meals provision. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the provision of free school meals was extended from 
six to seven days and was to include breakfasts as well as dinners. The Committee had 
requested head teachers to supply information on the number of needy cases in their 
schools, but twenty two replied that there were no such cases, and seventeen others 
claimed that whilst there was some need, the cases were generally very few. 
Councillors, personally aware of dire cases of poverty, believed these figures only 
touched on the fringes of distress, and the School Medical Officer's reports confirm the 
extent to which poverty was concealed. He asserted that 'the condition of the outer 
clothing was no index as to the general condition of the underclothing, which in all 
cases was clean but very much worn', and the deterioration of clothing and lack of 
wann underwear was widespread among the 4,176 children examined in 192283.  Again 
with the aid of public meetings and the press, it was made clear that free school meals 
were not a charity but permitted by State legislation, and the pre-war mentality of 
sending school children home with food parcels on Saturdays to prevent 'them from 
coming out on the Sunday and parading their poverty' had gone. Food parcels for 
breakfasts and Sundays would still be sent home, but to preserve privacy and comply 
with the preference of mothers to feed their own children 84 , it was emphasised that the 
Board of Guardians would not be involved and no records kept, and the system 
administered by the Education Committee to avoid stigma. The overwhelming success 
of these measures is demonstrated by the level of demand and evidence of continuing 
good health within the Borough (see Chapter Three). 
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Crime can be described as another form of self-help, particularly during times of 
economic hardship. The over-riding impression derived from the oral evidence suggests 
that 'people were very honest round here. They were very poor but I don't think they 
would do anything they shouldn't have done' 85 . This is supported by the Chief 
Constable's report for 1923, which acknowledged 'the uniformly good conduct of 
almost the whole of the inhabitants of the Borough throughout a year when many of 
them must have been sorely tried. During such a period of want and distress ... the 
prevalence of petty thefts might at least have been expected, but ... the increase is slight 
indeed' 86 . Barrow's crime rate also compares favourably to national figures. Whilst the 
national rate for indictable offences averaged around 2.4 per thousand of the population, 
the figure for Barrow stood at 2.2 per thousand. 87 . However, pral evidence suggests 
there was a fine line between casual opportunism and organised theft, and whilst the 
acquisition of stray sheep or those caught in the tide and picked up by boat might be 
deemed legitimate, they were also taken off the moors 88 . An insignificant testimony in 
isolation, this takes on a new dimension when combined with the theft of cows from the 
Co-op farm. That the cows and the culprits remained undetected despite a £10 reward 89 
suggests this was a well planned and co-ordinated venture, although it is impossible to 
ascertain how common this might have been given the absence of detailed police 
records. 
The most significant working class response to unemployment however, was the 
formation of Barrow's branch of the NUWTvP °. The minutes of both the Trades Council 
and the trade unions illustrate the impotency of organised labour, and testify to the 
importance of the UWM, which became the active ann of the labour movement. 
According to a former wartime shop steward and a founder member of Barrow's UWM, 
the unemployed fought harder because they were free from employer victimisation and 
had nothing to lose, and he describes them as bringing greater unity to a labour 
movement traditionally weakened by sectionalism 91 . 
Barrow's UWM, confident in the knowledge they outnumbered the police by around 
five thousand to ninety, could resort to direct action with impunity. The Board of 
Guardians was frequently the focus of such action, and in addition to occupying the 
Guardians' building as described in Chapter Five, on other occasions, by taking the keys 
or hammering wedges underneath the doors, the TJWM would lock themselves and the 
Guardians inside as a means of pressing their own agenda 92. Another important NUWM 
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activity was the fighting of evictions 93 , and the Barrow branch was no exception. These 
were a serious problem in Barrow and a typical example is provided by an ex-
serviceman and his wife, living in a 'structure' five feet high and evicted whilst out 
shopping. After they returned to find the locks changed and a new family in residence, a 
group of one hundred UWM members forcibly re-established the status quo 94 . 
A distinctive aspect of Barrow's UWM was its attitude towards relief work. Hannington 
asserts that the movement generally conducted a relentless fight against a rate of pay 
below union rates, and by simple acts of sabotage succeeded in defeating this 'in nearly 
every place where it was attempted' 95 . However, the Barrow branch adopted a different 
strategy, asking the Corporation for 'leave to be allowed to contract for all relief work 
given out by the Barrow Corporation' 96 . Although the Corporation agreed to consider 
this, the related documentation has not been found. Additionally, the UWM applied 
pressure for a wide range of concessions for the unemployed, including reduced prices 
for various goods and amenities, which always received a sympathetic hearing, and 
more importantly, never a flat refusal. However, many contemporaries see fish supplies 
as the UWM's greatest achievement. Over a two year period they hired a trawler, and 
rented a shop and market stall staffed by voluntary helpers. The catch, averaging about 
two tons per week, was sold to the unethployed at cost, but although of great benefit to 
consumers, greatly increased the pressures on local fishmongers 97 . 
However, the issue of municipal water supplies demonstrates that radical self-help or 
defiance was not confined to the UWM. This was a problematic issue for the 
Corporation, which sought to balance humanitarian and health arguments with the need 
to disconnect water supplies to prevent an organised effort to avoid water rate 
payments98 . To combat disconnection, the Barrow Leader advised asking 'a friendly 
moulder or brass fitter' to make a new key to reconnect the supply. This was an easy 
and popular option, but to inhibit future disconnection, it was prudent to then fill the 
hole with concrete 99 . Only a minority of Barrow's unemployed were persistent non-
payers, and Corporation tolerance is demonstrated by the debate surrounding sanctions 
for one such offender. This family with eleven children had defied the Corporation for 
three years and reconnected their own water five times. Although the Corporation did 
not want to establish a dangerous precedent, the principle that it was 'dangerous to kick 
a man when he was down' prevailed, and on this occasion, two councillors paid the £1 
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reconnection fee out of their own pocket, 'to give the man a chance and to prove his 
manhood" o° 
Macintyre argues that whilst resistance to authority provides evidence of an advanced 
political consciousness, the militants nevertheless represented a small minority' 01 , and 
oral evidence provides insights into how Barrow's UWM were perceived by more 
moderate members of the working class community. One witness describes them as 'not 
comprised of the best type of people', of being noisy and loud, and always 
demonstrating and demanding something. Consequently, 'they did more harm ... than 
they did good'. However, oral evidence also reveals that groups other than the TJWM, 
which included this man, actively opposed evictions 102 , and demonstrates that in 
Barrow, challenges to authority in defence of basic humanitarian rights were seen as 
legitimate by moderates and radicals alike. 
Furthermore, despite disapproval of direct action in some quarters, the worst fears of the 
Ministry of Health were realised as increasing numbers of Barrow's moderates joined 
the UWM, bolstering its legitimacy, broadening its support base and increasing 
solidarity. The most influential recruit was Alderman Basterfield, who apologised for 
his late association with the movement, attributing this to his belief that the depression 
would be briefer. But now he sought to 'do something for the cause of the town', 
arguing that 'long unemployment was a danger to the morality of the town; it meant 
silent suffering among women; it demoralised youth, and was a menace to children. 
Today there was murder being committed by mothers because they realised that if these 
children were born what they would come into. And the Churches kept silent 
Demonstrating the changing response to unemployment and the rejection of stigma, he 
emphasised that 'for a man or woman to starve behind clean curtains was cowardly. It 
was finer for such a man or woman to come out and state the 	 Again, as in 
Macintyre's 'Little Moscows', relief was seen as a moral right, not a disgrace 104 . 
(iv) Conflict or Cohesion? 
The Barrow interviews indicate that the images of unemployment were potent, and the 
overriding response was one of pity and not moralisation. They describe the sudden 
change from wartime affluence to unemployment, and the area of the town renamed the 
'Scrap Heap' because the unemployed would congregate there' °5 . Whilst some felt it 
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was pitiful to see men standing about idling their time away' 06 , the dole queue presented 
a forbidding image. One interviewee describes men queuing outside the Labour 
Exchange from 8.30 am to sign on. Unable to risk the loss of a day's money if they 
were absent when their name was called, they had to stand outside in all weathers, often 
all day. According to one local baker, the condition of the unemployed made him feel 
important, he 'wasn't making a lot but ... was never that far down'. However, rather 
than condemn them for their lack of work, he noted that 'they were half-starved and 
hadn't much food and not much clothing ... Some of them fainted while they stood 
against the wall'. Such images generated a positive response. For example, the 
Salvation Army would provide soup, and Arran's, a market trader, would supply the 
dole queue with items of food such as broken biscuits. To illustrate the increasingly 
reciprocal nature of Barrow society at this time, some of these men would get a shilling 
together and spend it at Arran's' 07 . 
At the other end of the income scale, the Corporation came under considerable pressure 
throughout the period on the issue of Chief Officers' salaries from ratepayers 
demanding economy, but also from clerical staff demanding greater equality. Councillor 
Doyle maintained that Chief Officers' salary levels were 'out of all proportion to the 
present rate of living', and it was 'only humane and proper' that these officials should 
consider a reduction given the levels of distress in the town 108 . The Chief Officers were 
obliged to defend their salaries in the local press' °9 , their arguments including low pre-
war salaries made adequate by war bonuses, but remaining below the national average 
due to the Corporation's non-implementation of the last Civil Service pay award. These 
arguments continued throughout the period, and despite demands that in the interests of 
fair play, workmen and Chef Officers alike should lose their bonuses, the Corporation 
consistently delayed tackling the issue. 
However, it was claimed that clerical staff were paid above the national average, and 
therefore were asked to accept a 5% salary deduction for a twelve month period 110 . 
Interestingly, against the advice of their leadership, NALGO members voted 
unanimously to accept this reduction given the economic conditions of the Borough, but 
only 'on the condition that a similar sacrifice is asked for and accepted by the other 
branches of the municipal service in Barrow whose post-war percentage exceeds that of 
the members of [NALGO]". Again, the Mayor failed to put this to other municipal 
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branches and the issue was side-stepped. Similarly, a proposed 10% cut for all grades in 
June 1926 got nowhere and the situation remained unchanged. 
This issue suggests that there was considerable antagonism between Barrow's salaried 
clerical workers and their superiors, in contrast to the sympathy for the unemployed 
apparent in the oral evidence. Indeed, unemployment had a significant levelling effect 
and all skills and occupations were treated alike. 'Foremen, chargehands, craftsmen, 
labourers, were all rubbing shoulders one with another, waiting to be interviewed by the 
Guardians before the pittance was doled out' 112 However, the high levels of middle 
class unemployment, the problems faced by shopkeepers and the number of 
bankruptcies indicate that economic hardship was not confined to the working classes, 
but was a common experience which contributed to the development of a cross-class 
communal identity and a sense of unity, emphasised further by the municipal failure to 
make economies on pay and thus widening the gulf between the upper middle classes 
and the overwhelming majority of the population. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion it can be argued that despite considerable improvements to working class 
living standards and levels of sobriety, the First World War failed to undermine the 
stereotyped images of poverty and its causes. As McKibbin suggests, working class 
affluence tended instead, to fuel middle class antagonisms. The most significant impact 
of the war was the official confirmation that the conditions to which the working classes 
were subjected were unacceptable, and although it is not possible to ascertain the impact 
of these observations, it is likely to have been considerable. Certainly, the working 
classes appeared less deferential in the post-war period. 
In contrast, the impact of the depression was significant. The scale of unemployment, 
although limiting any trend towards greater working class homogenisation through 
workplace changes, had a profound levelling effect, and social relationships underwent 
a considerable transformation. Although traditional sources of working class support 
such as benefits from trade unions, the Co-op and other clubs and societies were rapidly 
exhausted as the crisis deepened, it can be argued that the depression stimulated 
neighbourhood networks despite the increase in inter-personal frictions in some quarters 
revealed by oral evidence. Indeed, oral testimony used in conjunction with other sources 
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indicates the extension of a great many means of support. Charity is a prime example, 
but in addition to being rationalised, better organised and co-ordinated, it is the 
fundamental change in underlying attitudes that was significant. As Vincent suggests, 
•the victims of the depression were encouraged to see themselves as part of a benevolent 
community, and all agencies encouraged the rejection of the stigma attached to the 
receipt of relief. For example, in addition to the efforts of the TJWM, the Corporation 
and the Board of Guardians defiantly informed the government that 'our people will not 
accept the stigma of pauperism' 113,  whilst going to considerable lengths to overcome the 
ingrained resistance to aid and to ensure that relief reached the destitute. 
The scale of unemployment ensured that the unemployed were highly visible, but there 
is scant evidence of hostility or the suspicion and prejudices towards the unemployed 
described by Roberts. Furthermore, the severe class conflict between the working and 
middle classes described by McKibbin failed to materialise in Barrow during the 1920s. 
In addition to conforming more closely to Kirk's analysis, whereby working class unity 
increased as a result of shared hardships and insecurity, generosity, family and 
neighbourhood loyalties, the Barrow experience goes beyond this. The economic 
problems faced by the middle classes (and the lower middle classes in particular), 
together with the already blurred social distinctions arising from the close residential 
proximity of all grades of labour and also the middle classes, the high incidence of 
working class owner occupation and lack of suburbanisation, enabled the lower middle 
classes to identify more readily with the working classes. The greater unity between 
these hitherto disparate social groups is demonstrated by the responses to charity and 
the broadening base of the UWM, whilst the antagonism between the lower and upper 
middle classes provides the only evidence of a form of class conflict in Barrow during 
the period of this study. 
It is impossible to pin-point precisely when established attitudes began to change, but 
the disappearance of the old stereotyped images and the concept of the deserving and 
undeserving poor from public discourse during the 1920s is significant. There is also 
little evidence of isolation and passivity among the long-term unemployed, and in 
addition to the UWM being highly active, their strategies were both innovative and 
successful. The unemployed of Barrow, as in Macintyre's 'Little Moscows', 'never 
surrendered to their condition" 4, and consequently morale remained high, whilst the 
willingness to challenge authority in defence of basic rights and the determination to 
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unite and fight the effects of the depression was evident among most sections of the 
population. The similarity between Barrow and other radical communities is further 
suggested by the collective decision making at public meetings, together with the close 
ties of work and residence which were important contributory factors in the 
development of the town's 'extraordinary mentality'. Thus, with the exception of the 
upper middle classes, who became increasingly distanced from the bulk of the 
population, it can be argued that the shared hardships and economic uncertainties 
generated communal solidarity rather than selfishness and materialism, and social 
cohesion rather than conflict. However, the issue of whether Barrow can assume the 
status of 'Little Moscow' will now be examined in greater depth, as the concluding 
chapter pulls together and assesses the significance of the various aspects of change in 
Barrow between 1914 and 1926. 
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CONCLUSION 
In order to draw together and assess the significance of the various strands of change 
and continuity in Barrow between 1914 and 1926, this concluding chapter will begin 
with a review of the changing demographic and occupational structure, housing 
conditions and popular health, factors which provided the conditions of everyday life 
and the context in which ideology, policy and social attitudes developed. This will be 
followed by an examination of these evolving concepts, together with their significance 
for political alignments, the composition of local authority bodies and their responses to 
the demands of the depression. Finally, the implications of these developments together 
with the responses of other important local organisations will be discussed in relation to 
three key questions emerging from this study: the impact of war and depression on 
social attitudes, the nature of the communal identity that developed during these years, 
and whether Barrow can, in fact, be included among the ranks of the 'Little Moscows' 
of the inter-war period. 
Beginning with an examination of the occupational structure of the Borough, this 
changed little throughout the period and was characterised by an enduring dependency 
on the unstable shipbuilding, engineering and steel industries, and a dearth of waged 
employment for married women. The social structure, with its large working class and 
small middle class inevitably reflected this dependency, with a small elite of high 
salaried managers and professionals forming a distinct upper middle class. 
Whilst there is little evidence relating to middle class incomes prior to the First World 
War, those of their working class counterparts had traditionally reflected the booms and 
slumps of the trade cycle, with considerable distinctions between the wages of the 
skilled and unskilled. However, whilst the wages of the latter could be below 
Rowntree's definition of the povetty line', and overtime working was often necessary to 
provide a basic standard of living, in contrast there was a relatively wealthy group of 
working class landlords. However, due to periodic downturns of the town's unstable 
economy, it is extremely unlikely that 'the poor' or the low paid, could have managed to 
save a deposit or secure a loan as described by Elizabeth Roberts 2. It is more probable 
that such landlords were drawn from among the better paid skilled workers, using craft 
wages as a means of further material advancement. As a result of the income 
differentials created by the receipt of rents, these landlords displaced the skilled worker 
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at the top of the working-class socio-economic hierarchy, creating a distinctive variation 
of the 'labour aristocracy' theme. 
The impact of war and depression was out of all proportion to anything previously 
experienced by the town's fluctuating economy. In addition to full employment, the war 
brought unprecedented work opportunities for women and also increased the earnings of 
many male workers, which together with the benefit of a wife's wage, brought a new 
affluence to many working class families. Whilst there is little information on middle 
class incomes generally, or the effects of wartime inflation which reduced them in real 
terms, the records of Vickers and Barrow Corporation enable an assessment of the 
extent to which middle and working class income differentials were eroded. Whilst the 
manual, clerical and administrative workers of both Vickers and the Corporation all 
received substantial war bonuses, the higher bonus rates paid to white collar workers in 
both organisations suggests that income differentials between the lower middle and 
working classes may not have been eroded to the extent generally accepted 3 . Similarly, 
the narrowing middle class income differentials described by McKibbin 4 do not appear 
to be reflected in Barrow, the massive bonuses paid to both the senior managers of 
Vickers and the Corporation's Chief Officers extending rather than reducing the gulf 
between them and the mainstream middle class. 
In the post-war period the position of Barrow's middle classes was again out of step 
with wider national trends. A distinctive feature of Barrow during these years was the 
rapidity of the transition from that brief period of affluence to mass unemployment, and 
whilst the speed was possibly without parallel, the unemployment rate at 73% by 1922 
was comparable to the very worst experiences of the early 1930s. However, although 
mass unemployment is generally associated with the working classes, in the local 
context this case study is able to challenge McKibbin's assertion that unemployment 
amongst the middle classes was comparatively low 5 and, as the evidence from Vickers 
and Barrow's Co-operative Society demonstrates, design, clerical and retail staff were 
more seriously affected than has previously been assumed. Furthermore, the reduction 
of the earning capacity of such a large percentage of the population inevitably had a 
profound effect on consumption patterns and therefore, in such a self-contained and 
isolated community, had a particularly adverse affect on the livelihood of other sections 
of the population. Thus there can be little doubt that smaller businesses were forced to 
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shed their employees at a similar rate, although it has not been possible to ascertain the 
numbers. 
With regard to income levels, whilst some historians assert that both middle and 
working class incomes in many areas improved in real terms during the 1920s 6 , Cronin 
describes pockets of severe unemployment in which the decade represented a period of 
pronounced and prolonged hardship 7 . Although the argument refers specifically to the 
working classes, in Barrow where unemployment was particularly severe, the reduced 
spending capacity of the working.classes ensured that Barrow's middle classes, and 
particularly small businessmen and trades people, also failed to experience any 
improvements in real incomes during the decade. 
A further distinctive aspect of the town at this time was the failure to attract new 
industries or investment as a result of the depressed economy, the town's location and 
lack of natural resources: Consequently local industry was unable to diversify, and 
whilst it has been argued that middle and working class gradations generally became 
less distinct as changing employment patterns restructured the workforce, this was not 
reflected in Barrow's occupational structure. For example, the shortage of capital 
restricted technological development, preventing the emergence of new skills 8 , with no 
appreciable increase in the numbers of semi-skilled workers as might have been 
precipitated by manufacturing and technological change 9 . Thus Barrow's male working 
class did not become more homogeneous as a result of reduced skill differentials. 
Additionally, with the exception of the war years, women's employment patterns were 
unaltered in the twenty years to 1931, and domestic service remained the main 
employer. Consequently, the proportion of women in the local workforce remained 
unchanged, representing 18% of the total workforce, in contrast to the national figure of 
nearly 30%. 
Middle class employment patterns are particularly difficult to quantify due to the 
changing definition and classification of occupations in the census returns 10 . Thus it is 
not possible to ascertain the extent to which the growth of Barrow's clerical and service 
sectors or the expansion and composition of the management class 11 reflected wider 
trends. Changes within teaching, clerical and retail occupations are also obscured by the 
lack of consistent data, but there is little doubt that the apparent expansion of the 
comnercial and financial sector was due toclassification changes rather than economic 
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growth. Barrow does however, reflect the wider trend of the erosion of small businesses 
described by McKibbin, but this was the product of bankruptcy rather than economic 
development 
Whilst Barrow's occupational and social structure changed little during these years, the 
demographic impact of war and depression was profound. An ebb and flow of the 
population had been an established feature of the town as a result of the unstable 
economy, but the scale of the influx of wartime munitions workers was unprecedented 
and placed the infrastructure of the town under severe pressure. However, the estimated 
figures vary considerably and suggest that the authorities had little conception of actual 
numbers, although the Chief Medical Officer's figures, possibly the most reliable, 
suggest a wartime increase of 46% 
However, the dramatic decline of the populatioii in the post-war period is not solely 
attributable to the exodus of the thousands of munitions workers, and the exceptionally 
high rate of out-migration was a significant and distinctive aspect of Barrow's 
demographic development. However, whilst Griffiths asserts that Wigan experienced 
the highest rate of population loss amongst Lancastrian County Boroughs during the 
1920s 12, census tables reveal that in fact this distinction belongs to Barrow. Indeed, 
Bainbridge contends that Barrow's 10.8% decrease was exceeded only by Merthyr 
Tydfil and the Rhondda during the 1920s 13 , an inverted accolade which gives Barrow 
the highest population loss in England during the period. Additionally, a closer analysis 
of the statistics reveals the greatest loss was among young adults and their families, a 
loss which caused the birth rate, considerably higher than the national average during 
the pre-war period, to plummet. Equally significant however, was its failure to return to 
pre-war levels, remaining persistently below the national average. As with mass 
unemployment, out-migration is another phenomenon that tends to be more widely 
associated with manual workers, but there is no reason to assume that the middle classes 
were excluded from the 1920s exodus. Although the lack of detailed statistical evidence 
makes this impossible to quantify, the scale of population loss, together with the 
permanent reversal of the traditionally high birth rate, clearly illustrates the cataclysmic 
impact of the depression. 
With regard to housing, although the majority of the town's housing stock was no more 
than fifty years old at the outbreak of the First World War, working class housing 
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conditions were characteristically poor, and high rents, sub-letting and overcrowding 
were endemic. However as a result of the town's modernity and its favourable 
comparison to the stereotyped image of what constituted a slum 14, the prevailing 
conditions were regarded as acceptable by the authorities, and together with the 
intention of minimising municipal expenditure to keep the rates low, provided no 
impetus for reform. 
Inevitably, the wartime influx of munitions workers had a profound effect on levels of 
overcrowding, but whilst the Rent Restrictions Act pegged rents at 1914 levels, it 
offered no protection for the thousands of lodgers in the town. Consequently sub-letting 
became extremely profitable and stimulated the eviction of sitting tenants and the sub-
letting of rooms at famine rents. The Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest 
Supplemental Report for Barrow-in-Furness, 1917, demonstrates the nature of the 
housing problem and the tensions created by the fusion of industrial and social issues. 
Thus whilst Abrams describes housing as traditionally providing a reliable indicator of 
levels of deprivation 15 , in Barrow at this time, the housing issue had come to represent 
levels of social tension, and this, together with the high degree of popular participation, 
should have provided an impetus for reform. 
Indeed, the merging of housing and industrial issues and the very real threat of unrest 
emphasised the need for urgent measures to maintain stability. Thus the introduction of 
a Ministry of Munitions building programme represents, as Pepper and Swenarton 
suggest, a political response to the crisis, but was clearly seen as a practical necessity 
rather than a welfare measure 16 . However, despite the urgency of the situation, the 
Ministry successfully reduced the number of houses to be constructed on the grounds of 
the temporary nature of the demand, the anticipated post-war population fall and the 
unjustifiable expense. Thus whilst Marwick asserts that change stimulated by 
participation could be temporary", in Ban -ow, the impetus for reformwas particularly 
short-lived, and following the demise of the Ministry of Munitions, the building 
programme was abandoned, with 50% of the houses unbuilt. The ability of the Ministry 
to minimise the crisis in this way, together with the absence of popular protest, 
undermines arguments that housing reform was provided as a counter to revolution. 
In the post-war years, Abrams contends that although the wartime crisis generated both 
a powerful impetus for reform and created the machinery with which to implement it, 
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powerful forces worked against reform' 8 . In Barrow, the number of houses built under 
the Addison Act of 1919, failed to equal the pre-war building rate, whilst the impact of 
the 1923 and 1924 Housing Acts was negligible, with the construction of just twelve 
houses in the Borough between 1923 and 1926. However, arguments which describe the 
1919 and 1923 Housing Acts as short term measures to allow the private sector to 
or attribute their failure, for example, to a rejection of financial innovation 20 
or a clash of interests between local and central government 2 ' have no bearing on the 
situation in Barrow where the financial effects of the depression overrode all other 
considerations and prohibited any possibility of housing reform. 
Consequently living standards failed to improve, and the poor conditions and high 
levels of overcrowding continued as the depression deepened. Despite continued rent 
controls, there was again no protection for lodgers or caravan dwellers, and 
repossessions and evictions continued. This presented a particularly acute problem in 
Barrow, and although magistrates adopted a humanitarian policy, compelling the new 
owners to accommodate the outgoing tenant, thus reducing the levels of homelessness 
and the number of families living in makeshift structures, the problems of overcrowding 
inevitably increased. 
The situation in Vickerstown was somewhat different from the rest of Barrow. The 
readiness of many tenants to buy their homes in the immediate post-war period reflects 
both the working class affluence of the war years and the popularity of home ownership. 
Nevertheless, with the depression, the rapidly mounting rent and mortgage arrears 
resulted in rising numbers of houses repurchased by the Walney Island Estates 
Company. In order to avoid a repetition of events on Clydeside, Vickers had adopted 
discreet, self-protective strategies throughout the period to avoid rent strikes and 
industrial action. Consequently, employees resident in company houses were given 
special consideration throughout the depression in the form of favourable terms and 
priority of employment, not out of humanitarian concerns, but in the interests of stable 
industrial relations and the solvency of its Estates Company. It appears therefore, that 
with regard to company housing, the threat of industrial unrest necessitated the adoption 
of a cautious policy by the employer, until the weakening of the trade unions after the 
Engineering Dispute of 1922 removed the threat of industrial unrest and enabled 
Vickers to take an increasingly hard line against its tenants. This was in marked contrast 
to the humanitarian approach adopted by the magistracy, and also the levels of 
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toleration displayed by the Corporation, particularly with regards mounting rent and rate 
arrears and the expanding colonies of makeshift housing. 
The Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest of 1917, by holding the 
Corporation responsible for the appalling conditions and identifying housing as an 
important contributory factor to levels of unrest, should have represented an important 
milestone. However, whilst there is some evidence of a change of attitudes, with some 
councillors readily accepting local authority responsibility for the provision of working 
class housing, the near bankruptcy of the borough's finances prevented this from 
becoming a contentious issue. Indeed, the striking feature of living conditions 
throughout the period was their continuity, and bad conditions and high rents remained 
a perennial problem. What did change however, were the underlying causes of these 
conditions, which moved from the disregard of the governing elite, through the 
pressures of war, and finally, depression and the high rate burden. Significantly 
however, despite the town's tradition of industrial militancy, housing conditions had 
never given cause for concern in the pre-war period and there is no evidence to suggest 
that housing, despite the deteriorating conditions, was considered to be a contributory 
factor to inter-war unrest. It could be argued that the perceived need of a wartime 
building programme lends itself to the interpretation of the use of a progressive housing 
policy as a counterbalance to revolution 22 . On the other hand, the ease with which the 
wartime housing crisis was minimised and the building programme abandoned, together 
with the passive response of the town's inhabitants both before and after the war, 
suggests that with the exception of company provided housing, the link between 
housing conditions and social unrest was a tenuous one, long before the depression 
disarmed the organised labour movement. 
Thus, with the exception of the war years, the lives of many Barrovians were 
characterised by financial hardship and deteriorating living conditions, outstanding for 
their.continuity and with oonsiderable implications for the health of the population. 
However, the Borough's health trends are distinctive and demonstrate that poor housing 
and the extraordinarily high levels of unemployment did not result in a deterioration of 
health. This provides the first indication of significant changes in Barrow during the 
inter-war years. 
227 
In order to illustrate the full significanceof the impact of war and depression on health, 
it is essential to re-appraise established opinion of the high nutritional standards and 
prevailing good health of the town during the pre-war period. Elizabeth Roberts 
maintains that the high culinary standards of Barrovian women were a major 
contributory factor to the town's 'healthier than average population' 23 , and that the 
statistics of the School Medical Officer of Health do not suggest a significant problem 
of malnutrition 24 . However, his reports draw attention to the poor nutritional standards 
evident in a majority of the school children examined, and he had little confidence in 
either the culinary skills of working class mothers or their understanding of nutrition. 
This was inevitably reflected in the condition of the children, the height and weight of 
the majority of those examined being under the national average. The statistics of the 
town's Chief Medical Officer also reveal nutritional deficiencies amongst the wider 
population. For example, infant and maternal mortality levels, generally accepted as 
reliable indicators of underlying levels of ill-health 25 , were slightly above the national 
average, whilst the death rates from contagious disease, also closely linked to nutrition, 
provide more conclusive evidence. Although the national death rate from contagious 
disease declined over the period and the average is difficult to calculate, Barrow's 
mortality rate was appreciably higher than the national figure of .99 per thousand in 
1910 quoted by Middlesbrough's Chief Medical Office? 6 . 
The health of the borough improved dramatically during the war years, which clearly 
demonstrates the close correlation between income levels and health. Local health 
trends support Winter's contention that working class health improved as a result of 
higher incomes and better diets 27 , although the effects of purer food and a reduction in 
the house fly population should not be discounted28 . Winter also asserts that as a result 
of wartime overcrowding and deteriorating housing conditions, TB and other respiratory 
diseases moved against this trend 29 , although Bryder points out that other bodies of 
opinion maintain that nutrition remained an important factor 30. However, despite the 
often appalling living conditions, TB mortality rates in Barrow remained persistently 
below the national level, and in the period between 1912 and 1926, exceeded it only 
once. Barrow's death rates from other respiratory diseases were equally favourable and 
demonstrate that, despite the prevailing conditions in the town, housing conditions were 
not a major detriment to health. 
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Of major significance however, was the sustaining of Barrow's wartime health gains 
during the depression, and mortality levels for both contagious and respiratory diseases 
continued to fall despite the drastic reductions in incomes, poorer diets and deteriorating 
living conditions. This apparent anomaly emphasises the importance of the analysis of 
health trends across the entire period, and inevitably calls into question the validity of 
loal health statistics. This is a particularly pertinent point, given that the population 
statistics published by the Corporation in the wake of the Commission of Enquiry into 
Industrial Unrest, 1917, are not an accurate reflection of the numbers resident in the 
town in the final years of the war. Additionally, Webster and Bryder describe the 
relationship between health, nutrition and unemployment as increasingly played down 
throughout the inter-war period 31 , and it is possible therefore, that local statistics reflect 
an attempt by the local authority to conceal deteriorating health standards, initially in 
the wake of the Commission of Enquiry of 1917, and later in an effort to down-play the 
effects of long-term unemployment. Consequently, comparative analysis provides an 
important means of validation, and Middlesbrough, with its steadily rising (if less 
severe) unemployment levels, similar relief scales and deteriorating living conditions 
provides a particularly useful comparator. Additionally, the studies of Elizabeth Roberts 
and Katherine Nicholas 32 , which reveal the similarity of working class diets in the two 
towns, provide a valuable adjunct to this analysis. 
As regards Middlesbrough, Nicholas arguesthat during the 1920s, the unemployed 
could afford less food and families therefore ate less, and her analysis of the calorific 
value of these diets is invaluable. She demonstrates that nutrition levels among certain 
sections of the population were insufficient to sustain good health, and it is reasonable 
to assume that this analysis is equally applicable to Barrow, given the close similarity of 
diets and income levels amongst the unemployed. This casts further doubt on the 
validity of Barrow's published health statistics, particularly as Barrow's official death 
rate from contagious diseases, with their close relationship to nutrition levels, was 
significantly lower than in Middlesbrough, despite the comparable living standards of 
their populations. A large discrepancy is also evident in the death rates from respiratory 
diseases, particularly TB and pneumonia, and as might be expected, Middlesbrough's 
Medical Officer attributed these high death rates to unemployment, poverty, 
overcrowding and inadequate facilities. His Barrow counterpart however, attributed the 
relatively low incidence of respiratory disease, despite similarly poor housing, to local 
health initiatives, and indeed, Barrow's facilities for the treatment of TB certainly 
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surpassed those of Middlesbrough. However, throughout the period, Barrow's vital 
statistics frequently go against national trends and illustrate levels of good health that 
are remarkable given the prevailing economic conditions. It is therefore necessary to 
look beyond incomes and living conditions and examine the impact of war and 
unemployment on other aspects of life if a satisfactory explanation for these changes, 
other than the manipulation of the statistics, is to be found. 
As part of this wider analysis, an examination of political change provides insights into 
the ideological undercurrents of the period. Although identified as a strong Labour 
borough and a model Labour Party constituency by the outbreak of the First World 
War33 , poor material conditions together with working class enfranchisement failed to 
bring the anticipated post-war gains for Barrow's Labour Party. Indeed, the wartime 
growth of Socialist ideology coupled with the extension of the shop stewards' influence 
within the Party itself, proved particularly divisive and culminated in the loss of the 
Parliamentary seat in the 1918 General Election. Whilst these divisions turned the 
attentions of the Labour Party inward and set the pattern for left-wing politics for the 
rest of the period, it was municipal politics that provided the main arena for the political 
struggles of these years. 
With regard to general municipal trends, the Labour Party's failure to gain control of the 
Corporation in 1919 was out of step with the wider Labour successes of that year. 
Although this was achieved the following year, Barrow's Labour Party nevertheless 
shared the general decline of the party's municipal fortunes between 1920 and 1926. 
However, whilst Davis and Morley describe unemployment as a major factor in the 
steady gains of Labour from 1926, this was not the case in Barrow, where the reversal 
of the Labour Party's fortunes coincided with record levels of unemployment. Instead, 
the major influence on local politics in these years was the growth of the radical left and 
the rallying of forces to oppose them. 
The composition of the 1920 council reflects the rapid growth of Barrow's Communist 
Party, and whilst it is difficult to identify the political persuasion of many councillors, 
the indicators are that at least five were Communist. Indeed, as in some other close-knit 
communities, steady Communist gains were not at the expense of the Labour Party 35 , 
and the two remained closely affiliated, although the Communist attack on the ILP in 
1921 illustrates the severity of the ideological divisions within the Left. 
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However, a distinctive and significant innovation by this first Labour council was the 
introduction of direct, face-to-face democracy in an effort to cultivate the trust and 
confidence of the populace. Equally significant for its continuity throughout the period, 
this innovation was to be of inestimable value in many aspect of local life, and was 
particularly important given the increasingly volatile nature of municipal politics. 
Ironically however, it also provided a yardstick by which to judge the Communist 
actions of 1921, which, together with the ensuing litigation, created an impression of 
underhand and illegal left-wing manoeuvrings, which were brought into sharp relief by 
the new openness of local government. 
Simultaneously, the growing strength of the radical Left had stimulated the formation of 
an early anti-socialist alliance not identified in Davies and Morley's study, but although 
Labour lost control of the Council in 1921, the Citizen's League made little headway. 
To this point, the divisive influence of Socialist ideology remained confined to the 
labour movement and had few implications for municipal politics. Indeed, neither the 
growth of the Communist Party norits dramatic schism from the ILP was the source of 
local political tensions. It was not until Communist control of the Board of Guardians 
and the economic consequences of the adoption of the National Relief Scale became a 
distinct possibility that the electorate was politicised. The conflict between ideology and 
economic reality polarised local politics, and the Citizen's League, distinctive for its 
ability to recruit from the Labour Party, became a true cross-party alliance intent on 
blocking the political advance of the far Left and denying them access to the public 
purse. Consequently, local elections became genuine battles for control. 
Davies and Morley describe the polarisation of local politics as expressed in the 
language of class and manifest in the anti-socialist alliances of the period 36 . They also 
describe these alliances as comprised of relatively small groups needing the fiction of 
non-party politics in the interests of the ratepayer to rally wider support 37 . Whilst 
Macintyre agrees left-wing gains could stimulate middle class elites, identifying 
themselves as moderates, to organise on the same lines as the radicals, he maintains that 
a tendency towards polarisation did not necessarily reflect class antagonisms. He argues 
that in some localities, the moderates' definition of community in terms of a shared 
financial interest, such as that of ratepayer for example, encompassed all, regardless of 
occupation or social position 38 . Thus the political polarisation in Barrow at this time is 
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significant, and the question of the identity of Barrow's competing groups is an 
important one. However, whether these identities were indicative of class antagonism, 
or were a defensive response of a mutually dependent community threatened by 
collapse, cannot be established by politics alone, and requires examination in the wider 
coiitext of local authority policies and the strategies adopted across the wider 
community. 
For much of the period, left-wing politics continued to be characterised by attacks on 
Labour Party defectors and appeared to take precedence over the formulation of social 
policy. Additionally, despite the expulsion of the Communists from the national Labour 
Party in 1924, the continued close links between Barrow's Communist and Labour 
Parties, togetherwith Labour's public obsession with its own internal discipline, 
continued to undermine public confidence and prevented Labour from regaining 
municipal ascendancy until 1926. However, as Farman contends, Communism had 
other significant implications for labour politics, and whilst local politics had stabilised 
by 1926, the gulf between the political and industrial wings of the local labour 
movement had widened 39 . Thus apart from re-kindling the antagonisms between local 
factions and emphasising these divisions, the political impact of the General Strike was 
limited in Barrow, and whilst the far-left feeling of betrayal reflected the wider 
animosity of the militants towards the TUC 40 , local unions remained more concerned 
for their own internal organisation and discipline than long term political objectives 41 . 
Comparative analysis with other localities emphasises the distinctive nature of Barrow's 
politics in the post-war transition period, and illustrates the problems of attempts to 
generalise, even between fundamentally similar localities. In Middlesbrough for 
example, despite its similar industrial base and growing levels of working class 
tepresentation on local authority bodies, there was little evidence of militancy, and 
Labour made no advances until 1927, despite steadily rising unemployment. Similarly 
in Nelson, despite being described by Hill as reflecting the inevitable rise of Labour and 
a centre of 'Red' politics due to the fusion of industrial and political conflicts in the late 
1920s42, the Labour Party were denied control of the council, again until 1927. 
Additionally, whilst the town experienced a similar rift between the Communist Party 
and the ILP, Communist influence remained limited in Nelson 43 , and socialism proved a 
less destructive force with the result that the town's politics was characterised by a 
degree of stability altogether lacking in Barrow. 
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The substantial gains of the far Left in Barrow more closely reflect the political situation 
in the three 'Little Moscows' of Macintyre's study, although the absence of a typical 
'Little Moscow' and considerable variation in levels of representation make direct 
comparison difficult". For example, whilst the Communists in the Vale of Leven held 
two wards, success in Lumphinnians and Mardy tended to be greater in the miners' 
Lodge than in local politics. Additionally in these two localities, Communist municipal 
gains have been attributed to the personality of individuals and the absence of a Labour 
candidate of equal stature 45 , a position somewhat at odds with the Barrow situation and 
the apparently seamless relationship between the two parties. However, whilst Barrow's 
Communists were excluded from the Board of Guardians and were denied control of the 
Corporation, they were nevertheless strongly represented on the latter, and of the three 
localities examined by Macintyre, only in Lumphinnians were the Communist and 
Labour Parties in the majority, controlling the Board of Guardians between 1922 and 
1926. It can be argued that although Communism proved to be a divisive force in 
Barrow, the radical Left were as strong and influential as in these localities, and the 
combined strength of the other contenders was necessary to contain its growth. A 
further important characteristic Barrow shared with the 'Little Moscows' of the period 
was the introduction of public, face-to-face democracy, and as in Macintyre's examples, 
elected representatives were seen as directly responsible to their electorate 46 . The new 
openness of local government was to have significant implications for many other 
aspects of community life throughout the period. 
The local authority's response to mass unemployment demonstrates the importance of 
this innovation, and helps establish the nature of the communal identity that emerged in 
Barrow during these years. As a result of the accumulative effects of long-term 
unemployment, the Corporation faced severe financial difficulties, income from 
domestic and industrial rates being drastically reduced as rateable values plummeted 
and the numbers with rent and rate arrears mounted. The situation was compounded by 
the Corporation's attempt to provide the customary relief work schemes, which 
inevitably proved ineffective and substantially increased the borough's long-term debts, 
and ultimately they were abandoned. 
Although budgetary cuts were introduced in an attempt to reduce the deficit, the 
Corporation did much to relieve the condition of the unemployed. Despite there being a 
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moderate majority on the Corporation, the strategies adopted represent a radical 
departure from the nineteenth century attitudes prevalent in the pre-war period, and 
were comparable to those in 'progressive' Nelson. The provision of free school meals 
for necessitous schoolchildren and permits to enable the unemployed to cross Walney 
Bridge were particularly significant, and although they placed the local authority budget 
Under considerable strain, they made a crucial contribution to the health and the stability 
of the town. Equally significant however, was the discussion and planning of public 
policy at open meetings, particularly discussions about the recovery of arrears, and the 
efforts to co-ordinate and maximise the benefits of free school meals and local charity. 
The unparalleled success of these measures owes much to the newly instigated public 
democracy, through which the new ethos surrounding relief was clearly evident. The 
emphasis given to the immorality of concealing poverty played a crucial role in both the 
identification of need and the increasing willingness of the destitute to accept aid,and in 
keeping with the Little Moscows of the period, reflects a radical change in attitudes 
towards relief. 
However, it was on the Boards of Guardians that the most crucial battles of the period 
were to be fought47 . A moderate Board in a volatile political climate, the Barrow Board 
faced a severe economic crisis and was caught between the pressures of a strong and 
well-organised labour movement and the government. As in many depressed areas, the 
Board had reduced scales twice by 1922, but the combination of Ministry of Health 
pressure, high unemployment and its crippling financial burden brought the situation to 
a head. However, whilst the crisis and issues were typical, the response was not. 
The Ministry refusal of further assistance represents an opportunist attack, carefully 
timed to take advantage of the Moderate Board and the severe financial crisis and force 
a reduction in relief scales. However, whilst the Ministry believed the Board, on the 
brink of bankruptcy, had no option but to comply, the Board instead resigned en masse. 
The full significance of the response of the Barrow Guardians is demonstrated by a 
comparison with other Boards. At one extreme, Middlesbrough provides an example of 
a Union which offered no resistance to Ministry demands, and its capitulation was 
complete by 192248.  As a consequence, Turner describes relief scales as reflecting 
Ministry dictates rather than a response to local levels of need, the effects of which, it 
can be argued, contributed to the poor health of that town. However, despite the Barrow 
Board's resistance, its members were in no way characterised by radicalism, and would 
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never have opted for prison like the militant Poplar Board 49 . Instead, by seeing 
resignation as their only option, this moderate Board unwittingly stumbled across an 
effective weapon, and their position of rebellion by default rapidly developed into a 
shrewd policy of open defiance, which fully exploited Ministry weakness. Thus this 
moderate Board was perceived as being particularly dangerous by the Ministry of 
Health, whilst its stringent administration and modest relief scales prevented a Ministry 
counter-attack. Thus in addition to illustrating the need to assess the work of Boards of 
Guardians on more than relief scales alone, this study of the Barrow Union has 
demonstrated that defiance was not confined to left-wing Boards. 
An important aspect of this struggle was the response of a vast array of disparate local 
organisations. This was a particularly significant aspect of Barrow's inter-war 
experience in that, although the prime concern of these organisations was to protect 
their own interests, this did not generate frictions between them. Instead, their attentions 
were focused on the Board of Guardians, who succeeded in co-ordinating this pressure, 
and directing it towards the government. This returns to the debate on the question of 
the identity of these competing groups, particularly given the intense political divisions 
of the period. Although it is possible to interpret Barrow's political polarisation as the 
product of class conflict between the unemployed and the ratepayers 50 , this view is too 
simplistic, particularly given that the majority of Barrow's working classes had become 
ratepayers, and a large proportion of them were unemployed. A more feasible 
interpretation, given Barrow's geographic isolation and dependency on a single 
industry, is that high unemployment served instead to emphasise the inter-dependency 
of the community. 
Thus rather than class conflict, the overwhelming impression is one of solidarity, local 
tensions being co-ordinated and directed towards a common threat, in this case, the 
government. Furthermore, this solidarity was to gradually broaden and gain momentum 
throughout the period, and there is little doubt that this united effort, which ultimately 
combined the Unemployed Workers Movement, the Ratepayers' Association, local 
banks, the Chamber of Trade and the Directors of Vickers among many others, played 
an important part in forcing the Ministry to moderate its demands, particularly regarding 
the loans repayment issue. Furthermore, the praise of the TradeS Council for the efforts 
of the Board of Guardians in those critical years provides irrefutable evidence that class 
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conflict was minimal, and points instead towards the existence of a common communal 
identity and shared struggle. 
Local authority policies and poor relief have considerable bearing on the question of 
whether Barrow can be classified as a Little Moscow, and Barrow demonstrates several 
key characteristics of such localities. As demonstrated, a significant feature of local 
government in these years was the introduction of direct, fact-to-face democracy 51 . 
Indeed, the importance of public debate and decision making cannot be overestimated 
during this period when political upheaval coincided with unemployment running at 
73%, the near bankruptcy of the Guardins and the distinct possibility of the suspension 
of out-relief payments. Crucially, the effect of this public democracy was to underscore 
the legitimacy, and therefore the authority, of both the Barrow Board and the 
Corporation, and was a major factor in maintaining social stability at a time of 
considerable tension and uncertainty. It can be argued that it also had a significant 
influence on voting patterns. Election results indicate that through the Board's public 
defiance of the government and its ability to balance the needs of the ratepayer and the 
destitute, the threatened community perceived the moderates rather than the radicals as 
offering the best form of defence. Thus local conditions proved more influential than 
political persuasion in Barrow, and in addition to the strong conviction that the 
unemployed were entitled to a sufficient level of maintenance, there was no distinction 
made between the deserving and undeserving unemployed 52 . However, whilst 
Macintyre describes most localities as having little chance of influencing central 
authority53 , Barrow is among the minority that achieved some success in this. 
The impact and responses to the depression across the wider community were equally 
profound but were not without tensions. Industrial relations were particularly volatile 
and described as being brought to an all time low in the war years, as Vickers exploited 
the Munitions Act to the fu11 54 . Whilst the war strengthened the local shop stewards 
movement, interpretations of the extent of their powers vary considerably 55 . 
Nevertheless, as in many industrial centres, although the movement collapsed after the 
war, the shop stewards' influence was transferred from the workplace to politics and the 
wider community56, and in Barrow had a significant influence on the policies and 
composition of the Labour Party. They were also a major force in the founding of 
Barrow's Communist Party and Unemployed Workers Movement, and therefore were 
of considerable importance during the inter-war period. 
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Whilst it has been argued that the intense class conflict between 1918 and 1921 
confirmed pre-war fears about the power of the organised labour movement 57 , the new 
revolutionary connotations of post-war disputes and state control of key industries 
ensured a turbulent transition period 58 . However, whilst the 1921 and 1926 miners' 
disputes were of major importance nationally, the 1922 Engineering Strike was the most 
serious industrial dispute in Ban -ow during the 1920s. When the shipbuilding and 
engineering unions' stand in opposition to the employers' aggressive reassertion of their 
prerogatives is placed in its context of political turmoil, extraordinarily high 
unemployment, the devastating effect on the local economy and the imminent 
bankruptcy of the Board of Guardians, the primacy of this dispute becomes evident 59 . 
Whilst in some areas there were frictions between the TJWM and the trade unions 60, this 
dispute provides an example of solidarity between these organisations 61 , together with 
remarkable levels of trade union discipline and loyalty. Nevertheless, there were 
considerable tensions between union members supporting the strike and those wanting 
to return to work, accompanied by a strong undercunent of violence which ran through 
the community and erupted into the worst civil disturbances in the town's history. The 
strike ultimately accelerated the post-war trend of falling trade union membership and 
the depletion of their funds, and was to have long term implications, severely 
weakening the unions, which were able to make only a limited recovery by 1926. 
Thus as Cronin argues, by 1926 a stable pattern had emerged 62. However, whilst the 
1922 Engineering Strike involved the defence of the town's staple industry and the 
livelihood of thousands, the issues of the General Strike had little significance locally. 
Although support for the strike was solid, the large, militant shipbuilding and 
engineering unions were confined to the short-lived second wave, and thus, unlike 1922, 
the effects were significantly curtailed. Additionally, there was no wish to jeopardise the 
town's limited recovery and risk a return to the hardships and uncertainties of 1922, and 
thus the majority hoped to avoid a protracted struggle. Consequently, the overwhelming 
reaction in the town to the decision to call off the strike was one of relief, and the sense 
of betrayal appeared largely confined to the radical left. 
However, the true significance of the General Strike in Barrow lies in the preparations 
of the Corporation, which, as had become the norm, were debated and planned in the 
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public domain. In addition to providing another significant example of the value of 
public democracy in underscoring the legitimacy and authority of the Corporation and 
maintaining the confidence and trust of the people, it also provides further vital insights 
into the social attitudes of the period. Whilst it had been argued that many of those 
recruited to the Organisation for the Maintenance of Supplies were motivated by class 
instinct63 , and the General Strike has been described as the crucial test by which the 
balance of class forces was established 64 , the situation is Barrow was particularly 
distinctive. In addition to the Councillors' declaration of their own neutrality, the 
invitation for trade union representatives to sit on the local OMS committee provides 
firm evidence of social co-operation rather than conflict in the town, tensions and 
divisions being largely confined to the organised labour movement. 
Moving beyond the labour movement and looking at Vickers from a management 
perspective, there is also evidence of considerable change. The attention paid to peace 
products in Barrow appeared minimal, leaving post-war planning woefully inadequate 65 , 
and thus the Barrow yard struggled to compete in the harsh inter-war financial climate. 
In this sense, the Barrow yard does not appear to share the progressive qualities of the 
Vickers group described by Scott, certainly up to 1923. Nevertheless, there is evidence 
of significant changes, particularly the struggle for control among senior management, 
which heralded a new era in shipyard management. The old autocratic management of 
the pre-war period was superseded, with concern for the welfare of the workforce 
gradually becoming more evident, and whilst staff hierarchies and salary structures were 
rationalised, more significantly, the abuse of management privilege had become 
unacceptable and indefensible in the inter-war economic climate. 
Another important local organisation, Barrow's Co-operative Society was an integral 
part of the local community, but struggled to reconcile the interests of worker and 
consumer66 . Although the strategies adopted during the period were innovative and 
diverse, they supported the interests of the consumer and the Society's own economic 
survival at the expense of employees. However, although Griffiths asserts that 
attachment to working class institutions such as the Co-op was inspired more by 
financial return that ideals of mutuality 67 , membership levels of the Barrow Society 
showed remarkable resilience despite the adoption of sometimes unpopular strategies 
and the high rate of migration from the area. Thus it can be concluded that, although 
sometimes unpopular, the strategies adopted to weather the depression engendered a 
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considerable degree of confidence and loyalty among the Society's members and 
employees 
Finally, an examination of changing social attitudes and methods of self-sufficiency 
provide important insights into the impact of war and depression. In pre-war Barrow, 
although there is evidence that for some people the concepts of poverty and 
respectability were not mutually exclusive ferms, social perceptions generally reflected 
those described in the historiography of the period. For many, the working classes were 
characterised by drunkenness, degeneracy and violence, with areas of the town 
designated 'rough' according to the habits or occupational status of their residents. In 
addition to failing to undermine these stereotypical images, middle class antagonisms 
were fuelled by working class affluence and the inequality of sacrifice 68 . 
The continuity of the occupational structure and established residential patterns, 
together with limited change within the workplace would suggest the stimulus for 
change was restricted, and even the 1917 Report of the Commission of Enquiry and its 
damning indictment of the Corporation, although providing a severe blow to civic pride, 
failed to radicalise the electorate. Nevertheless, the old stereotypical images disappeared 
from public discourse during the 1920s and social attitudes underwent a marked 
transformation, and an examination of changing support strategies provides 
considerable insights into these changes. Inevitably, traditional methods of working 
class self-sufficiency proved totally inadequate given the scale of unemployment, and 
support from the relief funds of organisations such as the Co-op and the trade unions 
was rapidly exhausted. Additionally, although neighbourhood networks were active and 
the town's geographic location offered considerable scope for foraging 69 , the natural 
environment would have provided little support for the families of up to 20,000 men, 
and it is reasonable to assume that these two long established means of support could 
offer only limited relief. Additionally, the widespread use of credit created debts for 
consumers and shopkeepers alike, and although providing evidence of mutual support, 
amounted to a short-term expedient with serious long-term financial implications. 
However, whilst the more traditional support strategies had proved inadequate, they 
were supplemented by highly successful innovations, the most significant working class 
response to unemployment being the innovative and highly succesful strategies of the 
UWM. The combination of having nothing to lose and heavily outnumbering the police 
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enabled them to take direct action with impunity, but significantly, not all their tactics 
were oppositional. For example, unlike most branches, they sought permission to tender 
for relief work contracts rather than sabotage them 70, and the highly successful fish 
initiative was an important benefit to the destitute and was seen by many as their finest 
achievement. 
There is little evidence of isolation and passivity amongst Barrow's unemployed, and as 
in 'Little Moscows', it can be argued that a strong sense of morality underpinned direct 
action and the defiance of authority. However, whilst the activities of the UWM were 
not universally approved in the town, it is significant that despite their disapproval of 
the UWM, some were nevertheless prepared to take direct action themselves, 
particularly against evictions. This is an important aspect of changing local attitudes and 
indicates that, as in 'Little Moscows', direct action and the challenge to legitimate 
authority in defence of what were considered to be basic human rights, was considered 
legitimate by moderates and radicals alike 71 . 
However, whilst the defiance of authority was not confined to 'Little Moscows', 
Macintyre argues that these radical communities were distinctive in that this defiance 
infused the lower ranks of that authority 72 . Barrow has significant examples of this. 
Local magistrates for example, in addition to adopting a liberal and humanitarian 
interpretation of the law, particularly regarding evictions, also sent a deputation to 
Whitehall to press for a change in that law. The Corporation too, took a defiant stance 
on key issues, particularly regarding loan repayments, their attempts to increase the rate 
of pay for relief works schemes and the tolerant approach to those with rent and rates 
arrears. And the defiance of the Board of Guardians was exceptional. These activities, 
together with the open and public debate of public policy, bolstered the legitimacy and 
authority of the Corporation and Board of Guardians and points to the existence of a 
particularly high level of consciousness in the town. 
Whilst local strategies reveal much about social attitudes, it is difficult to pinpoint when 
they began to change, but the crisis of 1922 represents an important turning point. 
Whilst the unemployed were highly visible, the potent imagery created sympathy rather 
than hostility, and no evidence has come to light to suggest they were regarded as 
scroungers or that a distinction was made between the deserving and undeserving 
unemployed73 . Indeed, unemployment had a profound levelling effect on both the 
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hierarchies of skill within the working class, and also the differentials between them and 
the hard-pressed lower-middle classes. Thus it can be argued that whilst in some areas 
white collar workers have been described as standing outside and in opposition to the 
labour movement74 , the close residential proximity of these social groups in Barrow, 
together with their common struggles and uncertainties, created a much closer 
relationship. This is further supported by the wide variety of groups and organisations 
involved in both charity and the wider struggles of the period, and illustrates the extent 
to which the conmrnnity was prepared to work together. 
That is not to suggest however, that social and institutional relationships were without 
frictions. Whilst significant levels of antagonism between the middle and working 
classes have been identified at a national level, in the local context the only evidence of 
class conflict appears to have been between the lower and upper middle classes. 
However, there were considerable tensions between various groups and organisations. 
For example, in addition to the divisive political impact of left-wing ideology, the 
various local authority bodies and committees jealously guarded their own spheres of 
influence. There were also considerable frictions within the labour movement, many of 
which were centred on the AFU, which was at odds with other unions, its own rank and 
file and also the local Co-operative Society, the Co-op's inability to support the trade 
unions in 1922 inhibiting closer liaison between the two movements 75 . Indeed, the civil 
unrest of 1922 illustrates the severity of local tensions and the inflammatory 
combination of industrial relations, political tensions and economic hardship. 
Nevertheless, the level of solidarity that evolved in the town during these years was 
outstanding. The success of UWM initiatives and the desperate situation of the town 
attracted influential and respected moderates to their ranks. In addition to further 
bolstering the legitimacy of the organisation, the broadening base of its membership 
further demonstrates that shared hardships and a comnon struggle created a strong 
sense of unity and purpose within the community. It can be argued that a shared 
economic threat stimulated the development of a cohesive communal identity, and the 
actions of the Board of Guardians in particular demonstrate that Barrow shared the 
tendency of radical communities to unite behind those best able to defend them against 
a common enemy. 
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Thus the levels of stability and order were remarkable and demonstrate the degree of 
cohesion within Barrow society at this time, in addition to which Barrow has significant 
similarities with 'Little Moscows'. The people of the town never surrendered to their 
condition, and as a result of the rejection of the stigma attached to poor relief and 
solidarity in support of their workless, morale remained much higher than in many other 
hard-pressed localities. In addition to the strength of the radical Left, another important 
characteristic was the democratic thread that ran through these communities, the 
adoption of open and collective decision making, and a willingness to challenge 
authority in defence of basic rights which infused the local authorities themselves. 
Finally, Macintyre argues that the attempt to enact a socialist lifestyle through 
fellowship, co-operation and mutual support is a major defining characteristic of such 
communities. However, given the exclusion of the radical Left and Moderate control of 
local authority bodies, this might appear unlikely in Barrow. On the other hand, a 
majority of Barrow's Moderates were in fact Labour Party defectors and the original 
left-wing of the town's militant labour movement. It can therefore be argued that these 
Moderates did not abandon their socialist ideals when they left the Labour Party. 
Certainly, the forces of anti-Communism were not the forces of working class 
oppression in Barrow. 
The radical metamorphosis which took place in Barrow during these years is further 
emphasised by comparison with Middlesbrough, which despite its similar social 
structure and industrial base, was the political antithesis of Barrow. Middlesbrough's 
lack of militancy was evident throughout the community, from the labour movement to 
the local authorities, and the absence of a determination to fight was evident in the 
passive response to Ministry of Health dictates and the increasingly impoverished 
conditions of the unemployed. This was clearly reflected in the poor health of the 
Borough, which contrasts dramatically with the position in Barrow. Indeed, the good 
health of the Borough throughout the 1920s can be seen as the tangible result of the 
policies of the Corporation and the Board of Guardians. These, together with the 
success of charity, the strategies of the Co-op and the work of the UWM, combined to 
supplement basic incomes and were sufficient to sustain the health improvements of the 
war years. 
To summarise the changes in Barrow between 1914 and 1926, despite perennially poor 
housing conditions and little change to the occupational structure, the town nevertheless 
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experienced radical change, social attitudes in the Barrow of 1926 being far removed 
from those of 1914. The impact of war was confined to an intensification of the housing 
problem alongside a temporary boost to the incomes of much of the working class, 
which was reflected in new consumption patterns. But whilst this affluence proved 
transient, the considerable health gains of the war were sustained throughout the 
depressed years of the 1920s. Indeed, although the war had fuelled antagonisms within 
the middle class, the depression had the greater and more far reaching impact, and the 
1920s were characterised by the evolution of reciprocal relationships and a common 
identity based on a shared struggle rather than class conflict. 
Barrow's outstanding achievements - political and social stability, its stand against the 
government, the degree of social cohesion and co-operation, and particularly the 
evolution of the town's extraordinary mentality, place Barrow firmly among the ranks 
of the 'Little Moscows' of the period. However, these developments go beyond abstract 
concepts and academic debate, and as the health trends demonstrate, resulted in tangible 
benefits for the population, a quantifiable reality that enables the direct comparison with 
other localities. In addition to illustrating the distinctive nature of Barrow's post-war 
experiences, this case-study provides important insights and contributes to the better 
understanding of the impact of war and mass unemployment on the economy and social 
dynamics of a single industry town. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
BARROW-IN-FURNESS 1916 
Source: Ordnance Survey, Lancashire Sheet XXI N.E. 
Approximate scale: 3 inches to 1 mile 
KEY 
A Site of Abbotsmead estate 
BI Barrow Island 
H Hindpool 
HB High Level Bridge 
R Site of Roosecote estate 
V Vickerstown 
yE Vickers Engineering Works 
VS Vickers Shipbuilding 
WB Walney Bridge 
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